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I. Introduction 
Early in the Spring of 1950 an entirely new devel-
opment occurred in the fi eld of railway equipment financing. 
At that time, Thomas I. Parkinson, President of the Equita-
ble Life Assurance Society of the United States, announced 
a plan for the purchase of railway equipment by the insur-
ance company and the l easing of this equipment to the rail-
roads. 
At times in the past, railroads have found it 
nec essary or expedient to lease equipment from other rail-
roads or to enter into equipment trust or conditional sales 
agreements, under which instruments the title to the equip-
ment rested in another party until payment therefor was 
completed. The so-cal led Equitable Plan was the first case 
of an insurance company r e taining permanent o~~ership of 
railway equipment. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate all 
phases of this new, unusual development and to evaluate 
its long-term significance to three great industries: the 
railroad industry, suffering under the burden of insuffi-
cient and obsolete equipment, yet unable to purchase the 
new equipment it needs; the railroad equipment industry, 
victim of violent business fluctuations as a result of the 
railroads' hand-to-mouth equipment purchase policies; the 
insurance industry, seeking new avenues for the investment 
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of funds, under constant pressure from declining interest 
levels and shrinking areas for profitable investment. 
There is no dearth of printed information, both 
general and statistical, on the railroad industry. On the 
contrary, one of the principal chores of the railroad 
analyst is to separate the germane from the irrelevant in 
the great mass of data issued by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and other sources. In addition, numerous tech-
nical studies are available, dealing with the "how" of 
equipment service, maintenance and repair. However, not 
too much attention has been paid to the "why" involved in 
the decision on the part of railroad officials to recon-
struct over-age equipment. This decision is of crucial 
importance, for if it proves to be more economical to scrap 
all railway equipment over twenty years old, then the rail-
roads have a tremendous physical and financial problem on 
their doorstep. 
Railroad officials, themselves, are not in unani-
mous agreement over the merits of the Equitable Plan. As 
the preliminary interviews progressed, it became apparent 
that very little prior work had been done on the economic 
aspects of railway equipment age-life. Not too much is 
known about equipment servicing and maintenance costs by 
age of vehicle. Few statistics are available which would 
give any indication of the economic costs of obsolescence. 
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Among those most familiar with this whole question are the 
members of the investment staff of the Equitable Life 
Assurance Society, the railway car builders who have exe-
cuted manufacturers' agreements with the Equitable, and 
the railroads who have agreed to lease equipment from the 
insurance company. 
In pursuing this research, much of the material 
was provided through the interest and cooperation of sev-
eral businessmen, railroad officials, investment bankers, 
and other executives familiar with the problem under exami-
nation. Interviews were conducted with the following: 
Mr. Hunter Holding, Manager, and Mr. Hudson L. Whitenight, 
Assistant Manager, Railroad Securities Section of the 
Investment Division, Equitable Life Assurance Society; 
Mr. William C. Tabbert, Secretary and Treasurer, American 
Railway Car Institute; Mr. W. S. Trowbridge, Vice-President, 
Boston and Maine Railroad Company; Mr. V. S. Whitbeck, 
Railroad Analyst, Bank of New York and Fifth Avenue Bank; 
Mr. John Stevenson, Manager, Statistical Department, 
Salomon Brothers & Hutzler; Dr. James J. O'Leary, Director 
of Investment Research, Life Insurance Association of 
America; Mr. Fairman R. Dick, formerly Senior Partner of 
Dick and Merle-Smith; and Mr. Clair Pontius, Research 
Analyst and Partner, R. L. Day & Company. These men con-
tributed generously of their time and experience in dis-
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cussing the many ramifications of the Bquitable Plan, and 
their assistance was of the gr eatest value. 
Thanks are particularly due to Mr. 1'homas I. 
Parkinson, President, ~quitable Life Assur2nce Society, who 
granted the writer permission to refer to records and inter-
view personnel of the company. ·without his cooperation, it 
would have been most difficult to secure the information 
essential to the completion of this study. 
In approaching a. thesis of this sort, whicn deals 
with an entirely new development in the fi eld of busine s s 
economics, it is most importan t to consider the problem in 
all its phases before attempting to weigh its importance. 
Therefore, this study will cover the following : irst, the 
historical background from point of 'Ti ew of all parties; 
second, a detailed discussion of the Equitable Plan; third, 
an analysis of the economic effects of the Plan; fourth, a 
discussion of the advantage s and disadvantages of the Plan; 
fifth, a summary of the financing which has been completed 
under the Plan; and, finally, an evaluation of its signi-
ficance. 
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II. Historical Background 
A. The Railroad Industry 
1. Growth of American ~usin~ 
A century a.go, this country's population was small, 
and its frontiers seemed boundless. Its vast resourc es were 
soon to be exploited in a fashion destined to bring grea t er 
prosperity than had ever before been attained. Its people 
were uni que in th eir energy in searching for new ideas and 
their capaciVJ for tr ansforming those ideas into pr actica l 
realities. Individuals were free to seelc their oV'm fi elds 
of endeavor and to profit in proportion to their efforts. 
They believed tha t people v;ere governed best who vvere gov-
erned l east, and the country's industries thrived in this 
political clima te. V~ i th political freedom and economic fr ee -
dom going hand in hand, it is little wonder tha t men of good 
spirit were able to mak e the most of the country' s tr emen-
dous pot entialities. 
2. Growth and Problems of the Railroads 
The invention of the steam engine and the develop-
ment of the railroads played a tremendo us role in the growth 
of America. How great a role, is a matter of historical 
fact which need not be discussed here. It suffic e s to say 
that the building of American railroads was instrumental in 
forming the character of the United States as wefind it . 
today , with over 150 mill ion people spread across the f a c e 
6 
of a continent, linked by the bands of steel which are the 
sinews of commerce and industry. The building of the multi-
billion dollar railroad industry required tremendous 
amounts of capital. It required a tremendous expansion of 
the nation's industrial capacity to meet its demands for 
steel, for equipment, and for supplies. The demand for 
capital also required the confidence of hundreds and thous-
ands of investors, large and small. This confidence was 
maintained for quite a time, as one profitable year succeed-
ed another. At one time, railroad securities were the 
"blue chips" among all investments. They were held in such 
high esteem that the railroads were able to issue stock and 
sell long-term obligations at premium rates. 
The debt structure of many a railroad was expanded 
beyond the point of prudence on the theory that the industry 
was 11 depression-proofn. Through all the years of railroad 
profits, railroad management and railroad investors alike 
consistently failed to give due consideration to the possi-
bility of a change in the level of prosperity. It was only 
about a quarter of a century between the day when the rail-
roads enjoyed the greatest public esteem and the dark days 
of the 'thirties when over half of the nation's major rail-
roads were either in bankruptcy or on the verge of it. 
Many factors entered into the switch from profits to defi-
cits. Competition from other forms of transportation was 
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one important factor, as were increasing labor costs, overuse 
of roads and equipment during World War I, declining traffic 
from the downward trend in the business cycle, shortsighted 
management policies in some cases, and top-heavy capitaliza-
tions. Bankruptcy, defaulted bonds, deficits, reorganiza-
tions, trusteeships -- these are no conditions to encourage 
investor confidence. A whole school of thought sprang up 
during the 'thirties that the railroads were doomed, that 
air and highway transportation would skim off all the profit-
able traffic, that this industry was in the midst of a long-
term decline leading to abandonment. 
The fallacy of this line of thought was clearly 
shown upon the entry of the United States into World War II. 
There is little doubt in anyone's mind, now, that the rail-
roads are an essential industry in this country's economy, 
in peace and in war. The nation must have adequate trans-
portation in order to continue to live, grow, and develop. 
The railroad industry is similar in some ways to certain 
other mass-production industries. The railroads have a 
tremendous capital investment, large overhead, high labor 
component, and high operational costs. Under these condi-
tions, the "break-even" point is bound to be rigid, and the 
railroads must look for a generally high level of business 
activity before they can expect to produce much in the way 
of earnings for their stockholders. 
8 
3. Traffic 
The foregoing paragraphs have been concerned with 
the financial ups and downs of the railroads of this country. 
The picture is not so gloomy when one considers t he physical 
volume of trade handled, shown in Chart 1. Going back to 
the year 1911, somewhat more than 900 million tons of reve-
nue freight were originated.* Traffic increased during the 
years of World War I to a peak of nearly 1.3 billion tons in 
1918, suffered somewhat in the postwar period, dropped to 
950 million tons in 1921, and then showed recovery as gener-
al prosperity improved. The average of revenue freight 
originated for the four years, 1926 through 1929, of all 
Class I railways was about 1.3 billion tons. A decline 
occurred in subsequent years to the low point in 1932, when 
only about 650 million tons were carried. Thereafter, a 
steady improvement occurred, through 1937, when 1 billion 
tons were carried. 1938 showed a steady decline to under 
800 million tons; then, as the tempo of industrial activity 
increased with the threat, and eventually the actuality, of 
World War II, railroad freight business also improved. 
1944 was the peak war year, when the railroads carried near-
ly 1.5 billion tons of revenue freight. 
The postwar period shows additional fluctuations 
of similar degree, but there is nothing in the picture which 
* 6, p. 15. 
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would suggest that plenty of business does not exist for the 
American railroads, unless general business is abnormally 
deflated. The fact is that, while other forms of transpor-
tation have increased their tonnage handled, and have done 
so at a faster rate than have the railroads, the railroads 
have sti l l been severe l y t ested in periods of good business 
activity in th eir abili~ to hand+e all the traffic that 
has been offered to them. 
In good times, the public demand for railroad ser-
vic es is tremendous. In 1950, the volume of freight traffic, 
measured in ton-miles, was greater than at any time in his-
tory except for the years 1942 to 1948, inclusive.* As 
evidenced in Chart 1, the long-term growth in fr eight tonnage 
has b een paralleled by the increase in revenue ton-miles, and 
has been accompanied by an increase in the average l ength of 
haul. f he inroads by compe ting forms of transportat i on have 
been most serious in the short-haul and l.c.l. traffic, while 
the railroads have better than held their own, percentage-
wise , where heavy items must be hauled long distances. This 
situation is reflected in the fairly steady up-tr end in the 
average length of haul per ton, which has increased from 
about 325 miles in 1930 to over 400 miles. 
Proceeding to Chart 2, it is also interesting to 
note tha t in spite of competition, the ton-miles of fr ei ght 
* 16, p. 137. 
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CHART 2 
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carried has increased over t he years in relation to the pop-
ulation of the country.* If one overlooks the drop in the 
ton-miles of freight per capita which occurred during the 
'thirties, this r a tio has more than held its m-vn in the pas t 
thirty years . It increased from approx i mately 3,000 to 4,000 
ton-miles during the prosperity of the 'twenties, dropped to 
about 2,000 in 1932, rose to about 3,000 in 1937, and then , 
after a minor dip in 1938, increased to over 5,300 in the 
peak war years. Since the war there has been a drop to 
approximately the 4,000 l evel. Operating r evenues per dollar 
of national income , on t he other hand, sho·w a steady decline 
from 1921's peak figure of just over 10 cents to the pre sent 
level of under 5 cents. It seems r a ther obvious that the 
r ailroads a re doing more for more people for less compensa-
tion. 
4 . Revenues and ~arnings 
As shovm in Table I, total opera ting r evenues of 
all Class I Bailway s increased from ~ 5.5 billion in 1921 to 
a figure which averaged over $ 6.2 billion in t h e late 'tvien-
ties and then declined to a low of $3.1 billion in 1933. 
Thereafter a gradual improvement occurred, with revenues 
r eaching ~4 .2 billion in 1937, dropping to ~3.6 billion in 
1938, and incr easing to a war-time peak of $9.4 bill ion in 
1944 . In t he post-war period, revenues reached a n ew high 
* 6' p. 21. 
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TABLE I 
SELECTED INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS 
OF CLASS I RAILWAYS 1 _1220 to 1942* 
In Million~ of Dollar~ 
Operating Operating Operating Net Operating 
Revenues l!':xJ2enses Incomg Income Ratio 
1920 :jji6,178 $5,828 $ 17 $430 94% 
1921 5,516 4,563 601 314 83 
1922 5,559 4,414 760 369 79 
1923 6,289 4,895 962 555 78 
1924 5,921 4,508 974 558 76 
1925 6,123 4',537 1,121 701 74 
1926 6,383 4,669 1,213 809 73 
1927 6,136 4,574 1,068 673 75 
1928 6,112 4,428 1,173 787 72 
1929 6,280 4,506 1,252 897 72 
1930 5,281 2,930 869 524 74 
1931 4,188 3,224 526 135 77 
1932 3,127 2,403 326 d 139 77 
1933 3,095 2,249 474 d 5 73 
1934 3,272 2,442 463 d 17 75 
1935 3,452 2,593 500 8 75 
1936 4,053 2,931 667 165 72 
1937 4,166 3,119 590 98 75 
1938 3,565 2,722 373 d 123 76 
19.39 3,995 2,918 589 93 73 
1940 4,297 3,089 682 189 72 
1941 5,347 3,664 998 500 69 
1942 7,466 4,601 1,485 901 62 
1943 9,055 5,657 1,360 873 62 
1944 9,437 6,282 1,106 667' 67 
1945 8,902 7,052 852 450 79 
1946 7,627 6,358 619 287 83 
1947 8,685 6,797 781 478 78 
1948 9,671 7,472 1,002 698 77 
1949 8,580 6,892 686 438 80 
* 24, p. a6. 
of $9.7 billion in 1948, declined to $8.6 billion in 1949, 
and presumably exceeded $9 bill ion in 1950. !able I clear-
ly demonstrates the effect upon revenues of the cyclical 
fluctuations in traffic shown in Chart 1.* 
Railroad expense s t end to be somewhat less flexi-
ble than would be desired in a situa tion where revenues are 
subject to vdde fluctuations. ·rotal operating expenses re-
mained at approximately $4.6 billion throughout the 'twenties. 
This condition resulted in a decline of the operating ratio 
from 83% in 1921 to 72% in 1929, and an increase in net 
railway opera ting income from $601 million in 1921 to 
$1,252 million in 1929. 
In hard times, railway expens es are subject to 
some reduction, of course, sinc e lower business means lower 
wag e and operating costs. In addition, operating income 
can be impro ved to a limited extent by deferring maintenance 
expenditures. In spite of such economies, during the 
'thirties the operating ratio ranged between 73% and 77%. 
Net railway operating income varied between $326 million 
and $869 mill ion during those years. 
During World War II, extremely heavy demand for 
vital transportation service gave the railroads an oppor-
tunity to make their best financial showing. Peak utiliza-
tion of railroad facilities lowered the operating ratio to 
* Supra, p. 10. 
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62% in 1942 and 1943, and produced the highest levels of net · 
railway operating income in railroad history. This was 
achieved in spite of tax accruals three and four t imes great-
er than in the late 'twenties. 
In the post-war period, following removal of the 
war-time controls which had aided in keeping dovm many rail-
way expenses, the railroads found themselves unable to con-
tinue thi s excellent record. The operating ratio stood at 
79%, 83%, 78%, 77%, and 80%, during the years 1945-1949, 
respectively. Operating income was $852 mil lion, $619 million, 
$781 million, $1.0 billion, and $686 million in t hose same 
years. 
These figures are indicative of the general finan-
cial health of the Class I railways during the 'forties, but 
do not tell the whole story as far as railroad owners are 
concerned. Due to the heavy senior capitalizations built up 
in previous years by most railroads, the owners of the capi-
tal stock have felt the full effect of the fluctuations 
which have occurred during the past thirty years. The stock-
holders saw net income slide from the 1929 peak of $897 mil-
lion to the low point in 1932, when a deficit of $139 million 
was reported. For the years 1931 to 1939, inclusive, aggre-
gate net income amounted to only a little over $200 million, 
and deficits were reported for the group of Class I railways 
in four years. However, the t win factors of higher revenue s 
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and a lower operating ratio produced a better picture during 
the 'forties, vd th net income ranging from a high of $901 
million in 1942 to a low of $287 million in 1946. 
5. ~ of Return 
Among the provisions of the Transportation Act of 
1920 was . the following statement of instructions to the 
I.C.C.: "In the exercise of its power to prescribe just 
and reasonable rat es, the Commission shall initiate, modify, 
establish or adjust such rates so that carriers a s a whole 
(or as a whole in each of such rate groups or territories 
as the Commission may from time to time designate) will, 
under honest, efficient, and economical management and 
reasonable exp enditures for maintenance of way, structures 
and equipment, earn an aggregate net railway operating in-
come equal, or nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the 
aggregate value of the railway property of such carriers 
held for and used in the service of transportation: pro-
vided that the Commission shall have reasonable latitude 
to modify or adjust any particular rate which it may find 
to be unjust or unreasonable, and t o prescribe different 
rates for different sections of the country."* 
It is thus apparent that there is nothing in the 
instructions of Congress which places the I.C.C. under the 
obligation to regulate the railroads' rates to such an 
* l, p. 18. 
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extent that this industry should suffer from financial star-
vation. The Con~ission, itself, in various statements from 
time to time, has paid lip service to the idea of permitting 
the railr oads to earn a fair return. It is axiomatic that 
any industry must earn a fair return if it is to survive. 
In the long run, no private ; corporation can continue to 
secure fund s from the investing public if it cannot generate 
sufficient earnings to make the ownership of the equity 
attractive, over a long period of years. There are many 
cyclical industri es in this country, and the market values 
of common stocks of corporations in those industries under-
go violent fluctuations. Nevertheless, in most of these 
cases the heavy profits of the boom years furnish a suffi-
cient incentive to stockholders to maintain their O\vner-
ship when the industry is operating at a low level. Also, 
prosperity profits may be r etained in part, so that cash 
reserves may be built up, in anticipation of the lean years 
when loss es will occur. 
According to Table II, the rate of return upon 
the net property investment of Class I railroads certainly 
shows little evidence of prosperity profits. 
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Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
Rate 
.2. 87% 
3 .59% 
4.33% 
4.23% 
4 . 74r~ 
4 .99% 
4.30% 
4 .65% 
4. 84% 
3.30% 
2.00% 
1.38% 
2.03% 
1.79% 
1.94% 
~rABLE II 
RATE OF RETURI~ OF 
CLASS I RAILROADS , 1921-1949* 
Year Rate 
1936 2.87% 
1937 2.54% 
1938 1.61% 
1939 2.55% 
1940 2 • 93?o 
1941 4.28% 
1942 6 .30% 
1943 5.71% 
1944 4 .71% 
1945 3 • 777o 
1946 2 .75% 
1947 3. 417t 
1948 4 .24% 
1949 2.85% 
At the time the 1'r anspor t ation Act was put into 
effect, the I. C. C. s e t the "fair return" at 6/{, for the 
years 1920 and 1921, and t hen reduced it to 5 3/4%.** In 
t he Bmergency Tr ansportation Act of 1933 , the percentage 
figure was eliminated, perhaps because it vas a source of 
embarrassment to the Commiss ion that such a disparity should 
exist betw·een the rate of r eturn which it admi tted wa s f a ir 
and the rate of return which it actua l ly allowed the rail-
ro ads to earn during the 'twenties . In 1937 the Commission 
issued a sta tement to the effect that a "fair return" 
* 24, p. a 13. 
-)Hf- 1, pp . 16-19. 
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was that return which would attract equity capital,* and 
this definition was reasonable enough. The Commi ssion 
showed little inclination to practice what it preached, 
when it came to granting the railroads the permission to 
charge rates and operate under conditions which would pro-
duce any such return. 
Many railroads have sought increased r a tes from 
time to time since the early 'twenties~ During the 'twen-
ties the Commission's refusal to establish higher rates 
seemed to be based generally upon the reasoning that the 
railroads were earning "good money" and that no dire emer-
gency existed . In the early 'thirties, the I.C.C. refused 
to grant rate increases because there ~ a dire emergency: 
namely, the depression. In the late 'thirties, no general 
increase in rates sufficient to produce a fair return was 
permitted, because the consensus was that the middle 'thir-
ties had been unduly depressed and that freight traffic was 
bound to improve.** During the early war y ears, rates were 
generall y maintained at their then present level because 
the increased traffic was more than adequate to take care 
-
of the increased expenses. Whatever the reason, the fact 
remains that in only one year, 1942, has the rate of return 
exceeded 6%, which the I.C.C. originally established as a 
* 6, p. 2. 
*-* 6, p. 10. 
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"fair return". 
Actually, as a 11 fair return" is that return which 
is sufficient to attract capital in private capital markets, 
it is highly doubtful whether 6~G for the railroads would be 
adequate for this purpose. The past thirty years have pro-
duced an earnings history under I.C.C. regulations which 
furnishes little encouragement to a prospective i nvestor. 
The return on property in the case of industrial corpora-
tions is generall y well in excess of 6% on the average, a 
return adequate to cushion the business against cyclical 
fluctuations. The public utilities industry, regulated as 
clos ely as the railroad industry, has had far less diffi-
culty than the railroads in obtaining rate increases to 
compensate for increased costs. Even during inflationary 
periods, the rate of r eturn of the utility industry has 
been maintained, with the aid of intell igent regulation, 
at levels sufficient to attract large quantities of new 
equity capital. State and Federal utility commissions 
appear to have had a muc.h clearer understanding of the facts 
of financial life than have their counterparts in the field 
of railroad r egulations. 
Many authoriti es on the national transportation 
problem have argued that the rail roads were in no position 
to request or obtain rate increases in view of the inroads 
upon railroad traffic made by trucks, pipe lines, air 
traffic, and private transportation. The arguments were 
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that the railroads were losing traffic and that an increase 
in rates mi ght do more harm than good; tha t is, that the 
higher rates would drive away traffic in amounts more than 
sufficient to offset the increased r evenues on traffic re-
tained. There is no doubt that efforts to divert traffic 
away from the railroads have been made by many competing 
forms of transportation, some of which have had the benefit 
of continuing direct and indirect subsidy. There is little 
doubt that I.C. C. has often been subjected in rat e h earings 
to considerable political pressure from customers of the 
railroad.* 
There are many competitive industries in this 
country, but there are very few industries where the rate 
of return is driven down by competition to the level of 
earnings which has been the lot of the railr oad industry. 
lf competition were as severe as this would indicate , there 
would be no conceivable need for the I.C.C. or other agen-
cies to put a ceil ing on railroad rates . Over the years 
since the various competing forms of trans por tation came 
into the picture, it has become increasingly apparent that 
each provides transporta tion service for certain t ypes of 
commodities for which it is particularly well suited. Rail-
roads will continue to provide essential transportation ser-
vice for a very large part of the people and products enter-
-* 1, pp. 32-33. 
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ing into the flow of the nation's economy. 
In the period since World War II, the I.C.C. has 
granted numerous rate increases. It presumably has been 
acting in the public interest in subjecting applications 
for rate increases to careful revi ew. The delays involved 
have usually meant that the railroads must apply for addi-
tional increases before the I.C.C. has acted on t he first 
application. It appears to be a continual proc ess of 11 t oo 
little, and too late". Rate increases permitted since the 
war have not even been adequate to cover the cost of wage 
increases granted by Government wage boards, to say nothing 
of meeting the increases in the other cos ts of running a 
railroad system. 
6. Bfficiency 
It may be r easonably stated that American r a ilroad 
management has done a good job in the past thirty years in 
improving the efficiency and economy of railroad oper a tions. 
As Chart 3 shows, there has been a cons istent improvement 
in the service which they offer, in spite of the difficul-
ties faced by manag ement in an industry earning inadequate 
returns. l'hey have increased the . net tons per train; they 
have increased very substantially the net ton-miles per 
train hour, as well as the car-miles per car day. Improve-
ment is also shown over the period 1920 to 1947 in cars per 
train, train speed , locomotive-miles per day, and gros s 
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CHART 3 
OPERATING AVERAGES * INDICES OF EFFICIENT RAILROAD OP E RATIONS 
RA ILWAYS OF CLASS I 
FREIGHT SERVICE AVERAGES 
NET TONS I NET TONS NET TON · MILES CAR · MILES PER CARS TRA IN YEAR PE'I PER PER CAR DAY PER TRAIN SPEED 
LOADED CAR TRA IN TRA IN HOUR Strv •ctoblt Core CE•cl Caboose) ( M •I et per Hou r) 
19 2 0 29.3 708 7,303 27.0 356 10 .3 
192 1 276 65 1 7,506 a8 374 11 5 
'922 269 676 7,479 269 375 Ill 
1923 279 713 7,770 303 390 109 
1924 27 0 7 15 8,222 29 I 407 11 5 
1925 27 0 744 8 ,773 308 42.8 11 8 
1926 27 4 772 9,20 1 326 442 1 9 
1927 27 2 777 9,583 32 2 45.5 123 
1928 26 7 792 10, 183 33.3 47 1 129 
1929 2 6.9 8 0 4 10,580 34.4 476 13.2 
1930 267 784 10,836 305 47.9 13.8 
1931 25.7 733 10,825 266 469 148 
1932 249 663 10,265 22.2 43.8 15 5 
1933 256 699 10,974 247 44.8 15 7 
19M 256 706 11,225 283 453 15.9 
1935 26.0 734 11,67 1 30.0 454 160 
1936 268 774 12, 146 35.3 45.8 15 8 
1937 27 1 796 12,695 366 466 16 1 
1938 26. 1 759 12,473 32.3 47 1 166 
1939 269 8 13 13,450 364 48.5 16 7 
1940 276 849 14,028 38.9 497 16 7 
1941 285 915 14,930 43.7 503 165 
1942 3 1 8 1,035 16,1 32 41l8 5 1 8 15 8 
1943 333 1,1 1 6 16,997 5 10 521 15 4 
1944 32 7 1,139 17,623 5 19 530 15 7 
1945 32.2 1,129 17,482 493 52 2 15 7 
1946 3 1 3 1,086 17 ,1 7 3 45.2 5 1 8 160 
1947 326 1,146 18, 126 41l8 529 16 0 
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ton-miles ner ton of fuel. Passenger train averages show 
declining trends from 1920 to the bottom of the depression, 
but have i mproved since that time. The improvement in 
train speeds and train loads means fast er service to the 
public and more efficient use of available equipment. 
This improvement in fr eight and passenger service, 
as shown in the preceding statistics, has exc eeded the addi-
tions to railway operating personnel. Chart 4 shows the 
great increase in the freight and traffic ~nits hauled per 
employee as the result of improved methods, better equip-
ment, and careful management. 
Improved passenger service has been accompanied 
by a better safety record, as demonstrat ed in Chart 5. 
Improvements have been made in way and structures through 
automatic block signals, automatic controlling _and signal-
ling devices, heavier rails, grouting, and elimination of 
grade crossings. ·rhe record of railr oad operations during 
the past t hirty years indicates clearly that railroad manage-
1 ment and railroad ownership have attempted to operate in the 
best interests of the general public and the industry. 
7. Equipment Situation 
The railroad industry came out of World War I 
with a large portion of old, damag ed, badly worn equipment. 
During the industrial expansion of the 'twentles, the 
industry purchased and reserviced a great many freight cars. 
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CHART 4 
TON-MILES HAULED PER EMPLOYEE 
TRAFFIC UNITS• HAULED PER EMPLOYEE** 
• (ton miles plus twice passenger miles) 
Class I Railways 
Per employee 
700 ,000r--------,--------.---------,--------,--------,-------~ 
TRAFFIC UNITS HAULED PER EMPLOYEE 
100,000 t-----+-----r------+-----+-------1----~ 
OL-------~------~--------L-------~------~------~ 
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 
Source • Calculated From Data In "Railroad Transportation" AAR No11 1947 
Note • Employees include all cateQorles -administrative, clerical, maintenance , and transportation, 
including those in passenger service . 
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CHART 5 . 
PASSENGER FATALITIES 
.PER BILLION PASSENGER MILES* 
(includ1ng passengers on tra1ns and travelers not on lra1ns and subsequent Fatal1t1es of InJur ed) 
Class I,II,and ill Ra1lways 
6 .0 
5 .0 
4 .0 
3.0 
2 .0 
1.0 
0 .0 
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 19415 19150 
Source I GG . Accident Bullet i n 
As the _'twenties progressed, the freight car shortag es were 
replaced with freight car surpluses. 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
TABLE III 
SUMMARY OF FREIGHT CAR SURPLUS AND SHORTAGE 
OF CLASS I RAILROADS, 1920 to 1949* 
Net Daily Average 
Surplus or (Shortage) 
(69,432) 
322,565 
135,970 
30,848 
235,402 
238,503 
204,768 
260,789 
281,445 
233,808 
456,378 
611,953 
694,022 
516,284 
363,813 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Net Daily Average 
Surplus or (Shortagel 
283,430 
163,522 
143,402 
258,224 
167,980 
131,052 
79,610 
60,031 
37,202 
14,174 
3,225 
10,397 
(18,672) 
6,558 
78,741 
These are average figures and serve only to hint 
at some of the equipment problems which beset rai lroad 
management. Freight cars are usually either in short supply 
or oversupply, since a t emporary surplus may exist in one 
section of the country, while a drastic car shortage pre-
sents a problem somewhere else. 'The railroads went into 
the ~hirties owning over 2.3 mill ion freight cars, many of 
* 19, P• 35. 
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them over-age and in need of repairs. Railr oad traffic was 
insufficient to utilize this number of cars, and railroad 
earnings were insuffici'en t to permit a proper standard of 
maintenanc e and repl acement. During the early 'thirties 
a good deal of rolling stock wa s taken out of service , prin-
cipall y the oldest, smallest, and l east efficient unit s . 
Between the end of 1929 and the end of 193 6, ne t retir ements 
of equipment for all railroads amounted to over 540,000 
fr ei ght cars and 12,000 passeng er cars.* While the figures 
show large surpluses of rolling stock in the late 'twenties, 
nevertheless it appears fairly certain that, allowing for 
increases in the efficiency of railr oad operations and in-
creases in demand for r ailroad service due to population 
growth, a substantial deficiency had occurred in all t ypes 
of rail road equipment by the end of 1936. 
fhe following quota tion is pertinent: "In a study 
published in 1940 by the Brookings Institute conc erning 
capital expansion and economic stability, the following 
conclusions wer e drawn concerning the railroad problem in 
the United States. 'A very substantial part of the railway 
plant and equipment of the country is in need of r eplace-
ment in the interest of decreasing costs. Gr eat improve-
ments have been made in the last decade in the tractive 
power of engines and i n the capacity and serviceability of 
* 19, pp. 1, 45. 
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other roll ing stock. 'I'here i s , . for example , a vast amount 
of obsolesc enc e in box cars as a result of chang es which 
have cccurred in the kind of freight servic e demanded. 
The present box cars are not well suited for many commodi-
ties and they do not offer protection against shocks when 
opera t ed a t the high speeds now r equired by shi ppers. f he 
increase in the weight and speed of engines and trains 
results in greater wear and t ear on roadbeds, nec essitating 
greater maintenance of way and structures. In addition, 
vast capital expenditures are still to be made in connection 
with the el imination of grade crossings, the reduction of 
curves and gradients, and the readjustment and r eorganiza-
tion of t er minal facilities.'"* 
I n the treatise from which the preceding quota-
tion was drawn, the author went on to point out th~t in 
1939, 25% of the freight cars were over t wenty-five ye a rs 
old ; another 25% wer e t wenty-one to twenty-five years old; 
17% were s ixteen to t wenty y ears old; and only 9% were 
under five year s old. With a box car havi ng only fifteen 
to ei ghteen years of ordinary service expectancy before it 
needs a compl e te overhaul tantamount to rebuilding , it was 
app ar ent that at that time well over half of the exi s ting 
suppl y of frei ght cars were at the a ge of retir ement. In 
the case of steam locomotives, the number of tractive units 
* 3, p. 14. 
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t wenty or more years old runounted to 69% of the total, with 
thirty years being described as the generally accepted aver-
ag e service expectancy. Some 28% of the serviceable loco-
motives were at that time in excess of the accepted fi gure. 
What is the situation at the present? As of 
January 1, 1950, in Chart 6 it is shown that 17% of frei ght 
cars in service were one to five years old; some 15% were 
six to ten years old; about 9% were eleven to fifteen years 
old; 6% were sixteen to twenty years old; about 18% were 
t wenty-one to twenty-five years old; 16% were t wenty-six to 
thirty years old; and nearly 19% were over· thirty years old. 
Far from showing an improved position by virtue of the bet-
ter .earnings pictUre of the 'forties , the perc entage of 
freight cars over t wenty years of age incr eased from 45% 
in 1939 to 53% in 1950. However, a somewhat larger pro-
portion was of recent constructi on than in the earlier 
period . It is signific ant that these conditions existed 
after ten years of considerable activity in the frei ght car 
cons truction field, during a period in which annual output 
for domestic use ranged between 31,000 and 113,000 units, 
including shop output.* 
The general custom in railroad circles is to make 
the decision to scrap or rebuild a freight car when it comes 
into the railroad maintenance shop for its t hird wheel-
*19, p. 13. 
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CHART 6 
AGE OF FREIGHT CARRYING CARS USED IN INTERCHANGE SERVICE* 
17) 7 •. 
1 r..l S YUIS OlD 
14 . 10 ·.~ 
6 TO 10 YIE .U S OlD 
Bt.•n 
a.ss ·• 
II TO 15 YEAIS OlD 
149,901 
J04 ,SII 
Owned or Leased by Class I Railroads 
January 1, 1950 
lesetl - Dele Originally lullt 
TOTAL OWNED 1,752,940 
A VIR AGE AGE 19.43 YEA liS 
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change, according to W. C. Tabbert of the American Railway 
Car Institute. The standard box car is equipped with whe els 
which, under ordinary usage, give service for some five to 
six thousand miles. Depending on the condition of the box 
car, the backlog of activity in the repair shops, the 
shortage or surplus of serviceable freight cars, the finan-
cial condition of the railroad -- at the time of inspection 
prior to the third wheel-change, the freight car may either 
be rebuilt, sold to another railroad, or sold for scrap. 
Locomotives, too, come in for this sort of inspection at 
or near the end of their normal service expectancy. 
There is little doubt that the rebuilding process 
extends the life of equipment at a lower immediate cash out-
lay than would be incurred in purchasing new eQuipment. It 
is anomalous that in times of inflation the expense of re-
building over-age and decrepit pieces of equipment may 
actually exceed t he original cost of that equipment. Also, 
it must be taken into consideration that the rebuilt equip-
ment, though apparently cos ting perhaps half as much as new 
equipment, wil l still be far out of date , will not embody 
the improvements which a modern piece of equipment would 
have, and may, actually, be obsolete. Furthermore, though 
there is much disagreement on this point among railroad 
people, the cost of maintaining and repairing rebuilt equip-
ment may, and often does, exceed the carrying charges on 
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new equipment costing considerably more. It goes without 
saying that the railroad which spends good money to rebuild 
obsolete equipment is being 11 Penny wise and Pound foolish." 
Even the bankrupt railroads of the 'thirties under-
stood tha t their eventual recovery depended on their becom-
ing mor e efficient. Whil e in the hand s of receivers, many 
bankrupt roads were able to spend large sums on Dies eliza-
tion and general modernization programs, and most of the 
reorganization of roads emerged from receivership with 
railroad oper a tions vastly improved by these progr ams. 
The equipment situation at the pre·sent, with re-
spect to tractive power, is as follows: As of January 1, 
1950, equipment aged from one to ten years amounted to 
30.0% of the total: 5.7% was eleven to t wenty years old; 
23.9% was twenty-one to thirty years old; and 40.4% was 
over thirty years old.* These figures show good improve-
ment over the decade, with a particular increase in the 
11modern11 category, for at the end of 1938 les·s than 5% 
were under ten years of age. fhe rapid Dieselization of 
recent y ears accounts for the improvement in the percent-
ages. f h e average age of tractive equipment will decline 
fairly fast as the over-age steam locomotives continue to 
be r etired. It should also be r emembered that modern loco-
motives, amounting to 30% of the total number of tractive 
* 26, p. H-199. 
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units, handle a much larger percentage of total ton-miles 
of freight than their numbers would indicate. 
In the case· of passenger train cars ovmed or 
leased by Class I railroads and the Pullman Company, Chart 
7 shows that on January 1, 1950, less than 26% were twenty-
one to t wenty-five years old, 14% were twenty-six to thirty 
years old, and almost 38% were over thirty years old. 
While this might seem to be a startling condition, it 
would come as no surprise to the traveling public, which 
has had to contend vdth wretched service on all too many 
scheduled passenger runs for entirely too long a period of 
time. 
In evaluating the information on age of railway 
equipment, it should be remembered that a program of re-
placing old equipment would not require the purchase of 
the same number of units as were being retired. Modern 
box cars and pas senger cars are larger, stronger, and 
capable of carrying heavier loads at higher speeds. The 
replacement of reciprocating steam locomotives with Diesel 
units would be even more advantageous, for the modern 
Diesel-electric locomotive can handle far more tonnage 
than the old steam engine can. 
8. Eauipment Requirements 
It is largely an academic exercise to estimate 
how much money the railroads would need if they attempted 
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CHART 1 
AGE OF PASSENGER TRAIN CARS* 
Owned or Leased by Class I Railroads and Pullman Company 
January 1, 1950 
4 .S7 -:. 
Ba•ed on Date Originally Built 
1 .67 ,.. 
1 TO S YEAU OLD 
3 ,114 
6 TO 10 YIAU OLD 
2 ,014 
4 . 11 ... 
II TO 15 YEARS OLD 
1,147 
5 . 57 ,.. 
16 TO 20 YEAIS OLD 
2 ,457 
25 .4 2 % 
21 TO 2S YEAIS OLD 
11 ,21' 
TOTAL OWNED 44,115 
AVERAGE AGE 25 .99 YEARS 
1 3 .• 1 % 
76 TO JO YEARS OLD 
6 , 13t 
;6 
to replace completely their over-age equipment. It is 
interesting to study, however, the sums involved in any 
large scale modernization effort. One authority* estimated 
that the effort would cost about $1.2 bill ion a year above 
the mere costs of maintenance necessary in operating with-
out the improvements. He based his figures on the situa-
tion as it was on January 1, 1948 and assumed a minimum 
modernization program under which all equipment over t wenty 
years of age would be r eplaced over a period of t en years. 
Breaking this down by classes for the full ten years, this 
program would mean the following expenditures, at 1948 
prices: 
Locomotives 
Freight cars 
Passenger cars 
Total 
$ 4.5 
5.4 
2.5 
$12.4 
billions 
" If 
II 
The same source estimated that another $4.4 bill ion could 
profitably be spent on the improvement of track, yards, 
stations, signal systems, and other equipment. 
A program of this sort woul d call for t he increas e 
in annual r a te of freight car production to over 130,000 and 
a pr oduction increase to nearly 2,000 Diesel locomotives and 
3,600 new passenger cars in each year of the ten-year period. 
As stated before, not too much· emphasis can be placed on 
dollar e stimates because it is impossible to predict the 
course of future events with enough accuracy for such a long 
* 6, p. 55. 
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period. fhe estimates do, however, underscore the magnitude 
of the problem. In retrospect, it would have been an excel-
l ent thing for this country if such a program had been 
carried out during the 'thirties, for it is a fact of recent 
history that the nation's transportation facilities were 
tremendously overtaxed during World War II (though without 
the chaos which occurred during the first World War). 
We are now engaged in a sta te of active war 
(euphemistically dubbed ''defense mobilization"), and once 
again we must utilize equipment which should have been cut 
up for scrap years ago. This situation is partly due to 
the timidity of railroad management, which has looked upon 
every dip in business as the beginning of another great 
depression. Railroad executives have bent every effort to 
avoid the freight car surpluses which dragged them down in 
the early 'thirties. On the other hand, if the railroads 
had not had to contend with perpetual financial· starvation, 
railroad management might have been more willing to prepare 
for the time when transportation services would be in great-
er demand. 
9. Summary 
The foregoing story of the American railroads 
examines many of the factors which entered into the deteri-
oration of railroad credit from its once excellent position. 
The Aaa railroad bond today is a rarity, and the railroad 
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credits which inves t ors irtsisting upon high quality are 
willing to accept w-l.thout question can be numbered on the 
fingers of both hand s . 1'he few nblue chip'' roads have been 
favored by territory, traffic and extraordinary circum-
stances over a long period of time, and they have been able 
to produc e satisfactory returns on their plant under the 
revenoo schedules permitted by the I.C.C. These roads are 
the exception. ~hey have had the earning power to aggres-
sively exploit the improvements and developments in rail-
road science, improvements which in turn brought increased 
efficiency and earning power. The oil-rich Union Pacific, 
which has enjoyed high investment esteem for years, has had 
no problem in keeping it s equipment modernized. ~he Atchi-
son, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway, s erving the booming 
Southwest, has profited as the general development of its 
territory increased the tonnag e and long-haul frei ght 
originating on its lines. The Atchison, like the Union 
Pacific, has financed its equipment purchas es from its own 
cash resources. Over the years, under efficient management, 
it has developed into what many consider to be t he world's 
finest transporta tion property. 
As for the other American r ailroads, it is the 
rare case which does not find the railr oad s eeking out the 
capital market s in search of fund s to finance badl y needed 
equipment purchases. In a good many cases, the railroads 
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have had subnormal earning power for so long that in spite 
of good war-time business they have been unable to build 
up their working capital to a point where they even feel 
they can afford the customary "down payment" on equipment 
purchases. It is these roads, the once-mighty eastern 
carriers -- the Pennsylvania, the New York Central, and 
others -- which have felt the pressing demands for new 
rolling stock and the even more pressing pinch for funds. 
The great majori~ of American railroads have found it 
necessary to exploit every possible method whereby they 
might achieve the efficiency which has been denied them 
by the years of financial starvation. It is these rail-
roads which were seeking the new idea to help them out of 
the hole , and their managements listened willingly to the 
proponents of the new idea in equipment financing . 
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B. The Railway Equipment Industry 
1. Characteristics .of Capital Good~ Industries 
It is axiomatic in the field of business that the 
capital goods industries profit most during periods of 
prosperity and suffer most during periods of depression. 
Clearly, the total demand for goods and services depends 
upon the capacity and the will ingness on the part of con-
sumers to spend for consumption. In perious of general 
prosperity, the facilities of manufacturers of consumer 
goods are expanded to meet the high level of consumer de-
mand. 1'hese facilitie s -- plants, machinery, etc. -- are 
built up through purchases from the various capital goods 
industries. As the prosperity reaches its peak, manu-
facturers of consumer goods find that their facilities 
are adequate to take care of total demand, and hence they 
cease their expansion. The resultant effect is a sharp 
cutback in the orders and sales of the capital goods inaus-
tries, which are thus the first to feel the pinch of the 
oncoming business decline. 
As total demand slacks off, most manufacturing 
establishments find themselves with excess capacity. This 
may not be of crucial importance to the manufacturer of 
consumer goods, since he may be able to contract his opera-
tions gradually to the level of then-present consumer de-
mand. By general economy and by curtailing the use of his 
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oldest and least efficient facilitie s , he may still be able 
to produce profitably at the lower level of economic acti-
vity. It is obvious, however, that he will have little 1.1se 
for new capital goods, unless shifts in demand or develop-
ment of entirely new techniques render obsolescent the tools 
and equipment he is presently using. 
However, to the manufacturer of capital goods the 
advent of a business slump does not mean a slackening of 
d emand and a lower level of profits. It may well mean a 
complete cessation of demand and an end to profits. In 
nearly all capital goods industries, the products manu-
factured are highly specialized, constructed to order, often 
"big-ticket" i t erns of great size and complexity . 1'he f acili-
ties of the capital goods industri es must be sui ted to the 
production of manufacturers' equipment and usually require 
a relatively heavy investment in plant and heavy-duty mach-
inery adaptable to the production of other machinery. The 
compound effect of ·sharply reduced revenues and continuing 
heavy fixed overhead co sts has a drastic i mpact on t h e in-
come statement. 
On the uptr end, the process reverses. At the 
bottom of the depression, spending commences to pick up. 
Manufacturers of consumer goods have trL~ed their facili-
ties to the most efficient level. Noting the pick-up in 
sales, they put any idle facilities to work and place 
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orders for new equipment. It is often the anticipa tion of 
increased business that causes initial orders to be placed 
with the durabl e good s builders as a business cycle r eache s 
its turning point. The production statistics of the durable 
goods industri es are hence highly regarded as bus iness indi-
cators, keys to coming events i n the business cycle. 
The following t able r a ther clearly indicates from 
a statistical standpoint the relative varia tion in the out-
put r a t e of the durable goods versus non-durable goods (i. e ., 
capital goods versus consumer goods) manufacturing industries: 
TABLE IV 
F£l.;D}!;R.AL Rl!:SERVE INDEX OF 
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION* 
Year Durable Non-Durable Year Durable Non-Durable 
1919 84 62 1936 108 100 
1920 93 60 1937 122 106 
1921 53 57 1938 78 95 
1922 81 67 1939 109 109 
1923 103 72 1940 139 115 
1924 95 69 1941 201 142 
1925 107 76 1942 279 158 
1926 114 79 1943 360 176 
1927 107 83 1944 353 171 
1928 117 85 1945 274 166 
1929 132 93 1946 192 165 
1930 98 84 1947 220 172 
1931 67 79 1948 225 177 
1932 41 70 1949 202 168 
1933 54 79 1950p 237 187 
1934 65 81 
1935 83 90 p -- preliminary figures 
* 20, p. 313. 
43 
During the thirty years covered by this table, 
there were three depression periods of major consequence: 
1920-22, 1931-33, and 1937-38. (There was also considerable 
readjustment in the eighteen-month period following the end 
of World War II, but this adjustment occurred in a piece-
meal fashion, industry by industry, with rising business 
in some quarters offsetting declines in others so that the 
over-all statistical average remained quite steady.) 
Examination shows that in each case the production drop in 
bad times was far more severe in the case of the durable 
goods manufacturers, and that their subsequent recovery 
attained greater heights. For instance, between 1929 and 
1932, the durable goods index declined 69% and the consumer 
goods index declined 25%; between 1932 and 1937, the durable 
goods index increased 198% and the non-durable goods index 
increased 52%. 
The record would be even more convincing if time 
permitted the examination of these statistics on a quarter-
ly or monthly basis. Such a study would show more clearly 
the precipitous fashion in which changes in activity occur 
in the heavy goods line. The railway equipment industry 
belongs with the durable goods group and, particularly on 
the 11 down" side, shares its characteristics to an advanced 
degree. This latter phenomenon is partly due to the atti-
tude of railroad management, who are often accused of having 
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a "disaster complex", using the slightest indication of 
possible future trouble as an excuse to curtail expansion 
and mod ernization of railroad plant. If this 'be a true 
accusation, the fault lies less with railroad management 
than with the years of basic earnings deficiency suffered 
by this industry.* 
2. Eguipment Deliveries 
The greatest activity in the railroad industry 
occurred during the second decade of this century. Refer-
ring to Table V, it will be noted that in 1913 over 176,000 
freight cars were built for use by American railroads. Con-
struction figures dropped somewhat during World War I under 
the impact of material shortages but picked up again in the 
middle 'twenties, with the industry reaching an output of 
175,000 units, 114,000 units, and 106,000 units in 1923, 
1924, and 1925, respectively. Output then declined through 
1928, when 46,000 units were built; a level of 81,000 cars 
was reached in 1929. 
Following the peak of prosperity, output declined 
rapidly, reaching a low of some 2,000 cars in 1933. It is 
of interest that fewer than 100,000 cars were built in the 
aggregate during the years 1931 to 1936, inclusive. In 
1937, some 77,000 cars were delivered to the railroads, but 
in the following year the figure dropped below 17,000. f he 
* Supra, pp. 13-17. 
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TABLE V 
FREIGHT CARS IN THE UNITED STATES* 
Includes Non-Revenue Cars 
CLASS II, Ill TOTAL PRIVATE CARS CARS 
YEAR CLASS I an d ALL OWNED TOTAL RETIH E I>t INSTALLED t CA~ RAILROADS SW.&TERM. RAILROADS (Uaed in CARS Ciani Ciani BUll Jntercbanre) Railroad• R ailroada 
1911 2,145,050 92,328 2,237,378 ··· · ·· · ·· - -·~ ..... ......... ........... .... 68,0 3 1 125,5 32 68,S 
1912 2,168,223 89,421 2,257,644 
·················· 
........................ 69,876 97,9 72 148.~ 
1913 2,237,446 89,681 2,327,127 
---··············· 
........................ 96,825 162,670 I 76,( 
1914 2,291, 7'50 87,451 2, 3 79,20 I ................ ... ........... ............. 96,985 150,813 97,t 
1915 2,286, 792 83,740 2,370,5 32 
··········-······· ······· ···· ···-·-······· 
90,347 86,012 58,2 
1916 2,280,955 77,214 2,358,169 
····-············· 
......................... I 09,996 88,254 \\ u 
1917 2.330,123 78,395 2,408,518 
···········-·-··· 
........... .............. 62,25 3 117,210 115,i 
1918 2,354.244 7.3,216 2,42 7,460 
··· ·· ······ · --· · ·· ········· ·············· 
56,024 65,249 67,( 
1919 2,389,860 66,747 2,456,607 ............... .. . 
························ 
43,274 76,019 94,S 
1920 2,3 50, 707 67,292 2,417,999 187,000 2,604,999 75,197 36,044 60,S 
1921 2,344. 780 63,817 2,408,597 189,090 2,597,687 69,245 63,406 40,2 
1922 2,322.286 60,050 2,382,336 203,372 2,585, 708 126,471 105,394 66.2 
1923 2,345,591 64,486 2,410,077 25 7,234 2,667,311 213,789 232,060 I 75,7 
1924 2"379,096 63,909 2,443,005 264,674 2, 707,679 118,590 156,5 72 113,7 
1925 2,387,551 5 7,85 7 2.445,408 269,376 2, 714,784 128,5 73 139,083 105,j 
1926 2,378,947 56,322 2,435,269 288,603 2,723,872 103,152 93,369 88,8 
1927 2,3 54,884 54,980 2,409,864 288,446 2,698,.31 0 96,991 73,254 63,3 
1928 2,327,518 50,121 2,377,639 288,592 2,666,231 90,707 62,945 46,(] 
1929 2,306,804 47,114 2.353,918 286,979 2,640,897 115,869 94,946 81,5 
1930 2,305 , 741 46,305 2,352,046 291,822 2,643,868 82,101 81,038 74,9 
1931 2.229,845 45,292 2.275,137 314,386 2,589,523 82,828 14,910 13.2 
1932 2.172.414 40,852 2,213,266 323,323 2,536,589 69,394 8,545 3,2 
1933 2,061.331 38,617 2,099,948 311,732 2,411,680 117,268 6.410 2.1 
1934 1,963,672 35,714 1,999,386 306,664 2,306,050 129,026 31,366 25,1 
1935 1,859,945 32,430 1,892,375 295,664 2,188,039 122,346 18.496 7.~ 
1936 1.781,217 32,620 1,813,837 287,662 2,101.499 131,754 75,979 46.~ 
1937 1, 766,512 33,374 1,799,886 290,668 2,090,554 105,324 91 . 128 77,4 
1938 1. 721.998 32,162 1,754, 160 285,069 2,039,229 70,235 25,721 16,4 
1939 1,671,712 31,256 1,702,968 281,186 1,984,154 82,274 31,421 25.1 
1940 1,675,080 31.307 1. 706,387 281.214 1,987,601 72 ,030 75,397 62,3 
1941 1, 725.437 30,161 1, 755,598 281,780 2,037,378 40,781 90,668 80,6 
1942 1,769,120 29,027 1. 798, 147 274,219 2,072,366 25,925 69,608 62,8 
1943 I. 780,520 28,919 1,809,439 272,740 2,082,179 26,086 37,510 31,8 
1944 1. 794, 1 35 28.272 1,822.407 270,936 2,093,343 30,987 44,654 43,(] 
1945 1,784,674 27,597 1.812,271 268.109 2,080,380 51,348 41.887 43,8 
1946 1.767,162 26,182 1,793,344 262,039 2,055,383 70,8 13 52.603 41.9 
1947 1. 758,144 26,372 1,784,516 265 ,2 50 2,049,766 70,382 61,182 68,5 
1948 1, 783,363 26,364 1,809,727 266,731 2,076,458 75,655 100,781 112,6 
1949 1. 777,661 25.893 1.803,554 266,102 2,069,656 106,010 100,331 92,5 
..... ................... ! --- - - -Averages ...... .... ........ 
·····-··········· ·· ··-····-··· ······ · ·· ·· ···-····· ········· 87,045 79. 139 69,5 
• Include• Canadian cara. 
t Source I. C. C.- Includes cnro Leased, Rebuilt and Reclnuified. 
Note: For curr~nt de taila nf cara Reti red and lnatallcd aee pa•~• -42 and 43. 
industry's output then increased until the year 1941, when 
81,000 cars were built. During the years 1942 to 1945, in-
clusive, output ranged between 31,000 and 63,000 cars. 
There is no question as to the value of transporta tion faci-
lities during; a war, yet due to shortages of materials and 
manpower the equipment companies did not make the most of 
the tight freight car situation. 'l'he post-war period saw 
an increase in car deliveries, with over 112,000 delivered 
in 1948 and some 92,000 delivered in 1949. 
3. Equipment Orders 
This production record is spotty, to say the least. 
It should be remembered " that the railway equipment factory 
is, in essence, a 11 job-shop". It produces rolling stock 
to order, upon specifications furnished by the purchaser. 
In the past there has been no such thing as a standard box 
car, hopper car, or flat car, mass-produced and sold at 
retail or wholesale to any interested railroad. 'h e rail-
roads, rather, have called the turn on amounts and types 
of equipment, and they have not had the capacity nor the 
inclination to buy as much as was actually needed to conduct 
thei r operations a t top efficiency. 
The manufacture and delivery of transportation 
equipment is dependent upon the orders for such equipment. 
What, then, is the history of orders for the output of the 
freight car manufacturers? Referring again to fable V, we 
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find tha t in 1913 more than 194,000 cars were ordered , a 
record fi gure. Orders were at an extremely high l evel for 
a number of years, averaging over 160,000 car s during the 
y ears 1913 through 1918, inclusive. 
Orders were dropped below 19,000 cars in 1919, 
compar ed to 110,000 cars in f918. During the 'twenties, 
frei ght car orders exceeded 100,000 units in 1922, 1924, 
a nd 1929. A r apid cur t ailment of car building t ook place 
in the 'thirties, with only 1,900 cars ordered in 1932, 
1,700 in 1933, and an average of slightly over 46,000 cars 
per year for the balance of the 'thirties. The carbuilding 
industry improved in 1940 and 1941, with orders for 66,000 
and 107,000 units in those years, respectively. During 
each of the other war years an average of about 40,000 
cars were ordered, due to the limited quantities of mater-
ials and manpower. Some pickup occurred in 1946 and 1947, 
when orders were placed for 67,000 and 120,000 cars, re-
spectively. But in 1948 only 95,000 cars were ordered , 
and in 1949 this figure dropped precipitously to 6,223 cars. 
It is worthy of mention that the problems of the 
equipment manufacturers are aggravated by the construction 
of new railway cars in railr oad maintenance shop s . f hese 
depots are equipped to perform all kinds of heavy repairs 
and are used largel y f or this purpose and for rebuilding 
old equipment in good times. However, when business is 
slack, the facilities of many of the larger railroads are 
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capable of producing a large portion of any new equipment 
that may be needed. Referring to Table VI, it takes l ittle 
imagination to see how the equipment manufacturers were hit 
by t h is policy between World Wars I and II. 
TABLE VI 
PERC~NTAGE OF FR~IGHT CARS 
ORDERED IN RAILROAD AND 
PRIVATE LINE SHOPS, 1918 to 1939* 
Year Per Cent Year Per Cent 
1918 2.73 1929 11.71 
1919 8.00 1930 27. 46 
1920 7.71 1931 57.18 
1921 3.93 1932 82.62 
1922 3.81 1933 43.08 
1923 11.62 1934 32.28 
1924 6.39 1935 42.99 
1925 10.33 1936 20.67 
1926 18.46 1937 30.50 
1927 16.96 1938 12.39 
1928 21.11 1939 26.94 
As one of industry's leaders** has pointed out, 
nearly everyone regarded as an expert in the railroad fi eld 
including r ailroad men, financial men, equipment ma.nufactur-
ers, I. C.C. representatives, executives of t h e Office of 
Defense Transportation, etc. -- has r epeatedl y underscored 
the bas ic fact: a huge deficiency has existed in modern 
railroad equipment for a period of some t wenty years.-~** 
* 19, p. 4. 
** 10, p. 452. 
*~* cf. ante, pp. 35-38. 
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To rectify this situation, it calls for a carbuilding program 
of a magnitude estimated by various sources at from 10,000 
to 15,000 cars per month! (This, one must understand, was 
the weight of competent opinion in a year in which some 500 
cars per month were actually ordered.) 
For the moment, put yourself into the position of 
the president of a car manufacturing company, keeping in 
mind the over head costs involved in a h eavy plant i nvest-
ment. Then look at Chart 8. Try to visualize the problems 
of scheduling plant faciliti es, finances, and personnel at 
both executive and operating level, to handle orders which 
may run to 20,000, 30,000, or 40,000 cars a month, as was 
the case in the early 'twenties. Then visualize the adjust-
ments necessary for survival, vvhen in the same .business one 
may have a period such as that betvreen March, 1929, and 
December, 1935, during which time monthly orders exc eeded 
2,000 cars only twice. Note, also, that in 1949 (which 
was a good year for general business), the volume of equip-
ment orders resembled the depressed 'thirties. 
4. .l:!.lnployment 
As a rough guide to the employment picture in 
this industry, the following table is indicative: 
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CHART 8 
FREIGHT CARS! ORDERED ~~ 
Ooto£STIC 
c--s ""~' 
-«1.000 
I 
1-'-- •• 
:!6.000 
--·- -
---
32.000 
--·-
-· 
28000 . --··· 
~-
2-4000 ~ - --
20000 II III 
* 19, p. 6. 
, 
8.000 
111;~-
,. -· •• !......- 11 111 I .J j ~ jl , I~~ .J I' Ullllllllll I u 'I.Ll I ,I I f------~ 
I I .:I I II ! II 
• '--r- 1 I l1 t '' J J. j 
f----. 
tl!ll...:..l I . I I I I j_ t------
J '1111 .l 
' 
I z ~- ..j ~ I l 
II ..• .,., • ..j Ul 
...........4--_ ~ . 
!!• I 2 f-.---;; . ..,....... .. 
- I 0 i-f· . - fit1-:- I lili I 
- I 
t 
I I I 
--'-- -----~ r-· ···-+ I i. I I I I I 
. 
I I II .,1 I I 
-- !l ' II ·-LLi · I f-···~~ ....... ·······=~ l 'l I . . .. I i _ .J li ·-- .l'' ..... j [ L I, !I ! ft t - .. i -·- --····.r J\ '..l. 
·+ 
I j_ 
-·· 
--· I{ \ \ I u:~~ ri ~ -·-· t---,...!_ .. f\ · -- -- ..... -- y ~ ll I ~i:~; 1::.--;.;.: . A& .. -·1\·. '#.A v .! lij! I ll' 'l4( '" .. VI ,....___ ... ~ ·~ '\ u - ~ 1-.y II'V"" tlf I'"'"" ~~ f&i > ~n~~~ ~mm~~ ~~IIi~~~§ ~~ 0 
19 4 7 I ~II. 19& G I 4 2 19 3 1944 19 4 5 I G4 6 
40000 
40.000 
36000 
~.000 
32000 
32.opo 
8.000 
28000 
4000 
2400 
20000 
20000 
6000 
16000 
2000 
12.000 
8000 
4 000 
4 .000 
0 
1920 
* 19, p. 
TABLE VII 
l!.:MPLOYMEN:I' STATIS1'ICS FOR THE 
LOCOMOTIVE AND LOCOMOTIVE PARTS INDUSTRY* 
All Employees £I:Qguction vi orkers 
Number Number Salaries Number Salaries 
of Estab- (Average & Wages (Average & Wages 
Year lishments for the _year) (OOO's) for the_xgarl_iQOO'sL 
1904 15 27,970 ~pl7 , 474 24, 806 $15,798 
1909 16 16,938 11, 211 14,909 8,914 
1914 19 19,047 13, 862 17, 391 11,085 
1919 17 28,741 43,577 26 ,71 5 18 ,799 
1921 22 18,327 24,576 16,583 20,473 
1923 19 33,583 58,591 30,672 51,867 
1925 18 14,673 23,456 12,809 18,219 
1927 17 14,611 22,632 12,961 17,648 
1929 16 12, 846 23,514 11,045 17,994 
1931 16 n. a~ . n. a . 5, 443 5,590 
1933 13 3,200 3,292 2,374 1 , 863 
1935 14 4,734 5,925 3,790 3,972 
1937 13 10,989 19,336 9,000 14,845 
1939 20 n.a. n.a. 10,486 23,450 
1947 36 30,337 97,608 25,368 78,131 
This table is concerned with a different section of 
the equipment industry than were the paragraphs on equipment 
orders and deliveries, and is inserted largely because of the 
availability of dependable statistics. It is safe to assume, 
however, that nearly all elements of the industry share a 
similar set of employment problems, with periodic layoffs of 
indeter minable duration. This might be expected to create 
worker dissatisfaction and a tendency for personnel to seek 
employment with somewhat mor e dependable tenure . However, 
* 29, p. 766. 
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the industry does not appear to have suffered unduly in this 
respect, in comparison with other heavy goods industries. 
5. Profits 
As would be expecte~, profits of the major rail-
way equipment producers fluctuate even more violently than 
sales, due to the large fixed overhead inherent to their 
opera tions. The following t able gives clear indication of 
t his profit position: 
TABLE VIII 
PERCENTAGE EABN~D ON N~T WORfH BY 
FIVE MAJOR RAILROAD ~QUIPMENt COMPANI~S~ 1919 to 1950* 
Year Per Cent Year Per Cent Year Per Cent 
1919 12.42% 1931 def. 1.20% 1941 8.83% 
1920 10.19 1932 def. 3.45 1942 7.44 
1921 4.95 1933 def. 3.36 1943 7.90 
1922 5.26 1934 def. 1.44 1944 8. 83 
1923 11.90 1935 def. 1.37 1945 7.96 
1924 8.21 1936 2.88 1946 6.38 
1925 6.48 1937 6.35 1947 8.64 
1926 9.06 1938 def. 0.91 1948 9.09 
1927 5.47 1939 1.56 1949 8.2.1 
1928 4.93 1940 6.48 1950 (9 mo.) 6.36 
1929 7.33 def . - de f ici t 1930 5.20 
Note that the percentag e earned on net worth shows 
a declining trend . ~ven in the good years, the 1919 record 
was never again touched. Note also t hese percentages: 
1923, 11.90%; 1926, 9.06%; 1929, 7.33%; 1937, 6.35%. 1he 
record of the 'twenties shows quite clearly t he effect of 
* 2L 
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I. 
the decline in orders for new equipment as the decade pro-
gressed. In that period, a period of general prosperity, 
the industry suffered a declining trend of business because 
the railroad industry was permitting the average age of its 
equipment to advance. Then crune the 'thirties , with rail-
road income f alling to such a low point that orders for new 
equipment were held to a minimum. The war years brought a 
measure of recovery, but the industry could not realize 
fully the profit potentialities because of material alloca-
tions , diversion of facilities to war production, and excess 
profits taxes. In the post-war period, there was a large 
order backlog for nearly all types of rolling stock. In 
what would normally have been a "sel lers' market", however, 
the equipment companies were concerned primarily with utili-
zing their manufacturing capacity which had been expanded 
for war production and bid keenly on the new contracts, with 
tha result that the profit picture was not particularly 
glowing: 
TABLE IX 
PERC~NfAGE OF NBT INCOME tO SALES OF 
FIVE MAJOR RAILROAD EQUIPMENT COMPANIES, 1936 to 1950* 
Year Per Cent Year Per Cent Year Per Cent 
1936 12.63% 1941 7.96% 1946 7.85% 
1937 12.10 1942 5.02 1947 8.19 
1938 3.86 1943 4.15 1948 8.25 
1939 10.70 1944 4.06 1949 " 6.90 
1940 11.68 1945 4.97 1950 5.87 
* 21 
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6. Economic Position 
The railroad equipment industry appear s on balance 
to have a gen eral ly unsatisfactory earnings picture, with 
most of the bad f eatures of the "boom and bust" capital 
goods industries, without the compens ating profit position 
on the "up-side" enjoyed by other s in the heavy goods line. 
The economic position might well be s ummed up with the fol-
lowing quot ation: "On the whole , t he past performance record 
of the r ailroad equipment industry has been poor (i. e ., from 
a stockholder's viewpoint). It is, of cour s e , d ependent 
upon the prosperity of the r ailr oads which it serves and, 
if railroad earnings are poor, the equipment busine s s suf-
fer s . Aside from this, the background of five y ears of 
losses following 1929 and another smal~ loss i n the mild 
depression of 1938 indicate how sensitive t hi s busines s is 
to general conditions. Over-all prosperity is a nec essity 
to the achievement of reasonable earnings and, as a conse-
quence, the percentag e of profit earned on net worth over 
the .years has been substantially l ess than in bus ines s as 
a whole."* 
* 22 
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c. The Life Insurance Industry 
1. Growth of Life Insurance 
Since the turn of the century , lif e insur ance has 
played an increasingly large part in the savings programs of 
Americ an families. The speculative exc esses of t he 1920's 
brought eventual disillusionment . to many indivi duals who had 
been holders of equiti es and accelerated the tr end towards 
institutionalized savings. There is an increasing r ealiza-
tion on the part of savers that preservation of capital values 
is of primary i mportance, especially to the so-called "small" 
saver. The preference on the part of savers for l ife insur-
ance, government bonds, and savings accoun·t s , r a t her than 
o~mership of corporate securities, attests to this fact. 
The $214 billion of life insurance in forc e a t the 
end of 1949 averaged nearly $5 ,000 per fami ly. Approximate-
ly eight out of ten United States families own some life 
insura nc e, and more famil i es own life insurance than own 
their o\vn homes, savings accounts, or savings bonds. Life 
insur ance ownershi p increased from some 14 million polici es 
in 1900 to over 193 mi l l ion policies at the end of 1949 . 
Ins uranc e coverage was only $7.7 billion in 1900, increased 
to $102 billion in 1929, fluctuated s omewhat during the 
'thirties, and increased from $115 billion in 1940 to the 
1949 level of $214 billion.* 
* 5, pp. 7-12. 
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2. Life Insurance Purchases 
Life insurance purchases totaled some $92 billion 
(face amount) in the four years, 1946-1949, inclusive, or 
almost as large an amount as during the previous eight years.* 
The sales figures are influenced by rapid expansion of 
group i nsur ance, which has been and will continue to be a 
factor of increasing importance, both to the insurance 
industry and to the laboring classes, for whose benefit 
insurance provisions are being incl uded in employment con-
tracts. Further stimulation has been given to insurance 
sales in recent years by the general level of prosperity. 
Some insurance purchases appear to be motivated by a desire 
to obtain an insurance contract with today 's 11 easy 11 dollars, 
in t he hope that the contract may become payable during 
harder times when dollars will be worth more. Ot h er in-
surance sales, particularly endowment insurance and con-
tracts dealing with retirement income , may be attributed 
to the desire on the part of insurance purchasers to pro-
vide for a given amount of purchas ing power; t he increased 
cost of living causes them to supplement earlier insurance 
purcha s es . 
3. Cr eation of Life Insura.nce Reserves 
Aside from the record of the insurance industry 
for outstanding security, the appeal of life insurance to 
* 5' p. 13. 
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a prospective saver is two-fold. First, in an ordinary 
savings pro gram, premature death may prevent the individual 
from sa1ring sufficient money to protect his dependents. 
Second, there is a human tendency to make current use of 
money supposedl y set aside for long-term savings. To a 
great extent, these two difficulties are overcome if sav-
ings take the form of life insurance. 
The latter f eature (namely, the "compulsory sav-
ing" aspect of life insurance) is not too widely understood. 
The premium which the ordinary life insurance policyholder 
pays periodically is of a different character than the 
premium paid by the holder of a fire or casualty insurance 
policy. The fire insurance premium, basically, covers the 
natural cost of the insurance (i.e., the policyholder's 
shar e of the losses suffered from fires during the period 
concerned) plus the exp enses of s elling and servicing this 
typ e of insur ance. The excess over the cost of the insur-
ance i s r eturned, in large part, to the payer of the premium 
at the end of the ins urance year. The life insurance premi-
um covers the mor tality cost and s elling and servicing 
cost; but, in addition, it includes an amount which is 
added to a r eserve for additional protection for the policy 
of the individual who pays the premium. This reserve is 
akin to a savings account, in that the money in effect 
belongs to the policyholder. 1.'he insurance company guaran-
tees to add annually to this accumulating reserve at rate 
5& 
specified in the insur ance contract. lhe policyholder is 
entitled to borrow from this reserve if he has t emporary 
us e for the funds. He may apply this reserve to the pay-
ment of current premiums if he is t emporarily out of fund s 
and w~she s to maintain his insurance. He may receive a 
so-called "cash surrender value 11 paid from this reserve, 
in the event that he t erminates the insurance contract 
before it matures. This savings funct i on has contributed 
to the ap peal of life insur ance to the American public. 
Policyholders' r eserves, which represent the funds held 
back of life insurance policies to assure future payments 
to policyholders and beneficiaries, totaled $51.5 billion 
at the end of 1949, and accounted for 86.5% of a_l life 
insuranc e assets.* 
4. Employment of Life Insurance Assets 
Life insurance assets have approximatel y doubled 
in every decade sinc e 1890, standing at !IP59.6 bil lion at 
the end of 1949.** Because of the guaranteed additions to 
policyholders' reserves, ~~* the insurance company is 
obliged to develop and maintain earnings to meet this obli-
gation, over and above the earnings neces sary to meet pay-
ments to policyholders and beneficiaries. Since the guar-
anteed interest factor is a significant portion of the cost 
of life insurance protection, and since premium payments, 
* 5, p. 47-9. 
** 5, p. 49. 
-*** Supra,pp. 56-57. 
alone, do not provide enough income to cover thi s factor, 
the employment of assets to earn a satisfactory rate is 
very important. 
The distribution of earning assets has shown 
considerable variation over the century of the industry's 
growth in the United States. As a matter of practical 
interest, where large concentrations of wealth ar e seeking 
investment outlets, the capital will usually be employed 
where the economic situation warrants. That is to say, 
when the railroad industry was going through its great 
period of expansion, insurance assets were heavily com-
mitted to this field; and when the electric utility indus-
try became an important factor in the economic picture and 
required large amounts of capital, the insurance industry 
took advantage of this opportunity to put its policyholders' 
funds to work for the benefit of the nation's economy. 
During World War II, the volume of 11 new money" corporate 
financing slackened off as the national effort required 
the channeling of funds to defense industries under the 
supervision of the government. During this period, insur-
ance company funds sought out the 5overnment bond markets. 
Sine e the -~'Var, large sums of insurance company money have 
found their way into the financing of the nation's expanded 
industrial capacity. Additional billions have gone into 
farm, home, and commercial mortgages, in concert with the 
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boom in construction. 
5. Limitations Qn Insurance Comnagy Investments 
This is not to imply that the demand for capital 
is the sole det erminant of where insurance company funds 
·shall be employed. In absolute terms, the limiting factors 
in insurance company investments are the laws of the sta tes 
in which insurance companies are organized and carrying on 
business, together with administration of the se lav· s by 
the commissioners of insur ance of the several s t a tes. fhe 
laws were formed in the public interest from time to time 
as the fact became apparent that these large concentra tions 
of wealth should be subjected to some supervision by repre-
sentatives of the public, just as are other funds held in 
trust. 
There is a moral and a practical obliga tion, as 
well as a legal obligation, on the part of insurance com-
panies to maintain a high ~uality of invested assets. fhe 
moral obligation concerns the use and treatment of other 
people's money, held for the eventual return to i ts o~ners 
in the form of mortality benefits. Such a grave responsi-
bility is to b e approached with the highest purpose. ~he 
practical requirement is to have assets of a quality high 
enough to preserve liquidity in time of crisis when policy-
holders may demand the return of their reserves in the 
form of cash surrenders and policy loans. Laws vary from 
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state to state, but in general they provide t hat the great 
bulk of reserves must be maintai ned in the obligations of 
responsible creditors. Liberalization in investment laws 
has occuxred from time to time as changing economic patterns 
have brought about the elevation to investment status of 
various industries which formerly were consider ed unsuitable. 
Limitations on insurance company investments are gradually 
being r emoved, when, as, and if warranted. 
6. Effect _ of _Decl ining Interest Rates 
At present there is a wide variety of avenues for 
investment open to insurance companies. fhis does not mean 
that all possible fi elds of investment are equally productive 
of income, or that investment s , in general, provide as good · 
a return as in earlier years. Since the turn of the century 
there has been considerable variation in the rate of inter-
est return obtainable on top-grade credits. Between 1915 
and 1932, high-grade bond yields varied from 4.7% to 6.2%, 
as Chart 9 indicates. However, commencing in 1932 and con-
tinuing until very recently, a steady decline in bond yields 
occurred. This tr end, r eflecting the Federal administr a tion's 
11 cheap-money 11 policy, was paralleled by a decline in t h e net 
rate s of interest earned on in,rested funds of life insurance 
companies. 
During t h is period of declining investment yields, 
insur ance companies were faced with the necessity of invest-
62 
Z}b 
1915 
* 27,1. 
** 5,p. 46. 
1920 
CHART 9 
INTEREST RETURN ON HIGH-GRADE CORPORATE BONDS 
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6% 
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ing newly r eceived funds at progressively lower rates. fhey 
also had to reinvest the proceeds thrust upon them as bonds 
owned by them were refunded prior to maturity by the issuing 
corporations taking advantage of lower interest rates. It 
is obvious that an insurance company cannot guarantee to pay 
a 4% return on funds given over to its control if it can 
onl y invest those funds at the going rate of 3;'o . Hence, 
there is a constant pressure upon the insurance companies 
to seek out the most profitable investment opportQDities, 
of course without sacrificing quality in favor of a specula-
tive return. In a period of declining interest rat es, the 
insurance company must either compensate for this feature 
through some spectacularly successful investment formula, 
or else arrange to write all new insurance contracts on a 
lower reserve basis, guar anteeing a lower rat e . Since 
there is a pr actical limit to the i mprovement possible over 
and above the level of general interest rates, it has been 
necessary that this latter policy be followed. 
7. Investment Polic2 
It goes without say ing that the i nvestment policy 
of an insurance company is based on the honest and pain-
stak ing effort of its directors and officers to provide 
the highest possible return on its investments co~nensurate 
with the ri sks involved in thos e investments, and to maintain 
at al l times a high degree of quality, on the aver age, 
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throughout the portfolio. In reaching this goal, the general 
rules for intelligent and prudent investment are followed: 
continuous study of industries and analysis of specific in-
vestments in those industries; investment timing; and diver-
sifica tion of risk. The continuous pursuit of safety and 
good return requires, above all things, not a static policy 
and a permanent portfolio; it requires a flexible policy 
adequate to cop e with the economic problems of this chang ing 
world. 
Do not misunderstand t lns point. Ins ur anc e com-
panies invest "for the long pull", buying for the most part 
long-term obligations of high credit obligors. fhis is 
entirely suitable in vi ew of the long-term nature of the 
relationship between insurance company and policyholder. 
The very large insurance company is particularly inc l ined 
to hold its security purchases to maturity, partly because 
of the difficulty of marketing huge quantities of bonds and 
partly because of the difficulty in finding suitable replace-
ments. However, wisdom demands that investment policy be 
flexible. The search must ever continue for new and more 
useful ways to put insurance company funds to work in the 
public good. Old values die, new values are created; es-
tablished industri es decline, n ew techniques fost er economic 
change. l'oday's investment research must be concerned with 
tomorrow's problems, and investment policy is shaped to that 
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end. 
It is true, of course , that the specific invest-
ment policies and actions vary from company to company with-
in the life insurance industry. This condition is inevitable, 
inasmuch as economics is an inexact science and investment 
is left up to human judgment. Life insurance investment 
persormel make no claim to be omniscient, nor do investment 
COTh~itt e es formed of life insurance company directors s how 
any t endency to give "rubber-stamp" approval to the recom-
mendations of investment personnel. Some companies are more 
aggressive than others in developing new investment outlets, 
or in seeking higher yielding investments. Some compani e s 
have been more successful than others in evaluating invest-
ment ri sks. On balance, the over-all record will bear up 
under the closest and most critical scrutiny. 
8 . Availability of Corporate Obligations 
Attention is called to the following table: 
'TABLE X 
CORPORAT~ FINANCING 
NEW CAPITAL OBTAINED THROUGH SALE OF BONDS AND NOTES* 
Year 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
Total 
Amount (Millions) 
$ 595.4 
889.3 
506.1 
286.1 
448.5 
-* 11, p. 71. 
Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Amount (Millions) 
$ 608.0 
2,084.1 
3,582.5 
5,280.1 
3,913.9 
$18,194.0 
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Sales of bonds and notes by U. S . corpor a tions 
for "new money" purpos es totaled $18.2 bill ion between 
January 1, 1940 and December 31, 1949. During the same 
period, assets of U. S . life insurance companies alone in-
crea sed $30. 3 billion. As sta ted earlier,* the gr ea t bulk 
of fund s neces sary for war-time expansion of productive 
capacity was provided by the government, both from borr owed 
fund s and out of tax proceeds. As government borrowi ng s e t 
the r a t e in the money market, t here wa s pressure upon corpo-
r a te interest rates and the progressive refm1ding of h i gher 
coupon corporat e obligations. Table X, of cours e , t akes no 
notice of the corpora te securiti es available to i nsurance 
compa nies as a result of such refundi ngs. fhe omission i s 
purpo s ef ul. Sinc e the ins uranc e companie s were t h e princi-
pal hold ers of a gre a t portion of t he refunded is sues, t hey 
general l y followed a policy of buying the refundi ng i s sues 
to repl a ce t he bond s taken away f rom t h em by call. 
Th e increas i ngl y short suppl y of corpora te obliga-
tions has resulted, over a period of time, in the absorption 
of t hi s t ype of investment by institutional inve s t ors . As 
Table XI shows, long-term corpor a t e debt wa s outstanding in 
the amount of $51.1 billion at the end of 1930. By t he end 
of 1948 t his figure had actually declined to $ 50.9 billion. 
This is the traditional ar ea of 11 supplyn in the equation in 
-:f- Supra, p. 60. 
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which is found institutional investment 11 demand li. DtU'ing 
the s ame period , life insurance a sse ts increased from $18.9 
billion to ~55.5 billion, and this r epres ents but one factor 
in the total demand. 
TABLE XI 
SELECTED FACTORS IN TH8 
SUPPLY AND D~D FOR 
CORPORATE AND MORTGAGE DEBT 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Sunp1y Factors Demand Factors 
Corpora te Non-Corporate Life 
Long-term Mortgage Insurance Savings 
Year Debt* Debt* Ass ets~<-* Depo s its-Y<--x--:<-
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 . 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
194 7 
1 948 
1949 
$ 51.1 
50.3 
49.2 
47.9 
44.6 
43.6 
42.5 
43.5 
44 .8 
44.4 
43.7 
43.6 
42.7 
41.0 
39.8 
38.3 
41.3 
46.1 
50.9 
54.4 
* 30, p. 10. 
-** 5, p. 48 
*-X-* 25, p. 101 
~ii42.1 
40.8 
38.6 
35.3 
34 .4 
33.5 
32.9 
32.7 
32.7 
32.9 
33.7 
34.8 
33.9 
32.6 
31.9 
32.5 
38.5 
44.8 
51.4 
56.9 
$18.9 
20.2 
20.8 
20.9 
21.8 
23.2 
24.9 
26.2 
27.8 
29.2 
30.8 
32.7 
34.9 
37.7 
41.1 
44.8 
48.2 
51.7 
55.5 
59.6 
$28.5 
28.2 
24.3 
21.1 
21. 8 
22.6 
23.5 
24.5 
24.6 
25.1 
25.7 
26.1 
25.5 
28.4 
33.4 
41.3 
48.5 
52.1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
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Thus it is shown quite conclusively that potential 
demand for .corporate and non-corporate mortgage debt is very 
large in relation to the supply thereof. These figures on 
debt do not, of course, illustrate the extent of all invest-
ment outlets available for institutional funds. For in-
stance, additional hundreds of billions of dollars in govern-
mental obligations (Federal, state, and local) were out-
standing during the period covered. Yet the search for the 
highest rate of return commensurate with the risk involved 
has directed and will continue to direct institutional funds 
into the fields of corporate bonds and non-corporat e mort-
gages. (The grow~ng assets of home loan bank and pension 
funds, not considered in the above figures, constitute 
other sources of demand in this market.) This market, 
namely, corporate bonds and non-corporate mortgages, con-
stitutes the natural outlet for institutional funds, and 
it quite obviously has fallen far short of supplying the 
institutional demand, entirely ap(3.rt from the demand on 
the part of individual investors. 
Further shrinkage on the available supply of corpo-
rate securities has been attributable to the increasing 
tendency on the part of major corporat i ons to finance a 
large part of their capital requirements from internal 
sources. Taking 1947 as an example, capital outlays by 
IT. S. corporations aggregated $26.5 billion, derived from 
69 
the fol l owing sources: ne t new capital issue s, $4 .0 bi llion; 
bank loans and mortgages, $3.5 bill ion; increase i n payables, 
$4.0 billion; reduction in liquid ass ets, $0.5 bil lion; 
depreciat~on provisions, $4.5 billion; and r e tai ned earn-
ings, $10.0 billion.* Note that the latter t wo items account 
for over 50% of the total. 
The month of April, 1951, has been mar ked by a 
reversal in the downward cour s e of interest r a tes. This 
reversal occurr ed upon the announc ement and carrying into 
ef fect of a change in the .F'ederal administra tion's monetary 
policy. (Between the beginning of World War II and 1951, 
Treasury and £i' ederal Reserve policy has called for the main-
tenance of markets for long-term government bonds at or above 
par.) f here was a brief opportunity to exchange Tr ea sury 
2 l/2s of the 1972 maturity for a 29-year 2 3/4% bond . This 
latter security is non-mar k etabl e, but is convertible a t the 
holder's option into a 5-year Treasury note bearing a 1 1/2% 
coupon. During the month, the yields on top-grade corpora te 
bonds have slipped 25 to 35 basis point s , i nfluenced partly 
by t his government action and partly by a rising demand for 
funds. 
It is far too early to tell with even fair accuracy 
whether a new trend is developing or whether this is a tempo-
r ary aberration in the long-term interest rate picture. The 
* 28, p. 12. 
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latter seems to be more likely. By fall, restrictions on 
materials and credit ~~11 do much to slow down the call for 
new money. On the other hand, institutional assets will 
continue to increase. It is difficult to see how the supply 
of high-grade obligations can outrun the institutional de-
mand for those obligations over the years. 
9. Growth of Private Financing 
The dwindling available supply of high-grade corpo-
rate obligations relative to the institutional demand there-
for is probably the most compelling cause for the increase 
in direct financing between corporate borrowers and insur-
ance company lenders.* fhis shrinkage of supply i s of 
serious concern to insurance company financial officers be-
cause of the quality standard applied to portfolio securi-
ties by the Committee on Valuation of Securities of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners on the annual 
occasion of the year-end report to the Commissioners by each 
insurance company. 
In brief, corporate obligations may be carri ed at 
amortized value (cos t less amortization of premium or plus 
accrual of discount) provided the issue is incl uded in any 
of the four highe st grades (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa) of any two 
recognized rating agencies.** If a corporate bond is not 
rated "Baa or bettern, it is stil l amortizabl e if its year-
* 
** 
31, p. 3 
Moody's, Fitch's, or Standard & Poor's bond ratin~ services 
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end market yield (effective yield to maturity based on 
market quotations as of December .31) is no greater than 
1.50% plus the market yield of taxable D. S. Treasury Bonds 
of comparable maturity. Non-amortizable bonds ( l ike pre-
ferred and common stocks) must be carried on the year-end 
statement at market value.* 
'It may readily be perceived that the presence in 
the portfolio of a large portion of non-amortizable securi-
ties introduces an element of fluctuation into l ife insur-
ance assets. Indi ~.ridual i nvestors who are famil i ar with 
the mechanics of market quotat i ons and are able to reg ard 
fluctuation in portfolio values with equanimity mi ght not 
be concerned if the assets of i nsur ance companies by which 
they were insured should show a fluctuation from year to 
y ear. However, the great majority of insurance company 
policyholders are not informed inves tors, and purchase life 
insurance for protection rather than profit. The insurance 
company's surplus account, which reflects fluctuation in 
market values, may thus become a source of concern to 
insur ance company policyholders, h ence to insurance company 
officers. 
It is possible (and it has occurred many times in 
the past) that an insurance company purchases non-amortiz-
able s acurities and, during the course of the _year, finds 
~(.. 2, -p. 23. 
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considerable appreci a tion in the market va l ue of t he se secu-
ritie s. 'l'his bring s a corresponding . absolute i ncreas e in 
the surplus account (which may also be a much l ar ger per-
c entage i ncrea se in the surplus account). This occur r ence, 
of cours e , would result in no criticism f rom policyholders. 
However, a t t he conc l usion of the subsequent year, marke t 
value s might have r evert ed to cost of the non-amor ti zable 
s ecuritie s . l!.;ven though this were a temporary f l uctua tion , 
and even t hough the value s were at or above original co s t, 
t he ch ange from the first to the second year would show a 
sizeable perc entage decrease i n the surplus account. This 
mi ght eng ender policyholder distrust and dissatisf action, 
however unwarrant ed ; thus it might ca use an increa s·e in t h e 
surrender r a t e , a cut i n sales, or both. The arbi trary 
valuation a t year en d of non-ruaorti zable securiti e s puts 
inve s tment offic ers a t the mercy of the caprices of the 
auction ma rket and, therefore, places a serious deterrent 
in t he way of holding large amount s of s ecurities of this 
t ype . 1'he insuranc e companies have , t herefore , mad e every 
effort to obt ain good-grade bonds in t he f a ce of t h e declin-
i ng availabi l ity of corpora t e s ecurities, a nd t hey h ave 
actively prosecuted the direct placement as an outle t for 
investment funds. 
Dir ect pla cement ·r efers to the procedur e in which 
the issuing corpora tion a nd t he institutional purcha s er deal 
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with ea ch other, some times with the aid of an i n t er medi ar y , 
in negotia ting the t er ms of a s ecurity issue. Title to the 
securities is taken dir ectly by the institutional investor 
or group of investors. Between 1900 and 1933, only about 
3% of all bonds , notes and debentures, totaling some $37 
billion, could be t er med priva te pla c ement s . Since 1934, 
however, the direct plac ement ha s loomed much mer ;;; i mportant 
in the over-all pictur e of corpora t e finance , accounting for 
between 9% and 50% in each of those years.* Some direct 
plac ements of pr eferred and common s tock s have been made, 
but they are not a significant factor in the gener a.l picture. 
Various reasons have been advanced for t he pheno-
menal increase in the volume in number of loans privately 
placed, but t wo of the se seem the most compelling . f he 
most important was the shortage of available high-grade bonds, 
relative to the demand therefor.~* The other was t h e enact-
ment of the Securities Act in 1933 , which ca used more t han a 
little dismay throughout industry, which makes an elabor ~te 
system of r eports and di sclosures pr erequisite to any public 
financing .*-** fhe cos t and the delay involved in meeting 
SEC requir ements made it a ttractive for corporation financial 
offic ers t o t a..ke t he s i mpl er me thod of dealing priva t ely with 
one agent or one company for the sal e of a bond i s sue , with 
a minimum of red t ape , l egal expens e , and delay. SBC regis-
~~ 31, p. 2 
** Supra, pp. 66-71. 
**-* 31, p • 3 • 
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tration of issue s to be publicly offered is cumber some , time-
consL1Tiling, and expensive. Due to the waiting per i od betvveen 
f iling and aut horizing, the issue is placed at the mercy of 
adverse marke t action during tha t time; Q~usually heavy f e e s 
for a ttorneys, accountant s , and others are involved , beca use 
of t he complication s and the vas t amounts of informa tion re-
quired. Trustee's f ees, if any trustee is involved , are high 
for · public issue. Additional expens es are involved for 
lis ting on stock ex chang es, tr ansferring and exchangi ng 
s ecurities, and publi s hing r edemp tion notic es . Direct pl a ce -
men t circumvent s a gr eat deal of t hi s cumber s ome mac hi nery. 
It offers a flexibility v~th reg ar d to t er ms accept able to 
both parties.* The insurance company is a financi ally ex -
perienced investor whose self-interest dicta t e s t he r each ing of 
a prompt mutual agr eement, soundly devised. 
Certain issuer s of securities are reluctant to 
furnish the volume of da t a r equir ed by the SEC, be caus e of 
t he us e t o which such information can be put by comp etitors. 
The trend i n financial reporting is right ly continuing in t he 
direc tion of full er and more widespread r elea se of informa tion. 
Never t hel ess, many companies pr efer t o ke ep the circulation 
of conf idential data to a mi ni mum, wher e such action will not 
injure t he general public. 
-* 31, p. 5. 
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When a giant corpora tion borrows many millions of 
dollars from a large insurance company, it may be assumed 
that the borrower has adequate financial advice. However, 
the smaller corporations may well benefit from the advice 
furnished by an institutional investor in the process of 
concluding a direct placement, and may also benefit over the 
longer period from the establishment of the lender-borrower 
r elationship. Much talk has occurred on the advisability of 
having i nsur ance companies thus gain influence over the 
affairs of a borrower. fhis is a debatable point, but the 
record indicates that most of the advice is aimed at pro-
moting healthy internal affairs in the borrowing corporation. 
This c an scarc el y be consi dered deleterious to the inter ests 
of either the s tockholder or the public. 
The advantages to a borrower are not without some 
comp ens a ting di sadvantages. Since a life i nsuranc e company 
customarily holds its bond s to maturity, the issuer of a 
private placement is confined in the retirement of the debt 
to the t erms of the a greement * and is unable to acquire 
bonds at a discount in a d epressed marke t (as he might be 
able to do witha public issue, provided he had the cash). 
Also, the loan agreement may well contain restrictive cove-
nants on corpor ate action which might be missing in a public 
issue. General ~-Y speaking, the large corporations can borrow 
on terms and at interest rates similar to what would be 
* 31, p. 6. 
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available to them in a public offering. Smaller corpora tions 
gen e.ral ly pay "some thing extra" for a private loan , perhaps 
as evidenced by a slightly shorter maturity, higher intere s t 
r a te, h eavi er sinking fund, or increased working capital re-
quir ement. ·The record indicates t hat such requirements even-
tually accrue to the benefit of the borrowing corpora t i on. 
The process of direct placement circumvents, to a 
large extent, the machinery of the investment banking system. 
Where private placements are negotia ted through an invest-
ment dealer, the latter is usuall y pa id a smaller f ee, be-
ca us e he does not tak e any underwriting risk.* Many invest-
ment banker s are now increasing their a ttempts to serve as 
middlemen in private loans, in return for which they receive 
a "finder's fee". This procedure is a far cry from the 
function traditionally performed by the investment banker, 
and it has contributed to the decline in the activity and 
profitability of this es s ential industry. f he inves tment 
bankers are thus doubly hit from the decline in the avail-
ability of corporate debt, underwriting a dwindling portion 
of a dwindl ing supply. If the investment banking industry 
shrink s because of a long-term trend of lean profits brough t 
on by increas ed private financing , the nation's economy may 
feel t he i mpact. However, it can scarc el y be argued that 
institutional investors do not act in the public interest 
* 31, p. ?. 
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in seeking actively to make direct placements, when such an 
overwhelmingly large portion of the public is composed of 
life insurance policyholders. The fact appears to be that 
a fundamental evolutionary change has occurred in the source 
of funds available for investment, and such changes general-
ly have side effects which necessitate adjustment on the 
part of many to the new conditions. 
It has been previously demonstrated that life in-
sur ance investment officers are unwilling to make too great 
a portion of their investment in non-amortizable securities, 
because of the potential effect of a fluctuating surplus.* 
Herein lies the reason for their desire to make high-grade 
direct loans. As in the case of marketable corporate securi-
ties holdings, decisions as to year-end valuations lie with 
the Committee on Valuations of Securities of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissions. Having no quoted 
market, valuations of these loans are dependent on the 
appraisal by the Committee, -vvhich attempts to set its 
standards on these loans at the same level as those apply-
ing to market issues. If the Co~~ittee is satisfied that a 
given private loan would warrant a rating of' ttBaa or better" 
if marketed publicly, the security may be carried at amor-
tized value. If a private loan is not so determined by the 
Committee, it is carried at $UCh percentage of par value as 
-* Supra, p. 72. 
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the Committee may consid er justified.~E-
This a ppraisal i s a matter of cons iderable effort 
and study on t he par t of the Committee in t he interes ts of 
life insurance policyholders. It t akes into account all t he 
f actor s involved in the loan, including size of t _ e loa n, 
financial status of the borrowing corpora tion , earning power, 
intere s t r a te, and ne gotia t ed terms. If the borro er lacks 
a well-established earnings record, the Committee may pl ace 
reliance upon contra cts between the borrowing corpor a tion, 
i t s customers, and its suppliers, or perhaps on t he qua l ity 
of li ens on fix ed property.*~*" Life insuranc e companies are 
requir ed to furnis h complete de t ail s to t he Committee u on 
comple tion of the loan, and further furnis h the Committee 
copi e s of the periodic financial statements, together ~~th 
notifications of any irregularities, defaults, or amendments 
to t he loan agr e ement in question . 
Directly purchased preferred. s t ocks (which, l i ke 
all stocks, are non-amortizable) are given ~ralues according 
to a formula in which the aver age market y iel d of ten 
select, high~grade , non-callable preferred s t ocks i s us ed 
as t he criterion. *-)H*- Should the market yield of t he stand-
ard f ormula stocks i ncrea se, due to market action, the 
a ssigned value of the directly placed pr efe r red stock is 
* 2, p. 34. 
-** 2, p. 35. 
-x-~,-x- 2, p . 35. 
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mark ed do\T-n to the point where its dividend r a te at the 
assigned value will produce the standard yield. 
The valuation Committe e c an, and has, assigned 
values at less than cost on private loans which it does 
not fee l are of quality equivalent to a marketable bond of 
"Baa or better" quality. These decisions may occur either 
at time of purchase or after developments in the borrowing 
corpor a tion's financial affairs seem to warrant such mark-
downs. 'I'hese markdovvns are the exception rather than the 
rule at the present time. The overwhelming majority of 
direct placements made by life insurance companies have been 
made with such car e and have worked so well to the long-run 
benefit-of the borrowing corporations that the Committee has 
not had to t ak e much more than a supervisory interest. How-
ever, it has the authority and is organized to step in to 
reduce security values, should the occasion arise where this 
authority is needed. 
The point has been made* that life insurance com-
panies have the strongest des ire to keep the great bulk of 
their assets invested i n amortizable securities. The author-
ity of the Valuation Committee to declare direct loans 11 non-
amortizable11 is a most potent instrument of control. The 
Committee may give any unsatisfactory loan an arbitrary 
valuation based on the Committee's opinion of the loan's 
quality. The difference be t ween such valuation and the cost 
-~ Supra, p. 72. 
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of the loan to the insurance company would have to be charged 
against surplus. This is inde ed a strong deterrent to making 
"risky" private loans. ·rhe "risky" direct placement can have 
fully as bad an effect on surplus as the "risky" public issue. 
10. Recent Developments 
There is little doubt that the insurance companies, 
over the longer period, will continue to i nve s tiga te all 
pot ential outlets for investment funds. Their assets are 
growing at too great a r a te for it to be otherwise . They 
face increasing competition for good-grade investment s from 
pension fund s and, to a le s ser extent, from commercial banks . 
The pas t t wo decades have seen the initia tion and r apid devel-
opment of insurance company activities in direct l ending . 
There is little likelihood that t his will not continue. In 
seeking outlets f or their funds through direct pl acements, 
t he insur ance companies hav e made most of their outlay s in 
the form of debentures and notes, secured by the gene,ral 
credit and earn ing power of the issuing corporation. -:(- They 
have also made a great number of loans to a 11 · .. idely diversi-
fi ed s cattering of industries, secured by almost every con-
c eivable t y pe of collateral and evidenced by many unusual 
t y pes of credit instruments. They have further developed 
outlets for investment funds in outright ounership ·of earn-
ing a ssets. These cover almost as wide a varie t y of forms 
-* 2, p. 143. 
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as do the direct loans, including owner ship of housing 
facilities, apartments, retail stores, warehouses, and fac-
tories. Some of their real estate purchases have been made 
from top-grade national organizations, which have co~current­
ly signed long-term net leases for the occupation, mainte-
nanc e , and use of the properties in question. Others have 
involved management of the properties directly by the insur-
ance company concerned. 
The acquisition of railroad rolling stock by the 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States is 
further concurrent evidence that no stone is being left 
unturned, no avenue is being left unexplored, in t he search 
for sound uses for policyholders' funds. It is evident that 
the insur ance companies are meeting the challenge of today's 
problems and will continue to pioneer in the development of 
techniques designed to meet the problems of tomorrow. 
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D. Financing Purchases of Railvmy Equipment 
1. Specia l Obligations 
hailroad equipment obliga tions have come to be 
r egarded favorably among investors by virtue of their long 
record of prompt payment of int erest and principle when 
due. Gen er ally speaking, the exi s tence of assets pledged 
for security of an obligation is of s ome comfort to the 
investor. Mortgage bonds of mos t corporations merit a h i gh-
er investment standing than the unsecured obligations of 
those corpora tions. ·rhis i s due to the precedenc e in liqui-
dation enjoyed by the holders of mortgage securities, should 
the enterprise be t er minated due to i nability to show a 
profit. Nevertheless, it is a truism that there is gr ea t er 
security i n earning power than in assets. Defaults on 
oblig a tions, both secured and unsecured, occur when the 
company runs upon unprofitable day s and fails to earn suffi-
cient amount s of money to pay for its current i nt erest 
charges and maturities. It i s far better to hold unsecured 
bonds in a profitable enterpris e than secured bonds in an 
unprofitable one. When hard times occur and obligations 
are defa ulted, economic conditions are usually such that the 
plants and equipment representing the security for mortgag e 
debt are of little immedia te value . The value of assets as 
security is usuall y dependent upon their earning power to 
the concern which owns them. If the earning power is not 
ther e , t he saleability of the assets is probably slight, 
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and the salvage value inadequate to cover the claims of the 
holders of the mortgage. 
There are, however, sever al special typ c~s of obli-
gations secured by assets where the value of the assets is 
substantial, of itself, as distinguished from the value of 
the assets in the everyday operations of the ow~ing corpora-
tion. Obligations secured by railroad equipment fall into 
this category. Railroad rolling stock, since it i s movable 
and usable by oth er railroads, might have a greater earning 
power in the event of depression in some other part of the 
country than in the section where it was originally located. 
That is, even in times of general depression, some parts of 
the country are hit harder than are others. A railroad in 
a heavily depressed area might fail to maintain its obliga-
tions to its bondholders and go into bankruptcy. The hold-
ers of the first mor tgage bonds might have a receiver ap-
pointed t o operate the r ailroad proper t y in t heir behalf. 
This mi ght improve somewhat the position of the mortgage 
bondholders, yet earnings might still be insufficient to 
meet their fixed inter est requirements. The holders of 
obligations secured by equipment would be in a position 
somewhat more secure, however. They would have the right, 
in the event that default occurred, to foreclose upon the 
rolling stock and make an arrangement to sell or lease the 
rolling- stock to another railroad in another part of the 
84 
country where economic conditions might not be so greatly 
depressed. This latter alternative is rarely exercised, for 
even a trustee in bankruptcy must make every effort to meet 
pay~ents on equipment obligations. If he hopes to generate 
any earnings at all for the mortgage bondholders, the trustee 
must have some operating equipment. The alt ernative does 
exist, however, and is of some consequence in investment 
appraisal. ~quipment obligations are secured not only by the 
general credit and earning power of the issuing corpora tion, 
but also by a marketable asset which has dependable value in 
times both good and bad. 
2. Record of Equipment Obligations 
In over fifty railr oad receiverships from 188-6 to 
date, the equipment obligations have emerged with nearly 
-perfect records for safety of principle and intere s t. There 
has been some variation in the treatment accorded the equip-
ment issues of some of these railroads in receiver ship. In 
1935 the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad 
arranged for the extension of its maturing certificates.* 
Partial payment was made when due , and the remainder retired 
by sinking fund or from proceeds of sale of trustee 's certi-
ficates. 
The Wabash Railway failed to meet its maturity on 
equipment issues in 1938, but obtained a loan from the 
-:f- 7, p. 6. 
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Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the follo~ ing year and 
paid off its certificate holders.* 
In the case of the Seaboard Airline Railway, its 
equipment obligations were exchangeable in 1932 for receiv-
er's certificates.** fhese were exchangeable, in turn, in 
1935, for other receiver's certificates, bearing a graduated 
interest rate. fhese latter certificates were eventually 
redeemed. 
The Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railway ob-
tained court approval in 1937 for the exchange of existing 
equipment trust certificates for an equal amoQnt of trustee's 
certificates bearing a rate of i n terest somewhat lower than 
on the original equipment obligations.*** Some of these 
trustee's certificates were r etired by sinking fund and 
some were c alled. 
fhe recei vers for the Florida Bast Coast Bailway in 
1934 were authorized to disaffirm one of their several equip-
ment trust agreements.-**-*-* 1'he trust ees for the equipment 
trust certificates, series D, foreclosed upon and sold the 
securing pro perty at a price which result ed in realization 
of some sixty per c ent of the original investment to holders 
of the s eries D equipment trust certificates . A defici ency 
* 
7, p. 6. 
~--~~ 7, p. 6. 
-}~~--~- 7, p. 6. 
-~~-~,-~-~ 7, p. 7. 
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claim for the remaining forty per cent was filed in the bank-
ruptcy proc eedings, and the eventual settlement (made on 
March 6, 1950) amount ed to approximately one-fourth of this 
unsecured claim. Net recovery by each certificate holder, 
aft er payment of all expenses, therefore, amounted to about 
seventy per cent of the face amount of certificates held. 
These few cases are the only one s where equipment obliga-
tions underwent reduction in interest payments, ex t ension 
of maturity, or capital loss. It is little wonder that 
equipment obligations have come to be regarded favorably in 
investment circles, when one considers the implications of 
such a near-spotless, long-term record. 
In the long run, of cours e , the soundness of rail-
way equipment obligations are affected by the same factors 
which affect the credit of the railroads' other obligations. 
As one authority has pointed out,* railroads have custo-
marily been able to service equipment obligations from the 
depreciation charges on the equipment in opera tion. An 
increasing number of railroads find their depreciation 
charges now inadequate to handle the carrying cost of equip-
ment debt. Thus equipment purchases must be financed par-
tially from net earnings. (fhis process further increases 
the already high cost of equipment, if one t akes into account 
the Federal income taxes which have been paid before arriving 
* 14, p. 456. 
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at the net income figure.) Furthermore, if equipment pur-
chases in the future are to depend upon net earnings, the 
question arises whether the credit standing of these obliga-
tions will always be as high as it has been in the past. 
Payments by the railroads for new equipment may exceed the 
depreciation charges on old equipment for two principal 
reasons . In the fir s 't place, equipment is usually paid for 
over ten or fifteen years, but under I.G.C. and Federal tax 
rulings it must be written off over a much longer period. 
Second, the railroads took advantage of accelerated deprecia-
tion, in some ins tances, during the war years, with the re-
sult that somewhat in excess of $1 billion was written out 
of the depreciation base. fhis authority advocated that the 
railroads exert every effort to obtain the approval of the 
proper authorities for more realistic treatment of the 
problem of equipment depreciation.* 
Another analyst** has advanced the opinion that a 
good deal of care must be taken in the s election of equip-
ment obligati ons, since the demand for new equipment hinges 
upon traffic expectations, hence may di s sipate in the event 
of a busines s shake-out. A recession may and has brought 
sharp cuts in the price structure of both tractive units and 
rolling stock. fhis has the effect of absorbing part or all 
of the so-called equity behind the railroad's recently issued 
equipment obligations. If equipment obligations are going to 
* 14, p. 457. 
** Mr. V. S. Whitbeck, Railroad Analyst, Bank of New York and 
Fifth Avenue Bank 
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depend for their security largely upon the general credit of 
the railroad operating the equipment, they would fall into 
much the same category as the first mortgage bonds of that 
railroad. If this should occur, there is little incentive 
for ownership of equipment trust certificates, which bear a 
low r a te of i ntere s t in comparison with the first mortgag e 
bonds of most railroads. 
3. Little-used Financing Methods 
How, then , may the railroads acquire the rolling 
stock <:md locomotives necessary to their operations? First, 
they may construct the cars in their o~~ shops. Many rail-
roads do t his, to an extent not widely understood.* It is 
logical that railroads should attempt to keep their own 
employees and facilities busy in periods of slack business, 
and one way they can do tha t is to fulfill their own equip-
ment needs during bad times. It is debatable whether the 
railroads can manufacture cars as cheaply as they can buy 
them, but by manufacturing them they may utilize othervfise 
i dle facilitie s and cut do~m on the dead weight of overhead 
expense. The question is whether these faciliti e s might not 
better have been utilized only for the repairing of unser-
viceable equipment at a time when most railroad car builders 
were not opera ting at capacity. Cars manufactured in the 
railroads' own shops may or may not be subsequently used as 
-* Supra, p. 49. 
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the security for some form of equipment financing, depending 
upon the provisions of the company's mortgage.* 
Railroad equipment may be purchased from the manu-
facturer by the opera ting roads for cash. As mentioned 
above,~* the equipment needs of most Ameri can railroads are 
far greater than their ability to provide cash ther efor. To 
a r ailroad with ample cash resourc e s and with no program 
under which it may be r epurchasing high-coupon, long-ter m 
debt at less than par, the outright purchase of equipment 
generally turns out to be a profitable inves tment. There 
is little question as to the earning capacity and operating 
savings resulting from modernization. The roads which can 
carry out such a program are, unfortunat ely, in a very small 
minority. In the old days, most railroad mortgages contained 
an "after-acquired" claus e , which meant that purchases of 
equipment became further security for the mortgage bonds. 
In some cases mortgag e bonds were issued for the purchasing 
of railroad equi pment, but t his pr actice is no longer per-
missible under most railroad mortgages . 
The railroad may purchase equipment on i ts general 
credit, secured by a promissory note.*** I n t h is case, title 
to the equipment passes to the railroad at time of purcha se. 
It is not too prevalent a form of financing . When it occurs, 
* 13, p. 292. 
** Supra, pp. 35-38. 
*** 13, pp. 292-3. 
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it is customarily concerned with small amounts of equipment 
with only one or t wo lenders in the picture. The transaction 
may be evidenced by a note and a bill of sale, and the note 
usually has a maximum term of some five years. _o I.C.C. 
approval is required, unless the note matur e s later than 
two years, or unless the note represents more than 5 ~~~ of 
the railroad's outstanding securities. In the event of de-
fault, the lenders must prove up the debt as general credit-
ors, and most creditors are unwilling to accept a position 
so junior to other obligations of the road. 
The railroad ' may obtain the use of equipment by 
renting it from another owner.* Up until the development of 
the purchase-lease agreement by the Bquitable Life Assurance 
Society, to be discussed in Chapter III, transactions of 
this sort were customarily concerned only with lea se arrange-
ment s >'. i thother railroads which had large surpluses of roll-
ing stock, or with private corporations owning such special-
ized eq uipment as sleeping cars, dining cars, and refrigera tor 
cars. 
Another little-used method is to have one or a few 
institutional lenders furnish the money for a railroad to 
purchase equipment secured by a chattel mortgage on the 
equipment.** The transaction may be evidenced by a bill of 
sale, a chattel mortgage to the lender, and perhaps the bor-
* 13, p. 292. 
** 13, p. 293. 
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rm-ver's note, with a usual maximum term of seven y ears. No 
I.c.c. approval is required unless a note is issued, in 
which case the same conditions apply as in the case of 
issuing a promissory note. In the event of default on the 
part of the railroad, the holders of the mortgage may sue 
for repossession of the equipment. There is some danger 
that the chattel mortgage may not be effective, particularly 
if the first mortgage on the r ailroad property provides for 
the inclusion of nafter-acquiredn property under the mort-
gage. Also, in order to be effective a chattel mortga ge 
must be recorded in every county ·where the equipment is to 
ope rate, a nigh-impossible proposition in these tim es of 
free interchange of rolling stock. 
4. New York Plan 
The most frequent methd of acquiring rai lroad equip-
ment is for the company to purchase the rolling stock or 
tractive units vtith the seller, or a trustee retaining title 
or lien.* The first of these traditional types of financing 
is the so-called .New York Plan, or conditional sales agree-
ment. This agreement is usually entered into by a builder 
of equipment and a railroad, with the former agreeing to con-
struct, sell, and deliver a specified lot of equipment at a 
specified price at a specified time and place. The railroad 
agrees to pay a percentage of the total cost upon delivery 
* 13, p. 293. 
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of the eq_uipment, and the balance in monthly or quarterly 
install ments over the term of the agreement, which custom-
arily has a maximum limit of ten years. Interest is paid 
upon the outstc.nding unpaid balance at a given r a te, and 
the railroad may or may not have the privilege of antici-
pating payments. The title to the equipment remains with 
the vendor until the final payment on account of the pur-
chase price is made and all conditions of the agreement are 
met, whereupon title passes to the railroad. 'I' axes and all 
insurable risks and maintenance costs are assumed by the 
r a ilroad when it gets the equipment. A manufactur er of 
railroad equipment usually has a concurrent agreement with 
a lending institution r epresenting up to a dozen banks or 
insur ance companies. Under this agreement the builder 
assigns the title to the equipment to the lending institu-
tion, with this assignment recorded in each sta te .rhere the 
railroad is to operate. In the event of default, the lender 
is entitled to repossession of the equipment and may sue the 
railroad for the unpaid balance of the purchase · rice. 
5. Philadelphia Plan 
The so-called Philadel phia Plan was evolved about 
1868, as a devic e whereby railroads might finance the ac-
quisition of railroad eqtupment without the equipment becom-
ing subject to an "after-acquired" clause in mortgage bond 
indentures. -lt- ·whereas conditional sale contracts arrive at 
* 13' p. 294. 
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the same result, at that time in Pennsylvania these con-
tracts were construed by the courts to be invalid against 
the claims of third pa.rties. The "after-acquired" clause 
in the mortgage indenture might sta te that the mortgage 
covered 11 all land, road-bed, structures, buildings, and 
equipment now owned or hereafter acquired." ·rhe Philadelphia 
Plan enables the railroad to buy and finance equipment with-
out running afoul of this clause. 
Two agreements form the basis of the Philadelphia 
Plan.* One agreement provides that the railroad is suing t he 
certificates acquire the equipment from t h e manufacturers 
and transfer title to the equipment to the trustee. 'l'he 
trustee receives the funds provided by the purchasers of the 
equi pment certificates (and also funds f rom the treasury of 
the rai l road in the event that the trus t involves a 11 down 
payment"). The builder delivers the equipment to t he trus t ee, 
who pays for it. ~ach of the certificates r epresents a bene-
fici al i nterest in the trust, and the return to the holder 
thereof is referred to as 11 dividend 11 • 1'itle to the equipment 
is in t he trust and the railroad usually guar antees the pay-
ment of principal and 11 dividends 11 by the trus tee. The second 
contract is a lease agreement. Under its terms, the trustee 
agrees to lease the equipment to the railroad at an annual 
rental in sufficient amount to pay the "dividends" on the 
* 13' p. 294. 
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outstanding certifica t es and the principal amount of maturing 
certificates. At the payment of the final maturity, the 
lease expires and title to the equipment is then transferred 
to the railroad. In the event of default, the lessee is r e -
quired to assemble the equipment at a convenient point and 
permit the trustee to take possession of the equipment for 
sale or re-lease to another lessee. fhe trustee may also 
proceed a gainst the railroad on its guarantee:* 
Sale pf equipment trust certificates under the 
Philadelphia Plan has been particularly well adapted to the 
procur ement of large amounts of funds for the rail roads' 
use. ~quipment trust certificates are sold under competitive 
bidding to any or all s ecurity buyer s , including the general 
public; hence they are adaptable for deals involvi ng large 
lots of equipment. Financing by this method involve s ex-
t ensive legal expense, printing cos t s , engraving cos t s , ex-
pensi ve advertising for bids, trustee's fees. It is believed 
tha t these expenses are more than offset by the savings in 
interest charges, which accrue from wide public acc eptB.nce 
of equipment trust certifica tes a s practically riskless 
s ecurities. 
Perhaps of equal importanc e to the legal safeguards, 
and certainly of great practical i mportance, is the rapid 
retir ement schedule set up for an equipment trust. This 
-~ 13, p. 294. 
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retir ement schedule is calcula t ed to amortize the invest-
ment in the equipment wel l before the end of its usefulness, 
and at a more rapid r ate than the equipment depreciates. 
In the past, railroad mortgage bonds have not generally had 
the benefit of annual sinking fund s , and this may be a con-
tributing factor to the unsatisfactory credit standing of a 
great many railroad mortgages. bquipment trus t obligations, 
however, usually mature in equal installments over a period 
of fifteen years or less. It is the unusua l cas e when the 
railro ad purchasing equipment does not make a 15 to 25% 
"dmm paymenttt at the time of purchase. The substantial 
equity behind the certificate s arises from t he fact that 
a porti on of the cost of equipment is paid by the railroad, 
yet the entire lot secures the certificates. £ven in cases 
wher e there is no original equity, the r apid pay-out r esults 
in the creation of an equity at a much greater rat e t han 
one would expect reproduction costs to decline , under all 
but the most abnormal business conditions. 1'abl e XII 
ill ustrates how the equity builds up to the benefit of the 
certificate holder in various typical cases. 
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1'ABLE XII 
PERCENTAGE OF ~Q UI'l'Y I N cos·r OF' 8QUIPMt;NT 
UNDt;R PHILADELPHIA PLAN* 
1 to 10 Year Trust 1 to 15 Year frusi__ 
End 25% 20% 101o No 25% 20% 10% No 
of Orig . Orig. Orig . Orig. Orig . Orig. Orig . Orig. 
Year Equity Equity Equity E;quity Equity Equity Equity Equity 
0 25.0 20.0 10.0 none 25.0 20.0 10.0 none 
1 32.5 28.0 19.0 10.0 30.0 25.3 16.0 6.6 
2 40.0 36.0 28.0 20.0 35.0 30.6 22.0 13.3 
3 . 47.5 44.0 37.0 30.0 40.0 36.0 28.0 20.0 
4 55.0 52.0 46.0 40.0 45.0 41.3 34.0 26.6 
5 62.5 60.0 55.0 50.0 50.0 46.6 40.0 33.3 
6 60.0 68.0 64.0 60.0 55.0 52.0 46.0 40.0 
7 77.5 76.0 73.0 70.0 60.0 57.3 52.0 46.6 
8 85.0 84.0 82.0 80.0 65.0 62.6 58.0 53.3 
9 92.5 92.0 91.0 90.0 70.0 68.0 64.0 60.0 
10 
--
75.0 73.3 70.0 66.6 
11 80.0 78.6 76.0 73.3 
12 85.0 84.0 82.0 80.0 
13 90.0 89.3 88.0 86.6 
14 95.0 94.6 94.0 93.3 
15 
* 7, p. 4. 
6. Adequacy of Traditional Methods 
This section has dealt with the usual methods of 
equipment financing, and the advantages and shortcomings 
have been discussed in sufficient detail for the purposes 
of the study . It must be pointed out, however, that the 
conditions discussed above in the section dealing with over-
all equipment needs of the railroads present a problem of 
sufficient magnitude to cast doubt upon the adequacy of 
conventional methods of equipment financing. ~quipment 
needs of American railroads are affected not only by the 
levels of traffic being reached in today's expanded economy, 
but also by the years of over-usage of 0\rer-age and ineffi-
cient equipment. There is little doubt that .the railroads 
could and should spend additional billions on modernization. 
If carried out, modernization programs may prove to be the 
railroads ' salvation , r egardless of what the future level 
of business may be. To apply traditional financing methods 
to a problem of this scope presupposes the ability of each 
r ailroad to come up with the cash for the initial 11 dovm pay-
ment". ·rhis has already been the stumbling block in the 
modernization efforts of many railroads . 'I'hese same rail-
roads, and many others , have not nearly exhausted their 
pot entialities for i mprovement. 1'he market for equipment 
trust obligations is a special ized one, and there is serious 
doubt as to whether it wouill absorb additional billions of 
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interest s have been able to devise solutions to their mo s t 
pressing problems. In meeting the problem under discussion, 
busine s s and financial leaders appear again to have met the 
challenge by devising a new method, the Equitable Plan, to 
aid . i n coping with a seemi ngly ins urmountable problem. 
III. The Equitable Plan 
A. Origination 
1. Sour£.§. of Information 
Most of the ma terial in Chapter III is bas ed upon 
informa tion received in i ntervi ews and telephone conversa-
tions with investment officers of t he Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society,* and from sampl e documents provided by them. 
Therefore, t here will be but a few further refer ences a nd 
footnot es in this chapter. 
2. Credit for Origination 
Many changes in economic pr oc esses and techniques 
have occurred from the origi na tion and r apid i mpl ementa tion 
by the inventor of some r evolutionary idea. Other, and 
probably far more, changes have occurred by t he pr ocess of 
evolution. Credit for origina tion of the ~quitable Plan 
probably belongs to a number of i ndivi d uals i n t he r ailr oad , 
railvv-ay equipment, and insurance fi el ds , each of t hem aware 
of the immediacy and magnitude of the r a i l way equi pment 
probl em , each of them striving to develop a workabl e solu-
tion. 
3. Investment Policy of t h_g Equitable 
The i n sur ance company involved in this development 
had shown an active interest i n the r ailr oad field a s a 
medium of i mrestment for many y ear s , and to a much gr ea t er 
* Supra, p. 4 • 
• 
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extent than in the case of most insurance compani es of its 
size. It was not numb ered among those insurance companies 
which took a Cassandra-like vi ew of the long-term prosp ects 
of the railr oad industry. It was fully aware of the impor-
tance to a heal thy national economy of a heal 'tilf railroad 
industry and knew well of the railroads' need for adequate 
earning s and modern equipment~ Sever al years ear l ier the 
Equitable made a study for the purpose of estimating the 
equipment needs of the railways and was actively seeking to 
fulfill as many of the se needs a s could be effected through 
traditional channels. 
The Equitable had a record for aggressively seek-
ing and developing new inves tment outlets. This company 
had taken good advantage of the various forms of pri,ra.te 
financing and was no stranger to the own er shi p of income-
producing real estate, a rela tively new fi eld for insurance 
companies. 
4. Mr. Parkinson's Statement 
In the summer of 1947, Thomas I. Parkinson, Presi-
dent of the ~quitable Life Assurance Socie t y , issued the 
:following statement to the press:* "It has been said that 
prosperity is assured to the nation within which men and 
goods move about quickly. We have the best r a ilroads in 
the world, and their services are available at the lowest 
* 9, pp. 1, 19. 
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rates . The people of this country and their bus i nesses 
demand adequa t e transportation , and they are prepared to pay 
for such tr ansportation an adequate r a te. Congres s should 
a s ain declare a public policy with respect to railroads tha t 
will mak e it possible for them to obta in the capi tal to 
undert~ke at once the great program of expansion and i mprove-
ment which they need. 
"After all, t he railroad s ar e not asking for public 
funds out of our already over-burdened Treasury. If permit-
ted, they are pr epar ed to finance themselves from priva te 
investment sourc es . They canno t do tha t if the r ailroad 
managers are compelled to go on from day to day b~aring heavy 
burdens of stc.. t e and Federal t axation , heavier burdens for 
wages and pen sions, and constant disputes with l abor leaders 
seeking higher wages , and Wlth rate making bodies reluctant, 
for political rea sons, to permit increased r a te s . Unques-
tionably, the r ailroads need financial elbow room. 
"If we do not deal with the problem in a practical 
way and soon, we m.ay again see the day when the public wel-
f are, or indeed the very existence, of this country may be 
threa t ened by the r ai lroads' inability to meet futur e emer-
gencies. That, if it happens, will be due to our f ailure to 
provide the r ailroa ds of today with the financial means of 
fitting themselves for their problems of tomorrow. ti 
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5. AQproach Qy ~ ~quipment Manufacturer 
It is not surprising that officers of t he Equi-
table were uniquely receptive to an idea arising out of a 
conference in October, 1949 with Champ Carry , President of 
Pullman Incorporated, manufacturer of railway equipment. 
Mr . Carry brought the suggestion that the Equitable partici-
pate in the financing of car purchases by the railroads in 
a fashion somewha t similar to various 11 sale and lease-backn 
rea l esta te deals in which several insurance companies had 
participated. If hi s sugges tion had been carried out, title 
to th e rolling stock would be ves ted in a fourth party , 
presumably a trustee, charitable association, or college 
endowment fund. Rental payments for the equi pment would be 
provided by the leasing railroad and would go to the insur-
ance company in payment of principle costs and interest 
cha r ges . At conclusion of the lease period, the insurance 
company would be fully paid off, and residual value would 
accrue to the holder of title, either i n the form of leas e 
renewals or from resale or s crapping of the equipment . 
6. Legal Considera tions 
Approaching this plan with open mind, it s oon be-
came apparent to members of the railroad securities and 
legal staff of the Equitable that the presence of a fourth 
party appeared to be superfluous . With re spect to the 
inve s tment of policyholders' reserves, Chapter 28 of the 
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Consolidated Laws of the S t a te of New York, as enacted in 
1939 with amendments t hrough 1949 , . provides the following 
in Section 81, (4b): t hat among the t ype s of investment 
suitable for t he i nvestment of r eserves shall be equipment 
trust obliga tions or certificates which are adequately se-
cur ed (or other adequately secured instruments) evidencing 
an interest in transportation equipment wholly or in part 
within the United States , and which have the right to re-
c eive determined portions of r ental, purchase, or other 
fixed obligatory payments for the use of purcha se of s uch 
transportation equipment. 
In the opi nion of the lawyers whose legal advice 
~as sought, there was nothing in state law which specificall y 
prevented the insurance company fromowning railroad rolling 
stock. Furthermore, section 81, (4b) appeared to be drawn 
with sufficient latitude to permit this proposed instrument 
to qualify as a ttreserve inves tment". fhis phrase, "reserve 
inve s tment",means that t he investment in question is in-
cluded in t he law among those inves t ments specifically 
listed as quali~;ing for purchase wi th policyholders'reserve 
funds. 
In the opinion of the ~quitable investment men, the 
ob~rious advantage (and possibly a more significant one) in 
the outright ovm ership of the rolling stock was the r e t ention 
of the residual value by the h9lder of the principal risk 
during the period of financing. 
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7. The Means to gg ~nd 
Summarizing this matter of origination, it may be 
said that the conditions of the day were partly responsible. 
·rhese conditions produced certain economic pressures and 
presented to many human minds a problem crying out for 
solution. The ~quitable Plan in its present form, as dis-
cussed in detail below, is the product of many active minds. 
More than anything else, it sho·ws. that where an end is 
desi r able, the means to tha t end can be found . 
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B. Manufacturing Agreement 
fhe Equitable Plan involves t wo s epara t e instru-
ment s , the first of which is the Manufacturing Agr eement. 
1. Manufacture and Sale of Cars 
I'he railroad equipment manufacturer agrees to con-
struct, and the Equitable agr ees to purchase, certain new 
railroad equipment. Specifications for the equipment are 
agreed upon in complete detail and are arranged to conform 
with equipment specifications of the railroad which is to 
leas e the equipment. (It is most interesting to note that 
a n article which appears to be a standard item, namely , a 
f r eight car, is actually manufactur ed in order lots, to 
specification of the purchaser. Basically, ther e is no 
rea son why the box cars or hopper car s of all r a ilroads 
could not be mass-produced; yet it has been the cus tom in 
the indus try to incorporate into the fini s hed product such 
minor variations as the purchaser mi ght desire. As of to-
day, the Diesel locomotive, a far more complica t ed apparatus, 
is more ne arly on a complete production-line bas is than i s 
the freight car.) 
Provisions are made for the identifica tion of the 
rolling stock, by affixing metal plates to each car and 
painting oh numbers, so that the purchaser may at all times 
be able to identify readily its equipment in the even t of 
default on the part of the lessee. 
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1'he number of new cars to be purchased is sta ted, 
to ge ther with the total delivered purchase price per car. 
1'he railroad which is to lease the car provides 
an inspector, s erving as the authorized repres entative of 
the purchaser and the lessee, to watch the manufacturing 
process, to inspect materials and components, and to pro-
tect the purchaser's interes t. This individual i s usually 
a designer, technical expert, or consulting engineer in the 
t emporar y or permanent employ of the railroad which is to 
lease the car s . Upon completion of the equipment, he signs 
a Cer tificate of Inspection in his capacity of i nsp ector, 
sta ting that dur ing manufacture, he, either personally or 
through qual ified inspectors working under his supervision, 
inspected materia ls, components, and construction and found 
th em adequa t e for the protection of purchaser and l essee. 
Conf ormity with standards acceptable to the As s oci a tion of 
American Railroads is required, together with compl e tion in 
accordance with specific a tions contained in the Manufactur-
ing Agreement and the Lease Agr eement. 
2. Conditions of Ca r Deliveries 
Upon completion of each piece of railway equipment, 
and upon receipt of a Certificate of Inspection, the manu-
facturer agr ees to deliver such car or car s to an authorized 
r epres entative of the purchaser at a predetermined point on 
t he line of the l ea s ing railroad. the manufacturer a gr ees 
t o commence delivery on or before a specified date, and 
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complete delivery on or before a second specified date. 
Delivery dates are subject to a limited extension by rea -
sons of delays due to accidents, fires, floods , labor 
strife, government al acts, war s, and other causes beyond 
the manufacturer's rea sonable control. Beyond t he final 
date , the agreement is deemed to apply only to cars deliver-
ed End accepted prior to the final da te. The purchaser 
agrees to keep an authoriz ed r epresenta tive at t he delivery 
point to receive the car s, and, upon hi s issuance of a 
Certificate of Deli very, title to the equipment passes from 
t he manufacturer to t he purchaser. In t he Certifica t e of 
Delivery, the r epresentati ve of t he purchaser identifies 
t h e cars by number and s t a t e s t ha t they ~1 ave been delirered 
in good order, ready for service. 
3. Purchase and Payment 
Documents required by the purchas er a t t h e time 
of purchase are the aforementioned Certificate of Inspection, 
Certificate of Delivery, Certificate of Acceptance (which 
will be discussed under "Lease Agreement"), a bill of sale 
evidencing the purchaser's title to such equipment, and an 
imroice covering the purchase price of the equipment. 
·rhereupon, a percentage, subject to negotiation but in 
ordinary cases amounting to 80% of t he purchase price of 
each completed car or piece of equipment, is paid in cash to 
t he manufacturer. I nvoice s fo'r cars purchased are r endered 
only in re spect of cars delivered under the lease and ac-
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cepted by the lessee, and invoices are rendered to the pur-
chaser at any one time for equipment lots in excess of fifty, 
except in the case of final billings at completion of the 
order. 
The balance of the purchase price of each completed 
car is paid in cash to the manufacturer over a five-year 
period in equal, consecutive, monthly installments, beginning 
with the second calendar month succeeding the calendar month 
irt which an invoice with respect to such car is rendered to 
the purchaser. If the original "down payment" on the part 
of the purchaser has been BO~b , then the balance to be amor-
tized over the succeeding sixty months amounts to 20% of the 
total cost of the equipment. 
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Subject to negoti a tion with respect to rate, inter-
e s t i s paid in cash to the manufacturer on the unpaid i ns tall-
ments of the purchase price of each completed c ar . Interest 
payments under this provision are on a monthly basis, typi-
c a l l y at the rate of 2J'o per annum. Interest begins to accrue 
on t he day on which the equipment is delivered under the 
lease and accepted by the lessee; the amount of such interest 
accrued in each calendar month is paid to the manufacturer 
on the next succeeding date that the purchaser is required 
to pay an installment of the unpaid purchase price pursuant 
to requirements outlined in the paragraph immediately pre-
cedi ng this one. 
The purchaser has the option at any time payment 
is made on principle to prepay, upon ten days notice in 
writing to the manufacturer, all or any part of the unpaid 
installments of the purchase price of the equipment. If less 
than all the unpaid installments are prepaid, all amounts so 
prepa id are applied by the manufacturer toward prepayment of 
the l atest maturing installments of the unpaid pur chase 
price, pro rated as by the cars. 
In case pay-ment for any equipment is made by the 
lessee to the purchaser pursuant to the section of the lease 
dealing with equipment lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond re-
pair, the purchaser pays the manufacturer in cash all unpaid 
installments of the purchase price of the equipment in ques-
tion on the fifth day after receiving ex traordinary payments 
from the lessee. 
Provision is made for the place of busines s where 
payments shall be made by the purchaser to the manufacturer. 
4. Default of Railroad ~ayments 
110 
The possibility of default on the part of the lessee 
of the equipment is implicit, although not expected by the 
purchaser or the manufacturer. If such default s hould occur 
so that the purchaser of the equipment does not r eceive from 
the leasing railroad all or part of the required lease pay-
ment, the purchaser is then entitled to cease making further -
payments to the manufacturer with respect to any of the cars 
included under the defaulted lease. 
Various alternatives for the protection of the pur-
chaser then become availabl e . The lessee may, of course, 
cure the existing defaults in the payment of rentals in a 
manner acceptable to the purchaser. In this event, the pur-
chaser i rr@edi a tely pays all amounts due to the manufacturer 
on account of unpaid balances and accrued interest thereon. 
Thereafter, the regular monthly amortization of unpaid ba l -
ances continues as originally scheduled. If the default is 
not cured by the lessee, thirty days or more after t he occur-
rence of default, the purchaser may make a written offer to 
t he manufacturer to sell to the manufacturer all right, titl e, 
and interest of the purchaser, as lessor, Qnder the equipment 
l ease. 
The price embodied in this offer is reached under 
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a r ather complicated formula which, if the manufacturer accepts 
the offer, results in the purchaser receiving an amount equal 
to the amortized cost of his investment at the time the de-
fault occurred. 
The manufacturer has a period of ten days to make 
up his mind whether or not to accept the purchaser's offer. 
During this ten-day period, the lessee has the right to cure 
the defaults. If the manufacturer declines to accept the 
offer to purchase the right, title , and interest of the l zssor 
of the equipment at the price calculated as explained above, 
then all rights of the manufacturer to receive any further 
payments from the purchaser terminate. 
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the 
manufacturer would ever take back any equipment. The marke t 
value of the us ed freight car would either be higher or 
lower than the purchaser's amortized cost. If it were 
higher, t he purchaser would not offer the equipment to the 
manufacturer. If it were lower, the manufacturer would not 
accept the offer. 
5. Pr eliminary Conditions 
Concurrently with the execution and delivery of 
t he Manufacturing Agreement, certain additional preliminary 
conditions pertain. Th ese revolve around the legal aspects 
of entering into such an agreement. Counsel for rnanufactur-
er and purchaser must deliver a satisfactory opini on to the 
effect that the manufacturer has adequate corporate power 
to ent er into this a gr eement and that the agreement has b een 
duly authorized, executed, and delivered, and cons titutes a 
vali d , legal, and binding agreement. (Similar provisions 
are also neces sary with respect to the Lea s e Agreement.) 
6. Patents and Comnlianc e wi th Laws and Rules 
--- ---- ---- ---
f he manufacturer agrees to protect the purchaser, 
if the occasion should arise, from any liabil ity, damages, 
claims, suit s , judgments , and costs arising from cla i ms that 
t he us e of a patented article or design used in th e manu-
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facture of the equipment constitutes an infringement of any 
patent. fhe manufacturer warrants that equipment delivered 
under the agreement will comply with generall y accepted 
standards, rules, governmental laws, regulations, and require-
ments r elating to the construction and equipment of railroad 
cars of the character .delivered. i'he manufacturer warrants, 
also, that each piece of equipment wi ll comply on t he da te 
of its deli very with the Rules of Interchange of the Asso-
ciation of American Railroads , which means tha t the ca r may 
be switched back and forth over the lines of all member rail-
roads. 
7. .c;xpenses 
The manufacturer agrees to pay f ees, di s bursements, 
and expenses of t he purchaser's special counsel for s ervices 
rendered to the purchas er in drawing up the agreement and the 
lease, including the furnishing of the opinions r eferred to 
in Section 5. The manufacturer also agrees to pay all ex-
penses of .printing the s e documents and other exp enses, in-
cluding any sales t axe s, transfer taxes, documentary stamps , 
and out-of-pocke t expenses of the pu~chaser in connection 
with drawing up this contract. 
8. Miscellaneous 
Correct addresses of each of the parties to the 
Manufacturing Agreement are included in the agreement. 
Arrangements are made for the i n cl usion of successors and 
assigns of the manufacturer and t h e purchaser, and for ncti-
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fication i n the event tha t an assignment occurs. 
By and large, this Manufacturing Agreement appears 
to be a perfectly s traightforward document. There are only 
t wo unus ual provisions: the one under which the manufactur-
er must initial l y assume 20~ of the cost (rather than re-
ceiving full and i~~ediate payment); and t he one under vn1ich, 
in the event of default, the manufacturer f aces a pot ential 
ces sa tion of payments on account of unpa i d balances of the 
purcha se price. 
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C. Lease Agreement 
The second instrument which is involve_ in the 
Equitable Plan is the Lease Agre ement. 
1. DeliYery and Acc en t ance of Cars 
As discus sed in preceding sections, the r esponsi-
bility for properins _ection of materials and construction 
rest s with th e authorized r epres entative of the l essee dur-
ing the period of manufactur e . ~ hen equipment i s completen 
i n accord with specifications therefor, the r epresentative 
ex ecutes and delivers t o the lessor and to the manufactur er 
t he Certifica te of Inspection discussed above.* Compl e ted 
equipment is then t endered to th e less ee a t a prede t er mined 
point on t he line of th s r ailroad-lessee. At this point, 
t he same or another authorized r epresenta tive of the leasing 
railroad inspects t he ca r to be sure that it is in good order 
a nd ready for service. Upon finding the equipmen t accept-
able, the representative executes and deliver s to the lessor 
and to the manufacturer a Certificate of Acceptance, a ttest-
ing to this fact, and also certifying to the proper identi-
fication of the equipment as t he property of t he purcha ser. 
With thi s assurance of a Certifica te of Acc eptc,nc e , t he 
car s are deemed to have been delivered to and accept ed by 
the l essee, and th ereaft er a re sub ject to all of t h e t er ms 
and conditions of the lease. The lessor warrant s tha t it is 
* Supra, p. 107. 
115 
the true and lawful o-vmer of each piece of equipment so de-
livered, and that s uch equipment is free of all liens and 
encumbrances. 
2. Rentals 
~quipment rental s are established by negotiation 
by the lessor and the lessee. They are composed of t wo 
factors: amortization of the investment of the purchaser 
over a fifteen-year period; and an interest factor to com-
pensate the purchaser for the us e of the capital involved. 
There are several pos sibil ities open i n case s of 
thi s sort - rhere an in,restor is attempting to amor ti ze an 
inves tment over a period of years. The simples t i s the 
s o-c alled s trai ght-line payout, wh ereby the capital invest-
ment is Qivided evenly by the number of y ears or months of 
t h e expec t ed life of the asset, and retired over t he period 
i n question. If the capi tal is being amortized in equal 
amounts and interes t is being cha r ged a t a fix ed r a te on 
the outstanding unamortized balance, then tota l payments 
for both interest and amortization decl~ne gradually over 
the life of the asset, until the amortization is complete. 
An alternative method is to compute a so-cal led constant 
payment, subject to ~1ortization of the capital over the 
expected life of the asset, including in the constant pay-
ment an interes t f actor. Where this method is used , during 
the early years interest accounts for most of the constant 
payment, and amortization is a rela tively minor part. '£he 
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amortization portion increases gradually over the years 2s 
interest on the unamortized balance declines. l'he lea se 
rentals under the ~quitable Plan involve a varia tion of t h e 
constant payment amortization method. The typical case calls 
for a fixed interest factor on the investment being amortized, 
together with a gr adual retirement of the investment over 
t h e initial l ease period; both f actors are covered by a 
schedule of constant payments providing for the reduction 
i n the cons t ant payment at the end of each three- y ear per iod . 
Although i n most cases large quantities of r a ilroad 
equipment of any of several types may be involved in one of 
t hese 11 deals " , under t h e Equitable Plan the i dentity of each 
pi ece of railroad equipment is carefully maintained t hrough-
out t he period of manufactur e and ·usage . Lea se r enta l s , too , 
a r e set up en a "per car 11 basis; and lease rentals are usu-
ally expre ssed in dollars per day , or fr actions t hereof. 
Customarily, a pr elimin ar y per di em renta l r~t e 
perta i ns during t h e time commencing with t he delivery of t h e 
fi r s t ca r and continuing until a given date or until all or 
an agreed portion of the equipment order has been delivered . 
O'pon d el ivery and accept ance of the specified equi pment lot, 
t he r eg ular rental rates pertain. Provisions are made for 
t he da te s and place of r enta l payments. In the t ypic al case 
detai led in Table XIII,* t he per di em lease rental for each 
* Infra, p . 130. 
car during succeeding three-year periods is $1.55, !Ji)l.50, 
i$1 • 2 5 , t .. 9 5 , and $ • 50 • 
Payment for use of the equipment of other rail-
roads at a specified amount per car, per day , is a well-
established part of railr oading oper a tions. It is this 
arrangement which makes it possible for goods to be trans-
shipped across the country over many different - routes and 
on t he tracks of many different railroad companies without 
being transferred from one f~ht car to another. During 
the period when a freight car belongi ng to some other rail-
r oad is on its lines, the r a ilroad using the equipment in 
its opera tions cus tomarily pays t he r ailroad owning such 
equipment a daily char ge of $1.75. 
Thus, the Equitable Plan fit s very nicely into 
railroading custom. Notice, also, in the typical exa~ple 
above, tha t the per diem rental per car payable to the 
~q uitable is substantially lower than the amount which the 
leasing railroad would have to pay for using the equipment 
of another railroad. Conversely, if ·the equipment leas ed 
from the Equitable goes off the lines of the leasing r ail-
road , the railr oa d company using the equipment pays a larger 
rent during the period to the leasing railroad than the 
l easing railroad must pay to the Equitable. 
Hence, if the lessee defaults, during t h e period 
tha t the default under the lea se continues, the Lease Agree-
ment c alls for a penalty charge payable to the lessor in 
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addition to the scheduled daily rental then applic able. This 
additional charge is equal to the amount by which the daily 
rental r eceived by the lessee from other railroads exc eeds 
the scheduled daily rental payable to the lessor. For ex-
ample, if the le s see railroad were in default with res pect 
to dai J..y r enta l payments of :jf; l.OO for a box car, and the 
less ee ·were at the same time r eceiving the r egular $1.75 per 
diem from another railroad for the use of the car in traffic 
interchange, the Equitable vmuld be entitled to rec eive the 
additional $ .75. 
3. Term of Lease 
The term of the leas e begins on t he date of the de-
livery to and acceptance by the lessee of the first car. Un-
les s default occurs, the lease t erminates at the expiration 
of fifteen years after the average date of acceptance of all 
of the cars by the l essee. fhe average da te of acceptance 
is determined by this formula: the number of cars acc epted 
by the lessee on each day is multiplied by the number of days 
elapsed since the date of acceptance of the first car and 
divided by the total number of cars accepted (quotient 
rounded to whole number.) 
4. Extension of Term 
By giving written notic e to the lessor less than 
six ty days prior to the expiration of the original fifteen-
year term, the lessee ha~ the right at its option to renew 
the lease for an additional t erm of ten years. During this 
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extended period, the lea se provisions continue to be in ef-
fect, except for the following : the rental payable in cash 
for t he use of the car is at a substantially lower rate (in 
the typical case discussed below, $ .20 per day); at any 
time on thirty days' written notice the lessee has t he 
ri gh t of returning any or all cars to the lessor, whereupon 
such car or cars shall no longer be subject to the lease; 
in case any car becomes lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond 
repair, cash damages payable by the lessee shall amount to 
the scrap value of the car, only. 
5. Identification Plates 
The purchaser of the equipment has the problem cf 
keepi ng track of its equipment, or rather, of being able to 
find and reclaim its e~uipment in t he even t of a default on 
t he part of the lessee. Bence, upon or before delivery , 
t ne manufacturer is required to place a metal plate , bear-
ing words in letters of not less than one inch in h ei ght: 
" The Equitable Life Assurance Society of The United States, 
Owne r and Lessor". The lessee agrees to restore or replace 
pla t e s lost, damaged, or defaced. The lessee may letter 
t he cars with nmnes or insignia used by the lessee on its 
own railro ad cars for identification, so that int erchange 
operation with other railroad companies shall not be hind-
ered. Ho wever, no designation may be placed on any of the 
cars which might be interpreted as ownership by any pa rty 
other t han the lessor. 
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For further assistance in identification and con-
trol, at tbetime of each delivery of cars, the lessee has 
one of his car numbers assigned to and placed on each piece 
of equipment. 
6. 'l'axes 
The les see agrees to pay promptly all governmental 
taxes , assessments, and charges levied on the interest of 
the lessee i n the cars, on the use of the cars, or on t he 
earnings arising from use of the cars . The lessee als o 
will pay any governmental charges levied against the lessor 
on account of its o~nership or use of the equipment, or the 
earnings arising therefrom. f his obligation does not ex t end 
to taxes on the rental provided for in the le&se unl ess 
payment by the lessor wo uld relieve the lessee from the 
pa~nnent of taxes which the latter would be otherwise obliga-
ted to pay. In t he event that the lessee is contesting the 
validity or amount of such taxes under prop8r l egal or ad-
ministrative proceedings, it may defer tax payments pending 
final judgment, unless thereby the rights or interests of 
the lessor will be endangered, according to the j udgment 
of the l e ssor. 
7. Maint enance of Equipment 
All equipment must be kept in good order and r epair 
during the cont'inuance of the lease . There is some leeway 
for t he lessee in t his provision, since ordinary wear and 
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tear are excepted. Expenditures made in keeping the equip-
ment pr operly maintained are, of course, paid for by the 
lessee. 
The possibi l ity is' pre sent that in the process of 
usage, a car may become lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond 
repa i r . In this latter event; wh en the nex t rental payment 
is due , t he lessee pays to the l es sor as damages an amount 
in cash equal to the sum of the scrap 1ralue of this non-
usable car at the current quoted prices for such scrap on 
the da t e t he car was destroyed or lost, plus the pr esent 
value of the total remaining daily rental due for such non-
usable car under the remaining t er m of the lease. I n compu-
ting the pr esent value of total r emaining daily r ental, the 
r ental in respect to each calendar month is discounted on 
the basis of .2 1/.2% per annum from the end of such calendar 
month to the date when such payment is required to be made 
under this section. Vihen the lessee has made t hi s cash 
payment for drunages , the le ssor is cons i dered to have been 
r e imburs ed in full for each car in que stion, and such car 
is no longer deemed to be s ub j ect to the lease. 
8. Annual Report s and Inspection 
On or before January 31 in each year during the 
life of the lease (or at other reasonable time reques t ed by · 
the lessor) the l essee furnishe s an accurate r eport, a ttes t ed 
by a president or vice-president, sta ting the following by 
car numbers: all cars sub ject to the lease; all cars lost, 
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destroyed or damag ed beyond repair during the per i od elaps ed 
since the previous report; all serviceable cars; cars avvait-
ing repairs; cars in the shops for repairs; and the presence 
of me t al plates and numbers for identifica tion on each car. 
The lessor is entitled to have its r ep res entative inspect 
car s a t the expense of the lessee whenever r easonabl y neces-
sary, to confirm that the leased equi pment is being properly 
maintained. 
9. Compliance with Laws ggg Rules 
The lessee agrees to comply with all governmenta l 
laws , regulations , and requirements, and with the Rules of 
Interchange of the Associa tion of American Railroads, with 
respect to the use, maintenance, and operation of the cars 
during t he lease period. In case changes in laws or regula-
tions require the addition of certain equipment or applianc e s 
to the cars, such additions will b e made by the lessee a t his 
ovm expens e , and shall be cons idered acc essions to the cars, 
wi th title thereto vested in the lessor. Respons i bility for 
any expenses or liabilities accruing t o the lessor becaus e 
of his ovmer shi p of the equipment are assumed by the lessee. 
lO. Condi tions of Default 
A vari e t y of conditions are defined as 11 events of 
default": f a ilure to meet rental payments scheduled in t he 
lease, with thirty-day period of grace; unauthorized assign-
ment or transfer of the leas e or of possession of cars, with 
t hirt y -day period of grace after vvritten notice has been 
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given by the lessor demanding cancellation of such unauth-
orized action; default in the observance or performance of 
any other covenants or 'conditions of the lease, with t hirty-
day period of grace after rec~ipt of ~Titten notice from 
t he lessor, specifying the def ault; a decree or order by 
authorized court of law, arising from bankruptcy, i nsol-
vency , or liquidation of the affairs of the lessee, if such 
decree or order remains in force for sixty days; any volun-
t ary action on the part of the less~e which, in f act or by 
implication, seeks to establish the insolvency or ban."k:ruptcy 
of the lessee; and default under any other Lease Agreement 
between t he lessor and the lessee. 
11. Rights of the Lessor in Even~ of Default 
In any of these cas es, the le s sor has t he option 
of proceeding by appropriate court action to enforce per-
formance by the lessee of the applicable terms of this lease 
or to recover damages for the breach. If the les sor prefers, 
he may instead give notic e to the lessee terminating all 
rights of the lessee to use of the cars. In this latter 
ca se, the lessor is entitled to have its agents enter upon 
t he premises of the lessee (or go where v·er the cars subject 
to the lease may be) and tak e physical possession of the 
. 
equipment. i'he lessor may then put the cars to v,rhatever use 
it may desire. (This would ordinarily take the form of rent-
ing the equipment to another r ailroad company at whatever 
rental the t wo parties mi ght agree upon.) 
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The lessor has the right to recover from the origi-
nal lessee any and all amounts which are due under the terms 
of the l ease up to the date of termination, and may also re-
cover damages from the lessee for the "loss of the bargain". 
Onder the formula for comput~ng such damages, the lessor 
receives any difference between the scheduled lease payments 
and the payments it receives for renting such railroad equip-
ment to another railroad -- the "going r a te" of equipment 
rent als may be lower t han the scheduled lease payments. 
12. Re turn of Cars 
When the lessee compl e tes its use of any car (either 
upon completion without renewal of the original term of the 
lease, or during or at the end of the extended term , or due 
to the lessor's taking repossession of the cars due to events 
of default), the lessee must deliver the cars to the lessor 
in good order and repair, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 
The lessor designates the assembly point on the track s of 
the l essee where the cars are to be r eturned . During a 
period of one hundred days when such r eturn delivery of c ars 
is being effected, the lessee is required to assemble , de-
liver , stor e , and t ransport the equipment at t he direction 
of the lessor, so that the equipment may be usable for lea se 
to another railroad without any exp ens e on the par t of the 
lessor. 
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13. Miscellaneous Provisions 
The l ease may be assigned by the lessor without 
the con s ent of the lessee, but lessee may not do t he same . 
The sole exc ept ion allows the less ee to mer ge or consoli-
date with another railroad. 
Opinion of couns el is provided as to t he val i dity 
and the legality of the Lease Agreement, the right of t he 
parties t o enter into t he agreement , ex emp tion f rom approval 
by public authority, and conditions of r ecording . 
The neces sary registra tions and recordi ngs are 
made by the lessee i n all sta t es where it opera t es , f or the 
purpose of protecting the lessor's titl e to the equi pment. 
14. Lea se Ag r eements Covering Other Eq uipment 
The Equitable Pl an for financing purchases of rail-
way equipment is not confined i n its applic a tions to rolling 
stock . Several agreements have been r eached undar which the 
Equitable has executed Manufacturing and Lease Agreements 
coveri ng Diesel-electric . passenger, f reight, and swj_ tching 
locomotives . Dieselization presents such great opportunity 
for saving s in oper a ting cos ts to certain railroads that t he 
possibility of default on a lea se payment i s very slight . 
No agreements have been worked out yet on coal-consuming 
tractive units. 
The Lease Agr eement on a Diesel-electric locomo-
tive ndeal" contai ns only one significant difference from 
t he agreement with respect to rolling stock : because of 
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the much larger sums involved for each piece of equipment, 
t he lessee is required to purchase and carry adequate insur-
ance on the leas ed locomotives. fhis is not true in the case 
of freight cars, where the lessee is sel f-insurer for c ars 
lo s t, destroyed , or damaged beyond repair. 
No agreements were concluded in 1950 for the pur-
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chase and lease of special purpose rolling stock. "Deals " 
were largely confined to box cars, hopper cars , gondola cars 
and other sta.""'ldard equipment us ed and usable by many r a ilroads . 
Th i s would be of obvious advantag e in t he event of a defaul t 
under the lease. 
Furthermore, special purpose rolling s tock is usually 
more costly than the s tandard varieties. J.:his means t hat rent-· 
al payments would be higher over the 15-year period. The limit-
ing factor in this case is the $1.75 per diem which the lessee 
would receive f rom other r ailroads when the special purpose 
car had l eft the le s see's tracks . The lessor's position in 
the event of trouble would be most unde sirabl e if the lease 
r ent a l called for a $2.00 daily payment and r ailroads using 
the car in interchange of traffic were getting the benefit of 
t he car at ~1.75 per day . Bven assuming no def ault , t he high-
er r ental necessar y to amortize the investment in special pur-
pose equipment puts the lessor in the undesirable position of 
depending upon the general credi t of the lessee. The ~quitable 
Plan was originat ed and designed to serve the equi pment needs 
of roads whos e general credit vva s already pr e tty well extended. 
IV. Economi c Consideration s 
A. Financing Costs 
1. fy nic al gxample 
In order to get a clea r insig~t i n to t he worki n gs 
of the ~quitable Plan, a ~pical example follows. 
The Equitable Lif e Assurance Society purchas es 
400 box c ars from a manufactur er a t a contract price of 
~ 5,280.00 for ea ch box car. Bi ghty per c en t of t h e purchas e 
price i s paid to t he manuf actur er initially by t he ~quitable . 
f he ' 207~ balance of $1,056.00 per car is paid to t he manu-
fact ur er by th e - ~quitable i n equal amounts over a period of 
f ive ye ars. l'he manufacturer receives i n t er es t on t he un-
paid bal ance at the r a te of 2% pc::r annum. i 'he ~q ui t able 
t ak e s a return on its inve s t men t a t the r a te of 3% per annum, 
and appli e s the rest of the rental payment s to the amorti za-
tion of its investment over the 15-year initial leas e period. 
The ~quitable leases the cars to a r ailroad for a period of 
fi f t e en years a t pe r di em r ental char ge s fo r each car of 
~1.55 f or the first t hree year s , $1.50 for the second t hree 
year s , ~1.25 for the t h ird t hree y ears, ~ . 95 for t h e fourth 
t hree ye a r s , and $ .50 for the fifth t hree year s . 
2. Paving Off the Manufacturer 
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fhe work i ngs of the plan f rom t he viewp oint of both 
seller and purcha ser (i. e ., t he manufacturer and t he Equitable) 
is s hown in accompanying Table XIII. In order to simplify 
and abbrevi a te t he sta ti s tical detail, t his t able shows t h e 
rent al payment s and other fi gures on a ~uart erly bas is, 
while in actual pr actic e t he r ent al s ar e r ecei ved by t he 
life i nsur ance company ea ch month. Th e manufacturer carrie s 
on his books an a ccount r eceivable from the Equitabl e wh ich 
i s cut from it s origi nal bal anc e of $1,056 .00 by the amount 
of ;17.60 per month per car, or $52.80 per quarter . Si x t y 
equal monthly payment s resul t i n the compl e t e elimi nation 
of t he amount due t he manufactur er and r e i mb urse hi m f or t h e 
entir e contract price of each car. In return for carrying 
t h i s r eceivabl e , he r eceive s inter e st on t h e declining bal-
ance at the r a te of 2~~ per annum. 
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The per diem rental s are set up so t hat the Equit a ble 
may r ec eive an over-all int er e st r e turn of 3 i~; per annum on 
its i n ves t ment, and a t the same time furnish additional 
moni es suffici ent to pay out the manufacturer and to a!nor-
ti z e compl etely t he en tir e inve s t ment of the Equitabl e over 
t he initial l ease period of fifteen y ears. The column r epre-
s enting amortization of the ~quitable 's inves t ment is t here-
for e the bal ancing it em. Dur i ng the fir s t three y ear s , in 
which t he per diem r enta l is ~n . 5 5 per car, the ~quitable' s 
amortization fi gur e i ncr eas e s from ~f 51 .68 i n the fir s t quar-
ter to $59.12 in t h e t welfth quarter. Ina smuch a s t he ren t a l 
drops to $1. 50 per diem commencing with the fourth y ear, the 
TABLE XIII 
PURCHASE OF ONE BOX CAR UNDER THE EQUITABLE PLAN 1 SHO.NING INTEREST AND 
AMORTIZATION PAYMENTS .FOR THE MANUFACTURER AND THE !JiSURANCE COMPAllY 
-
~ -
OUtatiiidbig \ .; ' . Iii"reet·j lor Per!;! Instalment Repayment of Purchase Balance End or Per~cd ManUlacturer E uitibl~ Number Quarterly Re itab!e ManUfacturer E uitable 2% Total Hanufaoturer E ~ 2garterl;Il Rent. 2 ~ 5 ( 1) 0 $1,056 $4,224 
1 $141.1.4 $1C4.1.8 $52.80 $51.68 1,003.20 4,172.32 $5.28 $31.68 $;6.96 37 86.69 2 l4l.L.3 105.12 52.00 52.~2 950.40 4,120.00 5.02 31.29 ;6.~1 ;a 86.69 
3 l41J!h 105.79 52.80 52.99 897.60 4,067.01 4.75 ;o.9Q 35.65 39 86.68 
4 141.1.4 1o6.L.5 52.80 53.65 8L4.80 4,013.~6 4.49 30.50 ;4.~ 40 86.69 
5 l.4l.IJ4 107.12 52.e.c 54.32 792.00 3,959.~ 4.22 30.10 34.~2 41 86.69 
6 141.4~ 107.78 52.00 54.98 739.20 3,904.06 3·96 29.69 \ 33·65 42 86.C9 
7 l4l.h4 108.46 52.80 55.66 686.hO 3,848.LO ;.70 29.28 32.98 4; 86.68 
8 141.4h 1($.15 52.80 56.~5 633.60 3,792.05 3.43 28.86 32.29 L4 86.&9 
9 l4l.IJ4 1C9.83 52.80 57.03 580.00 3,735.02 ;.17 28.44 31.e1 45 86.69 
10 141-4~ 110.52 52.80 57.72 528.00 3,677.30 2.90 28.01 30.91 46 86.69 
11 141.~ 111.22 52.80 58.1.2 475.20 3,618.fl8 2.~ 27.58 30.22 47 86.68 
12 141.1.4 111.92 52.eo 59.12 422.L.o 3,559.76 2.~8 2i.~ 29.,2 h8 86.69 
13 136.88 108.('1"f 52.80 55.?7 369.60 3,504.49 2.11 26.70 28.81 h9 45.63 
14 1~6.87 108.74 52.E><> 55.9h 316.80 3 ,448.;5 1.85 26.28 28.1~ 50 45.62 
15 136.88 1C9.1.;4 52.80 56.~ 264.00 3,391.91 1.58 25.86 27.!:4 51 45.6~ 
16 136.87 llO.ll 52.80 57.~1 211.20 3,334.60 1.~2 25.~ 26.76 52 45.63 
, . 
17 136.~ 11C.81 52.00 58.01 158.40 3,276.59 1.06 . '' '25•01' .. ' 26.07 53 45.63 
18 136.87 111.51 52.80 58.71 1C5.60 3,217.~ .79 24.57 25.~6 54 45.62 
19 1;6.B8 112.?2 c;2.e.o 59.42 52.80 3,158.46 
·'3 24.1~ 24.66 55 45.62 
20 136.87 112.92 52.80 60.12 3,098.~4 .26 2;.69 23.95 56 45.63 
21 136.88 u;.~ 2,984.70 23.24 r 57 45.63 
22 136.87 114.48 2,870.22 22.~9 5'3 45.62 
23 1;6.88 115.35 2, 754.87 21.~ 59 45.62 
2~ 136.87 116.21 2,638.66 20.66 60 4?.63 
25 114.('6 94.27 2,544.~9 19.79 
26 114.06 94.98 2,!A9.41 19.N~ 
27 1l4.o6 95.69 2,353.72 18.37 
28 114.C7 96.142 2,257.30 17.65 
29 114.06 97.13 2,1~.17 16.93 ;o 114.06 cn.e6 2,062.~1 16.20 • Per Diem Renta1t $1 
31 114.06 98.59 1,963.72 15.47 t~ 
32 114.07 91.~~ 1,864.~e 14.73 
' 
33 114.04 100.08 1,7~-~0 13.98 
34 114..06 100.83 1,663.47 13.23 
35 114.06 101.58 1,561.89 12.48 
;6 11..4.07 102.;6 1.459.53 11.71 
p 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4, 
5 6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1~ 
13 '. 
14 
15 
' 16 • 
17 
18 
19 
20 ~ 
21 
22 
23 
2~ 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 ' 
33 
34 
35 
36 
1a;yment of Purchase 
Eguitable m 
(4) 
75.74 
76.31 
76.87 
77 .1~6 
78.~ 
78.63 
79.21 
79.81 · 
00.41 
81.01 
81.61 
82.2~ 
41.79 
42.09 
42.4l 
42.74 
43.06 
4~-37 
43.69 
44.03 
44.~6 
44.69 
45.0?. 
34.q:=; 
$h,2J4.Ti 
excess ot 
$10.42 
Outs tand in b 
Ealanee End of Period 
Equitable 
(6) 
1,383.79 
1,307.48 
1,230.61 
1,153.1; 
1,075.11 
~.48 
917.27 
837.~6 
757.05 
676.04 
5%.43 
512.21'> 
470.41 
428.J2 
385.91 
343.17 
300.11 
256.74 
213.05 
169.02 
124.66 
79.97 
34.95 
Interest for PeriOd 
Equitable 
3% per annum 
( 8) 
10.95 - ~-
10.38 
9.81 
9.23 
8.65 
8.C6 
7-47 
6.88 
:6.28 
'5.69 
5.0? 
.4.46 
"" 
3.81~ 
3.';3 
3.21 
2.89 
2.57 
2.25 
1.93 
1.60 
1.27 
.93 
.60 
.26 
~55 for first 3 years; t1.50 for second 3 years1 $1.25 for 
ird 3 years; $.95 for fourth 3 years; $.50 for fifth 3 years. 
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Equitable's amortization payment drops in the thirteenth 
quar t er to ij;; 55.27 and gradually increases to $ 60.12 in the 
twentieth quarter. 
It ~~ll be r emembered that the Equitable 's cash 
outlay initially was $4,224.00 per car. At the end of five 
years, when the. manufacturer is completely out of t he pic-
ture, the ~qui table's investme nt has been writ ten dovm to 
:r?3,098.34, or 73.35% of the insurance company 's original 
cash outlay. However, t his fi gure of ~; 3, 098.34, amounts to 
only 58.68% of the original cost of the car, which the 
~quitable now owns free and clear , with all the concomitant 
privileges and risks of ownershin. 
3. Comnletion of Amortization of the Eouitable's Inves t ment 
Cornmencing with the first payment in the sixth 
year, t he Equitable has the benefit of the full $1.50 per 
di em rental for a year before the rental drops to qf;l. 25. 
Four quarterly payments, r anging from $113.64 to •\116.21, 
cut down the Equitable's i nvestment to $2,638.66, or almost 
exactly 50%. of the original contract price for the car. 
Commencing v1i th the first paymen t in the seventh y ear, the 
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per diem drops to ~1.25. During t hi s t hird three-year period, 
t he Equitable receives amortization sc al i ng from $94 .27 in 
t he t wenty-fifth quar ter to ~~102.36 in the t h irty-six th 
quarter. This cuts the outstanding balance down to 
$1,459.53, or 27.64%. of the original contract cost. The 
peri odical amortization drops again when the daily r ental 
steps down to $ . 95 in the fourth three-year period . At the 
end of the t vmlfth year, the Equitable's outstandi ng bal-
ance amounts to $512.20, or 9.70;{ of the original contrac t 
cost of t he car. During t he final three-year period of the 
initial term, the per diem r ental is ~ .50 per car. fhis is 
sufficient to write off compl e t ely the r emaining balance of 
t he ~quitable's investment at the conclus ion of t he initial 
leas e period. In the typic al example given, the interest 
f actor s and r o unded figures combin e to produc e a rental of 
$45.63 during the last quart er, greater by $10. 42 than t he 
amount sufficient to make the final inter est and amorti zation 
payment to the Equitable. 
Notice that the Bquitable has rece i ved 3% per annum 
on it s ca s h investment t hroughout the initial period of t he 
lease , has written t he cos t of the equipment off compl etely , 
and ha s lc ept its inves t ment declining at a f ar fa s t er r a te 
t han one would expect reproduction costs of box cars to 
decline. 
4. Railroads ' Choice of Financing Me thod 
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The ~quitable Plan for financing purchases is only 
one of t he s everal available me t hods . In rec ent year s , prior 
to origination of the Plan , the most common me t hod was issu-
ance of equipment trust certifica tes under t h e Philadelphia 
Plan . Thi s t y pe of financing accounted for roughly 6o;s· of 
all equipment obliga tions, in total volume amounting to nearly 
t wice as much as was accounted for by its closest "rival", 
conditional sales agreements. 
It is obvious tha t the mere origination of a new 
idea in financial circles will be of little conseQuence if 
it does not have an appeal based on sound business considera-
tions. In approaching any financing , the financi a l offic ers 
of each of America's great corporations utilize t heir de-
tailed knowledge of the current condition of the · ar ke t for 
a l l ~pe s of securiti es, wei ghing the relative cc 8t and t h e 
r ela tive advantages of the various financ i ng methods open to 
them . Within the framework of the financial policies of 
long standing observed by the corporation in question, the 
ex ecutives usuall y select the lowest cost form of financing 
com..rnensurate with maintaining a sound capital structure for 
the "long pull". In order to be attractive to the railroads, 
the Equitable Plan must appeal to the railroads as a plan of 
financing whose costs are comparable to financing costs under 
the other plans for financing equipment purchases. Let us 
then d etermine th e comparative costs. 
5. Comparative Costs 
For purposes of comparison, let us assume that we 
are dealing with the purchase of a lot of 400 steel box cars, 
l ength 40' 6 11 , capacity 100,000 pounds, costing $ 5,280.00 
each , or a total of $2,112,000.00 for t h e lot. Let us as sume 
the a l terna tive of a fifteen-year Philadelphia Plan equipment 
trust, covering the entire cost of ~2,112,000.00. Interest 
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is assumed at 3% per annmn, and principal and interest pay-
ments ar e due semi-annually. fhis means that there is no 
initial cash outlay (one of the aspects of the ~quitable Plan 
which appeals to some railroads), and t hat principal payments 
must be made in the amount of $70,400.00 a t the end of each 
six months. 
Under Federal internal revenue regulations, princi-
pal payments on equipment trust maturities are considered as 
c apital charge s and do not qualify a s income deductions for 
tax purposes. However, the interest payments qualify as 
income deductions, as do depreciation charges. 
Depreciation allowances on equipment vary from road 
t o road, with the depreciation r a te for the individual road 
e s t ablished through conferenc e with internal revenue offi-
cials. fhe decision in this crucial matter appears to de-
pend upon the average age of the equipment of the railroad 
in question. That is, if the average age of a r ailroad's 
equipment were fifty years, the revenue officials would 
assume that the r ailroad would opera te ne~ly purchased equip-
ment for a similar length of time; hence a depr ecia tion rate 
of 2% per annum would be allowed, calculated to write off 
the cost of the equipment over its expected life. Similarly, 
if the average age of a railroad's equipment were ten years, 
it might be allowed a depreciation rate of approximately 10%. 
Few railroads fall into thes e extreme categories, and a 
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fair l y typical depreciation rate would range from 3 to 4~ . 
Depreciation allowances are referr ed to as "cru-
cial" because they appear in the earning sta tement as charges 
against income, and therefor e represent savings in income 
taxes. It is paradoxical that under this method of regula-
ting depreciation rates, the road with newer equipment and 
lower average age of equipment obtains the higher deprecia-
tion rate and higher tax savings. The road with the greatest 
need to modernize obtains the least tax savings from its 
modernization. For the purposes of this example, it is as-
SQmed that the equipment may be written off over a thirty-
year period. 
As far as income tax rates are concerned, the high-
er the tax rate becomes, the greater the savings represented 
by income deductions. Since it is pertinent to reproduce 
conditions as they were when the Equitable Plan was origina-
ted, a corporate normal tax and surtax compound rate of 38% 
is assumed throughout. (Since that time, taxes have been 
raised t wice, and in all probability will be raised further. 
This f act should be kept in mind in connection with the over-
all problem.) 
At the end of the first six months, as shown in 
Table XIV, the railroad must pay interest at 3% per annum 
on the total cost of the equipment order amounting to 
$31,680.00, plus the ini t ial principal payment of $70,400.00. 
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TABLE XIV 
NET COST OF PURCHASING $2,112,000 OF EQUIPMENT UNDER PHILADELPHIA PLAN 
(1.5' YEARS, NO DOWN PAYMENT, PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST DUE SEMI-ANNUALLY) 
! '2 
, 1/ 2 
' ' 
'2 
, 1/ 2 
8 
8 1/2 
9 
9 1/ 2 
10 
l l' 1 /2 
11 
11 1 12 
1"' 
12 1/2 
13 
13 1/ ? 
1.4 
1.4 l/2 
1::; 
Fi rs t l. yuara 
Sec cnd 3 years 
Th \ri 3 yeara 
Totn 1 9 years 
Four t h 3 years 
Toto1 1?. years 
Fifth 3 yeara 
Total 15 years 
Fr ~nc! pa l 
? yrae n t 
I 70,4oo 
10 ,1,oo 
7o,J,oo 
70,400 
70 ,LOO 
70 ,h00 
422 ,J·~ 
70,hOO 
70,400 
70,400 
70,1,oo 
70,h00 
70,400 
422,400 
e.'Jl,BOO 
70,400 
?O,L,oo 
70,400 
10,1,oo 
70,lOO 
70 ,400 
422 ,1.00 
1,267 ,200 
70,1,oo 
70,400 
70 ,h00 
o ,J.oo 
70 ,h00 
70,Loo 
42?,1,oo 
1,68CI ,6oO 
70 ,400 
70,h00 
70 ,400 
70 ,400 
70 ,400 
70 ,400 
422,400 
12,112,000 
let ~ e at Deproc i atlqn Totfll 
r, 3t ( 30 Yea rs ) in t<! :"., S t .!: 
?e r Annum Deorec i a t i 
' 31, 680 
30,624 
29 , '5613 
213,')12 
27,456 
26,400 
174 ,21~0 
25,344 
24,288 
23,232 
22,176 
21,120 
20,o64 
136 ,224 
310 ,h6l.. 
19,009 
17,952 
16,1396 
15 ,Bl,o 
11., 781.. 
1:'1,728 
98,206 
ho5 ,672 
12 ,672 
11,616 
1C,56o 
9 ,504 
8 ,1.48 
7,W2 
60,192 
4c3, 36L 
6 ,336 
5,280 
4,221 
"3 , 1613 
2,112 
1,0')6 
22,176 
$191,040 
I 35,200 
35,200 
35,200 
35,200 
35,200 
~5,200 
211,200 
35,200 
35,200 
35,200 
35,200 
35,21)0 
35,200 
211,200 
422,hoo 
35,200 
35,200 
35 ,200 
35,200 
35,200 
3'5,200 
211,200 
633,600 
35,200 
35,200 . 
~5 ,200 
35,200 
35,20C 
35,200 
211,200 
8LL,I3oo 
35,200 
35,200 
35 ,200 
35 ,200 
35,200 
35,200 
211,200 
ll,O'j6,000 
S 66 ,'B O 
o5,824 
64,768 
63 '712 
62 ,6'16 
~~:. 
os ,l~ 
,• l...L!.,. 
'-'" ,1:58 
:;c ,I 2 
57,376 
5r> ,3?0 
':'> ,26i, 
732 , 8.61.: 
5L , 208 
5" . 152 
z' i ')(. 
5 ~, J[A) 
t ' '3L 
LA ,92fl 
• -9 , l,oe 
1,042,272 
47,872 
46,1!16 
45,76o 
4), ,70}, 
1, 6J..n 
1:2:s 2 
41,536 
40,4 
39 ,42 ' 
~s , ; 
~7 . 3 12 
36,256 
233,376 
11,?47 ,040 
~ 25 ,J:l1 .Lo 
25,013 .12 
24,6 11. 94 
24 ,210. 56 
2'\ , 'lQ9 . '?3 
23 ,L, 8 .oo 
2 , o .?2 
22,6o5.44 
22 ,2<j, ,l6 
21, 2. 13 '1 
1,1,u1 .60 
21 , )()0 .32 
132 ,021. 12 
20 , '599 .01.. 
20 ,197.76 
19 ,796.40 
19 ,W') .20 
Ie ,9' '"' · 'P-
1A, 592~ 
103, 
15 ,7 f1"7, , 6~ 
15 ,392 . LO 
1.4,9 1. 12 
14,<;79 . 
11., 179 . 56 
13 , 777 .26 
68,662.138 
1587,875.20 
Net Cas h 
lthy 
76 ,66'j . 6o 
7£. , 010 .138 
T,. 56 .16 
7lt,701.4h 
74 , 6 .72 
7'1,~92.00 
450 ,172. 130 
72,737.213 
72,032. 5 
71,427. 134 
70,773.12 
70,119 .1~0 
69,463.69 
426,602.89 
876,775.69 
68,808.96 
68, 154.24 
67,499.52 
66,P.J.L.F)J 
66, 190 . 09 
65 , '535 . 36 
1,279/I/) '3 . 6L 
61.. ' 'l'3C • 61.. 
61..,225 . 92 
63 ,c;71.?.0 
62 ,91 . LA 
62 ,2 1. 76 
~·-=-o..!:!_ 
· ~g , / ,6~ . 04 
1, '"'1 ,271 .68 
00,0')2 .32 
,;:cq . 6o 
5 ,6L2 .'l8 
7 ,9 ·.16 
:;e , n. l 
57 , 67'3 . 2 
3'JS, 'l9). 12 
12 ,015 ,161...80 
The interest charge plus the allowable depreciation provision 
of $35,200.00 amount to $66,880.00 . Thus t here is a saving 
in income t axes (bas ed on a 38% tax r a t e ) of $25, 414 .40. 
Deducting t h is lat ter amoQnt from the actual ca sh payments 
of principal and interest, we see that the net cash outlay 
for the first six months amounts to $76,665.60. 
Summarizing the net cash outlay over t h e life of 
t he trus t, t he following totals are given: 
Summary of Table XIV 
First thr ee years 
Second t hree years 
::l'hird three years 
Fourth three years 
Fifth thr ee y ears 
Total for fifteen y ears 
$ 450,172.80 
426,602.88 
403,032.96 
379,463.04 
355.893.12 
$2,015,164.80 
1'able XV demonstrates what the same equipment pur-
chase would cost t he r ailroad under the Equitable Plan. ·.fhi s 
table utilizes the very same a ssumptions as to cost of equip-
ment a s doe s Table XIV, ~nd the same per diem rental s as Table 
XIII. For purposes of simplicity, the further assumption is 
made t hat each month contains t hirty days . (The rentals are 
thus understa ted each year by an amount equal to five days' 
rent.) The initial payment on the order is a monthly rental 
of $18,600.00 f or use of the equipment. this is an oper-
ating expense to the railroad, just as are any rent al pay-
ments the r ailroad may make for the use of box cars of other 
r ailroad lines, or r ental payments for its office , t er minal , 
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TABLE XV 
NET COST OF PURCHASING $2 1 112 1 000 OF EQUIF\!ENT UNDER EQUITABLE PLAN 
(BASED O!l RENTALS CONTAINED m TABLE XIII) 
Aggregate 38% Net 
of llonthlT Tax Cash 
Period Rentals Credit Outlay 
1st Year $ 223,200 $ 84,816 $ 138,384 
2nd Year 223.,200 84,816 138,384 
3rd Year 223,.200 84,~816 138,~384 
Total 3 Years 669,® 254,448 4l5,152 
4th Year 216,000 82,080 133,920 
.5th Year 216,000 82,080 133,920 
6th Year 2161000 82 208o 1332920 Second 3 Years 0481ooo ~451 ~4~ 4~11 700 Total 6 Years 1,~317,~006 5062688 8l1>,912 
7th Year 180,000 68,400 lll,6oo 
8th Year 180,000 68,400 lll,600 
9th Year 1801000 681400 lllz6oo Third 3 Years ~~~000 ~~~~~ ~~~B~ 
Total 9 Years 11B571C>OO 7~5 1 BBB 111511712 
lOth Year 136,800 51,984 84,816 
llth Year 136,800 .51,984 84,816 
12th Year 136,~800 511984 841816 Fourth 3 Years IU~14M5 1551,52 2541Ii4B Total 12 Years 212oB1ooo Bo11B4~ 114l50 11~ 
13th Year 72,000 27,360 44,640 
14th Year 72,000 27,360 44,640 
15th Year 72,.000 27 1~ 441640 Fifth 3 Years 2!o1ooo 133 926 82 .. ~ 1a24~:~~ Total 15 Years 214B4,.ooo '4~ .. ,2~ 
16th to 25th Years 288,000 109,440 178,.56o 
Total 2.5 Years $2,772,000 $1,053,.360 $1,718,640 
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and warehousing facilities, ovmed by others. Since the rail-
road may include this total monthly rental in operating ex-
penses, the ful l amount is subject to the 38% tax credit, 
and the net cash outlay is $11,532.00 for the first month. 
Summarizing the net cash outlay over the life of the initial 
lease period under the Equitable Plan, the following results 
are produced: 
Summary of fable XV 
First three years 
Second three years 
Third three years 
Fourth three years 
Fifth three years 
Total for fifteen years 
$ 415,152.00 
401,760.00 
334,800.00 
254,448.00 
133.920.00 
$1,540.080.00 
On the basis of this comparison, the Equitable Plan 
results in a saving to the railroad of $475,084.80. However, 
in order to relate these amounts more fairly, let us assume 
that at the end of the fifteenth year use of the equipment 
is to be discontinued. In this case, the railroad financing 
its equipment under the Philadelphia Plan would have benefits 
coming from sale of the equipment for scrap and from tax 
savings arising from the write-off of undepreciated book 
value. With the advance warning that the following figures 
do not take into account the value of cash for alternative 
uses, the follQViing comparison is presented: 
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fABL~ XVI 
COMPARISON OF N.I!:T CASH OUTLAY (15 YB:ARS) 
UNDER PHILAD~LPHIA AND ~~UITABLE PLANS 
Net Cash Payments 
1-15 years 
Undeprec. Book Value 
at 15th year 
Salvage Value (4.7%) 
Loss on Salvage 
of Equipment 
Less: 38% Tax Credit 
·:rhereon 
$1,056,000.00 
99..~.264.00 
$ 956,736.00 
Philadelphia 
Plan 
$2,015,164.80 
363,559.68 
$1,651,605.12 
l:!;quitable 
Plan 
$1,540,080.00 
$1,540,080.00 
Assuming that the equipmen t is not to be used be-
yond the fifteen-year period, it is apparent that the net 
cash outlay is smaller by $111, 525.12 under the £quitable 
Plan than under t he Philadel phia Pla n. This saving amounts 
to 5.28% of the origi nal co s t of the equipment, or .352% 
per yea r over the fifteen-year period. 
At the end of the fifteenth year, the railroad 
has the opt i on to lea s e the Equitable's car s at a per di em 
r ental of $ .20 per car. If it do es wish to continue using 
t he c ar s , it is t h erefore faced with an additional expense . 
On t he other hand , if it owned the cars itself (completel y 
paid for under the Philadel phia Plan), it would be pay i ng 
out no ca sh and would be r eceiving tax credits from the 
continuing depreciation charges. It woul d also be entitled 
to rec eive t he salvage value of the equipment if t he equip-
ment were t o be sold f or j unk at the end of t wenty-five 
y ear s , and would receive further tax savings from the 
write-off of the undepreci a ted book value. f'Ji t h the warn-
ing , again , t hat t he following fi gur e s do not t ake i n to 
consi dera tion t he value of cash for a lternative use s , t he 
f ollowi ng compari s on is presented: 
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·rABLB XVII 
COMPARISON OF NEf CASH OUfLAY (2 5 Y~AHS) 
UND.t!:R J£WUI·rAB1E AND PHILAD~I ,PHIA PLANS 
Net Cash Payments, 
1-15 years 
Rental Payments, 
16-25 years 
Less: 38% fax Credit Thereon 
Net Cash Rental 
Depreciation Charges, 
16-25 years 
Less: 38% Tax Credit Thereon 
Undeprec. Book Value 
at 25th year 
Sal vage Value (4.7%) 
Loss on Salvage of 8quipment 
Less: 38% Tax Credi t Thereon 
Net Cash Outlay , 
1-25 years 
Philadelphia 
Plan 
$2,015,164.80 
$288,000.00 
109,440.00 
$704,000.00 
267,520.00 
$352,000.00 
221264.00 
$252,736.00 
96,039.68 
~Pl , 651' 605.12 
..!:!;qui t able 
Plan 
$.)1,540,080.00 
178,560.00 
$1,718,640.00 
The preceding comparison shovvs an excess· cost 
under the Equitable Plan of $67,034.88, equal to 3.17~ of 
the original cost of the equipment over t h e period, or 
approximately .127% per year. 
6. Present Value of Comnarative Costs 
Thes e foregoing comparisons of the relative cost 
to the railroad of financing under the Equitable Plan and 
the Philadelphia Plan do not take into account the value 
of cash for alternative uses. fhat is, in each case a 
certa i n schedule of deferred payments must be made to cover 
the use of the funds and the repayment of t he funds. these 
scheduled payments are not identical, however, being heavier 
in the earlier years in the case of the Phil adelphia Plan, 
and involving payments in the last ten years under the 
~quitable Plan. Since at any given poin t on the schedule 
one Plan involves an excess of net cash outlay in comparison 
with the other Plan, it is impor tant that some mathematical 
tr eatment be used to reduce these differentials to a co~non 
basis of value. For instance, in the first year, net cash 
outlay under the Equitable Plan amounts to ~138,384.00, 
whi l e under the Philadelphia Plan it amounts to $ l52,676.48 . 
This cash savi ng of $14,292.48 could be used by the railroad 
to purchase more equipment, or to retire debt, or for gen-
eral corporate uses which might otherwise demand the issu-
ance of debt. fherefore, any cash savings of this sort 
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should be credited with a compound return based upon their 
value for these alterna tive purposes. 
De·pending on the purpose to w!1ich . they are put, a 
justifiable return on these savings might range anywhere 
from 2.% to 15%. lt'or purposes of illustration, it is assumed 
that ca s h sa'l.ring s are entitl ed to a 3:7; compound interest 
factor. In apply ing the factor, one might subject the . 
periodic saviD~s to a compounding at the 3% rate. A some-
what more satisfactory method would be to reduce all of the 
scheduled payments (and credits, in the case of the Phila-
delphia Plan) to their present value , using an interest 
factor of 3% per annum, and this latter trea tment is fol-
lowed. In establishing the interest factor, it is well to 
have in mind that under present value formulae, a large 
interest factor has the effect of minimizing the present 
cost of future payments long deferred, and conversely, of 
minimizing the present worth of future credits to be re-
ceived. Since the 8quitable Plan involves · rental payments 
in t he 15th to 25 th years, during which time under the 
Philadelphia Plan the railroad enjoys credits due to tax 
savings , the assumption of the fairly low interes t factor 
(3%) weighs the results · slightly in favor of the Philadelphia 
Plan.* 
* Advice andassistance in applying mathematical formulae 
received from Mr. Bverett C. Huntington, Associa te 
Actuary, State Mutual Life Assur ance Company of 
Worcester, Massachusetts. 
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The following comparison deals with the present 
value of the net cash pay1nents under the two plans, assuming 
tha t us e of the equipment c eas es at the end of fifteen years: 
:I'ABLE XVIII 
CO:MPARISON OF' PR.!:!;SENT VALUE OF N.t:;T CASH OUTLAY 
(15 YEARS) UNDER PHILADELPHIA AND EQUITABLE PLM~S 
Present Value of Net Cash 
Payments, 1-15 years 
Less: Present Value of fax 
Credit Arising from Los s 
on Salvage of Equipment 
Philadelphia 
Plan 
$1,630,675.84 
232,591.82 
$1,398,084.02 
.t:quitable 
Plan 
$1,295,525.96 
$1,295,525.96 
The cost under the Equitable Plan on this basis of 
comparison is lower than under the Philadelphia Plan by 
$102,558 .06, a saving of 7.31* · 
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The following comparison dea l s with the present value 
of the net cash payments under the t wo plans, assuming us e of 
the equipment for t wenty-five years: 
TABLE XIX 
COMPARISON OF PRBS_ri;.l\lT VALU~ 
OF NE'.l: CASH OUTLAY (25 YEARS) 
UNDER PHTLADE1PHI A AND EQUITABLE PLANS 
Philadelphia 
Pl an 
Equitable 
Plan 
Present Value of Net Cash 
Payment s , l-15 y ears $1,630,675.84 $1,295,525.96 
Present Value of Net Cash 
Rentals, 16-25 years 
Less: Present Value of Tax 
Sa~ring s Resulting from 
Depree. Charges , 16-25 yrs. 
Less: Present Value of Tax 
Savings Resulting from Loss 
on Salvage of Equipment 
99,346.88 
146,919.97 
45,619.30 
~1,438,136.57 $1,394,872.84 
On t h is basis of comparison, the co s t under the 
~quitable Pl&~ is lower t han under the Philadelph i a Plan by 
$43,263.73, a s aving of 3.01%. 
Nothing has been said up to t his point above the 
earnings v;hich the r ai l road would receive after the end of 
t he t wenty-fifth year on equipment it owned, financed under 
the Philadelphia Plan. It is obviously true that t he r ail-
ro ad could receive revenues from operating the equipment 
longer than t wenty-five years. It is problematical wheth er 
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there would be much in the way of net earnings after count-
ing in the increased costs of op erating obsolete equipment. 
Furthermore, assuming that obsolete equipment actually is 
capable of producing some net income, these future earnings 
would have a purely nominal present value because of the 
time element and compound interest factor. Since there is 
slight possibility of either incidence or influence, no 
attempt is made to take into account these potential c~arn­
ings beyond the t wenty-fifth year. 
It has been stated that in these figures a slight 
bias exists in favor of the Equitable Plan, d ue to the as-
sumution for simplicity's sake of a thirty-day month. Also, 
a slight bias exists in favor of the Philadelphia Plan in 
selecting a low interest factor in computing pres ent worth. 
It is submitted that the errors are of a compensat · ng nature, 
and that therefore the mathematical results are of suffici ent 
accuracy to draw these conclusions: 
Over a t -enty-five year period, the 
cost of financing railway equipment purchases 
under the ~quitable Plan is somewha t lower 
(3.01%) than under the Philadelphia Plan; 
Over a fifteen-year period, the cost 
of financing railway equipment purchases 
under the ~quitable Plan is substantially 
(7.31~) lower than under the Philadelphia Plan. 
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(The student of rails will be interested to know 
that if the Philadelphia Plan used for comparison had in-
volved a 20Jo cash 11 down payrnent 11 , the cost of financing under 
the Philadelphia Plan would have been lower by only $2,808.56, 
a negligible amount which would not alter the above conclu-
sion. Because of the 201~ cash "down payrnent 11 , :it was assumed 
that the interest cos t in this case would be 2 l/2%.) 
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B. Rebuilt Equipment 
l. Acknoviledgments 
In the absence of fir s thand knowledge of the prob-
lems of railr oading, information on the economics of rebuilt 
railway equipment has been heavily drawn from a report pre-
pared in 1936 for the American Rail way Car Institute, by 
Coverdale and Colpitts, a New York firm of consulting engi-
neers of national repu.tation. 1his report commenc es wi t h a 
survey of the equipment situation as of December 31 , 1935, 
of t he Class I railroads. It states t hat there wer e at t hat 
time about 760,000 f reight cars more than t wenty y ears old, 
cars which, generally speaking, "are uneconomical to operate 
and maintain and should be retired and •.• replaced with 
cars of the latest design. 11* 
2. A Decision for Railroad· IVianagement 
It is a very practical problem, confronting most 
railr oads, to decide whe ther to buy new equipment or to re-
build old equipment. At first blush, there seems to be no 
particular ob jection to r ebuilding the old box car. If 
trucks are thoroughly examined, wheels changed , worn manu-
facturing parts replaced, woodwork patched up, and paint 
applied liberally, the rebuil t box car has much the same 
surface appearapce as a brand new box car. :I:he rebuilding 
process costs less than a new box car (although rebuilding 
* 
4, p. 1. 
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cos ts are surprisingly hi gh). Appearanc es are not a l way s 
what they seem to b e , however, and the rebuilt box car may 
wel l occupy a position analogous to t he Deacon's One-Horse 
Shay, which looked perfectl y all right at t h e end of ninety-
n i ne y ears, but fell apart a year later. 
3. Basic Data 
In making the survey on freight car maintenance 
and rebuilding costs, the engineers surveyed four rail roads 
and ob tained data for 35,358 car s , most of which were re-
bui l t be t ween 1923 and 1929. Average age of box cars at 
time of r ebuilding ra.11 ged from one railr oad·' s 15. 7 years to 
another railr oad's 18.2 years. Av er age age a t time of re-
bui l ding for all car s survey ed wa s 16. 8 y ears.* The r ebuil d-
ing proc ess resulted in ex tending t h e life of t he equipment 
f or a period of years ranging from a rninimwn of 7.2 y ears 
f or one road to a maxi mum of 12.2 years on another road , the 
averag e for the four roads being 9.3 years. The co s t of re-
buil d i ng the equipment r anged from a low of ~1,200 on one 
r a i l road to a high of $1,689 on another r a ilroad, t he aver-
a ge f or t he group being $1,487. In corrobor a tion of t his 
evid enc e , t h e r e port Quoted a study made several y e a rs pre-
vious to that da te by an i ndepend en t firm of accountants, 
which study sh owed r ebuilding costs r anging up to $1,663 , 
with service life r estored by the rebuil ding proc e ss aver-
a ging about 8 .5 years. 
* 4, pp. 6-8. 
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4. Maintenance and Capital Costs 
It should b e fair ly obvious t hat a rebuil t car 
conta ins some parts which passed inspection at t h(:! time of 
rebuil ding but which have t aken so muc h punishment tha t 
their fai l m1 e may occur unexpectedly '~Ni t hin a shor t period 
of time. Also, over a period of years, changes occur in 
fr ei ght car design with the result tha t maintenance is 
simplified and car parts have superior properties . Further-
more, s afety devices are develop ed from time to time which 
the Association of American Railroads and the I. C.C. may 
require to be added to obsole te equipment, if such equipment 
is to be used in i n t erchange service. In v i ew of this, it 
vv-ould be most surprising to find t hat maintenance co s ts on 
rebuilt equipment are equal to or lower than maintenance 
co s ts on new equipment. fab le XX contains estimates as to 
maintenanc e co sts under conditions prevailing in 1935. 
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:I'ABLE XX 
BOX CAR MAIN'I'.LN.ANC~ cos·.rs BY YEARS , 
HEATl AND RUNNI NG R~PAIBS 
(BASED ON CONDITIONS I N 193 5)* 
Car Rebui l t a t 17 Year s 
9 Years Added Life 
New Moder n Car: 
20 Year Ll f e 
Year Amount Year Amount 
17 Rebui l t 1 $ 15.00 
18 $ 25.00 2 1 5 .00 
19 25 .00 3 1 5 .00 
20 25.00 4 1 5 .00 
21 25 .. 00 5 1 5.00 
22 25. 00 6 30.00 
23 500.00 7 230.00 
24 35. 00 8 30.00 
25 3 5.00 9 30.00 
26 35.00 10 30. 00 
11 40.00 
12 40.00 
·r ota1 9 Year s $730.00 13 375 .00 
14 40. 00 
1 5 40.00 
16 4 5.00 
17 45.00 
18 45.00 
19 45.00 
20 4 5. 00 
Total 20 Year s $1 ,185.00 
While it is logica l to expect h eavi er mai ntenanc e 
cos t s on rebui l t frei gh t cars , ther e is the compensa t ing 
f actor tha t capital cos ts of new equi pment wi ll be h i gher. 
-* 4 , p . 16. 
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Allowance for this is made in Table Y~I. 
1ABLE XXI 
COMPARI SON OF CAPI:J.'AL AND !v1AI N1'r.;NAN CE COS TS 
OF N~V/ ANlJ REBUILf BOX CAR 
Rebuilding of 
17-Year Old Box Car 
Estimated l ife 
Principal 
Interes t at 4% 
Repair s 
Total cost 
Salvage 
Net cost 
Net cost per year 
9 years 
$1, 487*-* 
297 
730 
2,514 
100 
2,414 
268 
(1935)* 
New A. A. R. 
Box Car 
20 year s 
$2,350 
494 
1,185 
4 ,029 
100 
3,929 
196 
The comparison indicates an arL"Ylual savings of ~;72 
per car would be r eali zed by the r ail road choosing to pur-
chase new equipment r a ther than rebuild old equipment. 1'he 
capital cos t of the new equipment is higher and the mainte-
nanc e co st of t he rebuilt equipment is higher under these 
estimate s . .Actual exper ience has shown rebuilt equipment to 
have a us eful l ife much shorter than is generally assumed ; 
t hus i s substantial economy a chieved t hrough the purchase of 
new equipment .*** 
* 
v v v 
_"_"_" 
4, p. 8 
Did not i ncl ude allowance for new A-B Air Br akes , h ich 
became r equired equi pment on all car s in interchange 
af t er January 1, 1945 
4, p . 8 
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Many change s ha ve occurred i n all of the factors 
entering into the for egoing comparison . Prices are differ-
ent, interes t rates are different, the rol ling stock is 
bui l t differently, and so on. Up-to-date statistics on t his 
problem ·Nould have to come from some r a i lroad company which 
maintains accurate, ear-by-car r ecords of its maint enance, 
r epairs, and r ebui ldi ng co s ts; such fi gure s have no t been 
curr ent ly available . It seems unlike l y t hat t he passae;e 
of fift een year s would have r eversed or dr as t i cal_y al tered 
such a clear-cut picture. In 1935, t he annual sa ri ng in 
maintenance and capital costs from b uying a moder n box car 
amounted to 3% of the co s t of the box car. Cast i ng t hi s 
fi gure i n t erms of t he present-day situation produces an 
amazing r esult . As of Janua ry 1, 1950, ther e ~er e 927,839 
frei gh t cars used in interchange service, owned or l ea sed 
by Clas s I railroads , which were more than t wenty year s old .-* 
If each of these car s wer e to be replaced wi t h a new, modern 
box car, at an average cost of $5,000, an investment of over 
$;4.6 billion would be required. 3% of t his amount is approx-
ima t ely $140 million , which compar es with net r a i lvmy oper a -
ting income f or t he year 1949 for all Class I railway s of 
$686 million. 
There is little advant age in going into mathemati-
cal detail, in search of fi gures sufficiently sound to prove 
-* Supra, p . 32. 
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t he potential savings avai l able to American r ailroads t hrough 
equipment moderni zation. In the fir s t place , when mat hemati-
ca l f ormulae ar e applied to practical problems i n t he field 
of e conomic s , valid r esults are not alway s obta ined . I n the 
second place, at t h e present moment American r a ilroads a re 
purchasing new equipment as f a st a s it can be manufactured . 
Understandably, there is much d i sagr e ement among 
railroad men over t his very question. Examples ca n be found 
of railroads which have judiciously purchas ed batches of 
us ed equipment at particularly advantag eous pric e s and re-
built them to perform useful service. Specifically, t h e 
Boston and Maine has minimi zed its inves tment in commutation 
equipment by purchasing old passenger cars from other roads 
and r enova t ing them at moderate cost . Doubtl ess, simi l ar 
examples could be found of r ailroads which have achieved 
satisfactory results from a rebuilding ' . p0-L1Cy . 'J.'hey are i n 
t he gr ea t mi nority . 
5 . Other Savings in New ~q uipment 
On the other side of t he picture, t ner e are com-
pens a tory advantag es of owning new cars in addition to t he 
savings in capital and maint enance costs . 'l'he railroads pay 
out millions of dollars every year i n claims for damages to 
goods in transit. Any rebuilt car would still contain many 
featur e s of construction and appurtenances which would be 
inadequate to the protection of the rollin~ stock, goods in 
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transit, and roadbed, when compared to what is offered by 
an entirely modern piece of equipment. A new car is more 
attractive to the shipper, is easier on the lading , can 
carry greater loads at greater speeds, and has a lower r a tio 
of dead weight to load capacity. Furthermore, nothing has 
been i ncluded in any of the for egoiP~ comparisons to repre-
sent the annual loss to the railroads resulting f r om the 
additional day s out of service which would accompany the 
mor e extensive repairs nece s sary on rebuilt equipment. 
It is submitted that: 
As a general rule, it is more eco-
nomical to purchase new equipment than to 
rebuild old equipment; 
Substantial saving s can be achieved 
by the railroads, if they will but move 
as rapidly a s possible towards a permanent 
policy of retiring rolling stock which is 
more than fifteen years of age. 
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C. Developments in Railway Equipment Design 
1. Locomotives 
Regardless of t h e condition and usa bility of the 
railr oads' old equipment, there is an increa s ing obsolescence 
factor which cannot be overlooked. Much has been r eported 
about the change i n t h e efficiency and profitability of r a i l -
road operations brought on by the increased use of Diesel-
electric tractive power. Modern Diesel locomotives pull 
grea t er lo ads, at f a ster speeds, over longer distances, with 
improved saf ety records, at le s s cost. At the beginning of 
1950, over 40% of tractive units were over thirty year s old.-~~ 
There is little doubt that thes e over-age r eciprocating 
steam locomotive s, of both the coal-burning and oil-burning 
type, are obsole t e. Their continued use represents a con-
siderabl e amount of economic ~dste. There is no quest i on but 
t hat t h e r ailr oad industry recognizes this fact, as shown by 
the proportionately larg e assignment, on a ton-mile basis, 
allotted to the Diesels. 
The gas-turbine locomotive is a nevv development 
which may furnish the Diesel locomotive with stiff comp eti-
tion . I n t h is equipment, pulverized coal or vaporized oil 
is ignited to form gases which drive a rota r y turbine . The 
increase in efficiency over the old reciproca ting steam 
engine i s enormous . This development is no longer in the 
* Supra , p. 34. 
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experimental phase. A few gas turbine locomotive s c:re h a ul -
ing freight today, and ultima te acceptance by the industry 
depends on their continued development, backed up by a 
record of op er a tions over a period of time. 
It is interesting to note t hat Diesel locomotives 
a re being ma ss-produced today. fhis means l ar ger production , 
better stanGardization, and lower prices to purchasers. 
fhese advantage s are reflected in lower capital costs, op era-
ting cost s , and maintenance costs per horse power of tractive 
effort. 
2. Fr e i gh t Cars 
Continual improvement is being made in t h e component 
parts of frei ght cars. In the aggregate, these i mprovements 
are of sufficient magnitude to indicate a high degree of 
obsolescence in frei ght cars built during the 'thirties. 
One of the advances is the development of the roller 
bearing for use v.rhere frei gh t car whe els come in contact with 
axles. Roller bearings practically eliminate 11hot boxe s" and 
the exp en ses and delays tha t go with them. By minimizing 
frictio1, th ~; cut repair bi l ls by reducing the ~ear on dr aft 
gear and other parts. Frei ght loads can go faster with less 
danger of damage to l ading due to stopping and starting jolts. 
Even such a standard item as chilled steel car wheels 
h~ve undergone notable improvement in recent years. Ri ms ha ve 
been thickened for longer life , and fl ange str ength has been 
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improved through the incr ease in numbers of supporting 
brackets. Rim strength is i mproved 100%, according to im-
uact tests made by the Association of Manufacturers of 
Chilled Car Wheels. 
The manufacturers of air brakes have developed pneu-
matic slack adjusters. These automatic devic e s help smooth 
out starting and stopping , with no need of manual adjustment 
for the life of the brake shoe. 
Progress has been made in developing lining s for 
hopper cars, through us e of both aluminum and steel alloys. 
Thes e go a long way in preventing the corros ion which occurs 
in coal-carrying cars from the action of the sulphurous acid 
which drains out of wet coal. 
The damage during shipment to high-value l.c.l. 
frei ght has cost t he r a ilroads mil l ions of dollars a ye ar. 
The General American Transportation - Evans Damage-fre e 
fr ei ght car is de s i gned to meet this problem. The D/F car 
has t he ex ternal appearance of an ordinary fr ei gh t car, but 
its i n terior is equipped with nailable steel flooring and 
slotted wall panels, which will all ow the r apid compartmenta-
lization of the cars tha t handle small er shipments . '..Lhe car 
i s designe d especiall y for quick loading and unloading, eli-
mination of ordinary dunnage for securing loads, and the re-
duction of loss and damage in transit. 
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Still in the experimental st~ge is the ITnicel car. 
Developed by the Pr es sed Steel Car Company, which also pio-
neered in the development of steel freight cars , this revo-
lutionary box car is constructed of plywood. Its makers 
claim that unnrconstruction methods and the inherent tensile 
str ength of bonded plywood combine to produce a car which 
stands up better t han conventional box cars Qnder the stress, 
strain, and rough handling. 
3. Obsolesc enc e 
Development in railway equipment design has pro-
ceeded so rapidly t hat much of the railway e y_ui.pment produced 
in the 'thirti es is obsolete. To meet the comp et i tion from 
alternative forms of transporta tion, the railroads must haul 
b i gg er loads over longer distances at higher s peeds . They 
obviously cannot do that with old-fashi oned equipment. they 
must moderniz e to meet the competition . 
Go i ng by th e r ecord, improvements in design h a ve 
had t h e effect of making equipment obsolete over a period of 
fifteen to t wenty years. It is likely tha t improvements in 
desi gn in the future will make today's railroad equipment out 
of date in another fifteen years. To hold a contrary opj_nion 
would be to imply that today's railway equipment is perfect. 
Emphasis has previously been placed upon t he r ela-
tively higher maintenance cost of over-ag e equipment.* Tha t 
evidence pointed to the economic waste involved in operating 
* Supra, pp. 149-156. 
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old equipment. To this heavier maintenance cost must be 
added the economic consequences of obsolescence, if a r ail-
road follows a policy of rebuilding old equipment at t he end 
of fifteen to t wenty years. 
f oday 's fr ei ght car may well be obsolete in another 
fifteen years. This though t was uppermost in the minds of 
the financi al offic ers of one r a ilroad which has a cquired 
the use of some box cars under the .t!;quitable Plan. The ad-
vantag e s and disadvantages of this t ype of financing were 
carefully weighed . fhe deciding factor was their f a ith in 
t h e futur e progr ess in equipment des i gn. On t he basis of 
t his assmaption, financing under the ~quitable Plan holds 
forth its maxi mum advantages.* 
* Supra, pp. 140 and 145. 
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D. Taxes and Depreciation 
1. Importance of Changes 
In discussing the ~quitable Plan, every effort has 
been made to recr eate conditions as they were in the period 
leading up to the winter of 1949 - 1950, when the ~quitable 
Plan was originated and put into effect. 
Under conditions prevailing then, the corpora te 
tax rat e was 38% and the allowa ble deprecia tion r a te r a nged 
from 3% to 41&. Since tha t time the corporate normal and 
surtax rate has been lifted twice, and an exce s s profit tax 
has been levied, so t ha t now the compound t ax rate can go 
as high as 62%. 
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Changes in t ax rate s in an upward direction increa s e 
the tax savings on rentals paid under the .8q_uitable Plan in 
comparison with the interest and d epreciation charges under 
the Philadelphia Plan. However, just as dur'ing World War II, 
plant and equipment pur chased in the defense effort under 
Defense Order priority are allowed a much shorter write-off 
period . Railroad equipment comes under the categqry of 
equipment essential to t he defens e effort • .. 
Governmental rulings have been issued to t h e effect 
t hat purchases of equipment under Defense Orders may be amor-
tized over a f i ve-year period . Not necessarily all of a 
particular railroad equipment purchase may be allowed to 
qualify for five-ye ar amortizat ion. If a subs t antial portion 
of the cost of an equipment lot may be written off in five 
years, greater tax savings will accrue to railroads pur-
chasing and holding title to s uch equi pment, provi ded taxe s 
are again reduced after the five-year period . 
Uncertainties and indecision as to the desirability 
of financing under the £quitable Plan have l essened the rail-
roads' interest i n this type of financing during the spring 
of 19 51. This in no way alters the purpose of this study 
or the conclusions drawn from it. There is every hope and 
expectation that the defense emergency will pass, though the 
solution of today's international problems may require 
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y ears of effort. Granting a return to normal peace-time 
cond itions , a renewal of t he r ailroads ' interest in the 
~quit able Plan of financing equipment purchases s eems a ssured . 
V. Advantages and Disadvantages 
A. Railroads 
1. Advantages 
The railroad obtains the use of new, modern, and 
efficient equipment wi thout any initial cash 11 dovm payment", 
a requiremen t i n the ordinary Phil adelphia Plan financing . 
t his is the i mmedia t e and compelling advantage to the many 
roads with a tight working c apital position. 
It is true tha t in financings involvi ng no "down 
payment " under the Phi l adelphia Plan, such as t hat dis-
cus sed in Chapter IV and detailed in 1'able XIV,-* the s ame 
advant ag e is obt ained. It has already been demonstra t ed, 
h owever, t hat financing under the Equitable Plan cost s the 
railroad somewhat less than under the Philadel phia Plan.** 
Therefore, in the matt er of conserving t he railroads' work-
ing capital, th e Equitable Plan has the distinct advant age, 
particularly if a fift een-year obsolescence factor is a s-
sumed . 
The advantag es of the ~quitable Plan i n lower ini-
tial costs and lower financing costs enable the undert aking 
of l arge-scal e mod ernization programs. By bringing tractive 
unit s and rolling s tock up to da te, tremendous s a vings would 
accr ue t hrough the greater capacity, efficiency , and safety 
offered by modern equipment. 
* Supra , p. ~36. 
** Supra, pp. 133-148. 
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It is a matter of no small consequence that lease 
agreements of the ~quitable Plan ~;pe do not require the 
prior approval of the r.c.c. fhis feature permits the rail-
roads more freedom and flexibility than they have previously 
enjoyed in handling their financing problems. It also cuts 
out the heavy legal~ printing ~ and financing expenses in-
curred i n the issuance of equipment trust certificates at 
competitive auction.* 
Much controversy was aroused last year by a propo-
sal by Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, then head of the Office 
of Defens e f~ansportation and now I.C.C. Chairman. Colonel 
Johnson proposed that the government build and maintain a 
pool of 100,000 frei ght cars, ostensibly for use by the rail-
roads in handling shipment of defens-e order s . Critics of 
this suggestion pointed out that creeping Socialism already 
afflicts our nation, and that t his step would be a most ef-
fective entering wedge for Socialism in both the railroad 
and the carbui l ding industry.~* fhough this criticism may 
impugn Colonel Johnson's motives in unwarranted f ashion, one 
would nevertheless have more confidence in the advocat e s of 
the Planned Economy if the Planners would only plan with 
more competence. 1'he Equitable Plan represents a method for 
solving the railroads' car problems with no deviation from 
t he free enterprise system. 
* 18, p. 12. 
-:..'-* 18, p. 12. 
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2. Disadvantages 
l!;arnings on equipment subsequent to twenty-five 
years de not accrue to the railroad, nor does t he scrap 
value of the equipment. This is perfectly fair, inasmuch 
as the railroad never holds title to the equipment. How-
ever, in Table XVII* and 1-'able XIX,*-* allowance was made 
for salvage value of the equipment. As for earnings on 
equipment beyond twenty-five years, their existence is 
controversial and their present value is slight. 
A more compelling consideration is the point that 
lease rentals reduce the balance of income available for 
fixed charges. In some states, institutional investors are 
not permitted to purchase railroad bonds unl ess fixed charges 
are covered by a certain margin of earnings. If opera ting 
income wer e to decline, and were then further reduced by 
fixed lease rentals, earnings of some railroads might be 
reduced to a point wh ere their bonds might no longer qualify 
as legal i nvestments. 1'hi's would reduce the potential demand 
for their securities and necessitate higher coupon rates on 
any additional bonds they might sell. Of cours e , in periods 
of s l ack business and low opera ting earnings, there would not 
be any particular call for a railroad to sell new bonds, un-
less an issue needed r efunding. Furthermore, there is a 
strong likelihood that a railr oad woui'o_ more than offset 
* Supra, p. 142. 
** Supra, p. 146. 
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the relative disadvantage through lower maintenance costs 
and more efficient operations brought about by the newer 
equipment. 
Also claimed as a disadvantage is the likelihood 
that much of the new equipment would soon be rolling on 
the rails of other railroads , as the r e sult of traffic 
interchange. l'his is true, however, of any new rolling 
stock, regardless of how its purchase is financed. If all 
the railroads of the country were able to modernize their 
roll ing s tock with the assistance of the Equitable Plan, 
the inequities would e ven out for the separate roads. It 
should also be remembered that the lease rentals for a box 
car are a good deal lower than the per diem charge paid by 
other rai l r oads to the lessee while the car is on foreign 
mileage. Thus the lessee gets the full benefit of the 
Equitable Plan-financed equipment when it can use it on its 
o~~ tracks, and still makes money on it when some other rail-
road is using it. Any upward change in the !jpl.75 per diem 
charge will enhance this favorable position. 
During the last war, most railroads paid exc ess 
profits taxes according to the invested capi t a l method. A 
road renting equipment under the ~quitable Plan r aises no 
new capital, hence does not incr ease its excess profits 
ex emption in any way . 'I'his is a perfectly sound theoretical 
argument. In practice, few railroads have increased their 
earnings to t he point where they have to worry about excess 
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profits taxes. Their first problem is to show a little i m-
provement over t h e s t arva tion rate of return on t he i r pre-
s ent capitalizations, as shown in fable II.* 
i'he final objection voiced by critics of the 
Equitable Plan is the length of the initial contract period. 
The point has been made that advances in the art of equip-
ment design could conceivably make a frei ght car obsolete 
before the end of fifteen years. In this event, the r ail-
road would still be forced to pay rent until the end of the 
initia l leas e period. This is scarcely a valid ob jection 
to the ~quitable Plan of financing equipment purchases; it 
is an objection in principle to the purchase of any equip-
ment at all. If the railroads finance purchases by conven-
tional method s , their exposure t o the obsolescenc e f actor is 
more serious, not less serious. In vi ew of the obvious de-
ficiencies in their pr esent equipment, very few railroads 
can afford t o gamble that a revolution in the art of desi gn 
will tak e place in sufficiently short a period to make the 
ex ecution of a f ifteen-year lease on modern equipment un-
desirable. 
* Supra, p. 19 • 
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B. Manufacturers 
1. A:dvantages 
The basic advantage of the Bquitable Plan to the 
manufacturer lies in the additional sale s tha t will be gen-
era ted because of the Plan. The railroad equipment industry 
h a s always been a "feast or famine" industry, with the glut 
of prosperity. more than offset by the pangs of profit-star-
vation. Th e manufacturer is the first to reap the benefits 
of the Plan. 
It is entirely within the potential benefits of 
the Equitable Plan that the manufacturers will find steadier 
business, as well a s more profitable business. ~ e have yet 
to see the Equitable Pl an in action during a business re-
c ession, in competitive markets. In times past, business 
depressions have meant a comple te collapse of equipment 
order s , a s railroads sought to reserve present supplie s of 
cash against future uncertaintie s . Better equipment means 
better earnings for the railroads, so the Equitable Plan 
will help the railroads to have more "cash in the till" at 
all times. This is indir ectly beneficial to the manufactur-
ers. If the availability of a financing method involving no 
cash outlay brings a change in the cautious attitude of rail-
road managements toward modernizing during periods of low 
business activity, the manufacturers will receive addi tional 
aid. Better orders in hard times mean more efficient use 
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of plant capacity and steadier emplo~nent for labor. 
2. Disadvantages 
The only disadvantage of consequence is t ha t t he 
manufacturer receives only 80% of the purchase price ini-
tially. In today' s market, the manufacturer need s to mak e 
little effort to get an order, and equipment trust certifi-
cates are readily saleable. Nevertheless, the roads with 
biggest equipment needs are tho se which are shortes t of ready 
cash. Furthermore, most car manufactur ers can remember the 
depr essed 'thirti es, when more than one lot of equipment was 
f inanced by a conditional sa l es agreement, under which the 
manufactur er either took the principal risk, _or else shopped 
around for money on behalf of the railroad in question. 
Those days may come again. Pullman, Incorpora t ed, one of 
the parties to t he originati on of the Ji;quitable P1an, ha pp ened 
to have a larger working capital position than many manufac-
turers, by virtue of the sale of its sleeping car subsidiary. 
It has been no strain for Pullman to carry a receivable ini-
tia l l y ruaounting to 20% of the delivered price of an equipment 
lot. Most of t he other manufacturers have been willing to 
help the Plan along by participating in this type of finan-
cing . Wihere they have needed tc make banki ng arrangements 
to permit them to carry the recE;! i vable, they have done so. 
·ro refuse would be to kill the goose tha t lays the golden 
eggs. 
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C. fhe Insurance Qom~~nY 
1. Security 
As far as t he insurance company is concerned, its 
investment is well secured. While lease a greements cannot 
be ordinarily cons idered to represent as good security a s 
mortgage or general credit obligations, the case of the rail-
rocd equipment lease is an exception. fhe special nature of 
the l ease of new railro 2,d equipment rests in the usefu~ness 
of the equipment to another railroad if lease payments are 
not k ept up. .t!;v en in bankruptcy, a public carrier must 
op erate, and it must have equipment with which to operate. 
Failure to kee p up l ease payments will result in t he reclaim-
ing of the equipment by the l e ssor for sale or lease to a 
solvent railroad. f his factor has resulted in an outst anding 
history of security for equipment trust certificat es. The 
same factor should persis t with the leas e arr an gement under 
t he Equitable Plan. 
Additional safety is provided in the 20% portion 
of the original risk borne by the manufactur er. _t should 
be remembered that if default occurs during the f:Lr s t five 
y ears, the insur ance company may offer t o r esell the equip-
ment to the manufacturer at a price equal to the book value 
of the insurance company's investment. If the manufacturer 
declines, the insurance company is relieved of making further 
payments under the manufacturing agreement. 
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Table XXII comlJares how the equity builds up as a 
result of rental payments in the case of ~~uitable Plan, 
Philadelphia Plan with no original equity, and Philadelphia 
Pl an wi th 20% original equity. 
TABLE XXII 
PERC~NTAGE OF ;~QUITY IN COST OF J£Q.UIPIVIBNT* 
Assuining Philadelphia Philadelphia 
Def ault Equitable Plan (15 Years, Plan (15 Years, 
at b;nd of Plan No Eq uity) 2~ Eq uity) 
lst year 24.0% 6.6% 25.3% 
2nd Year 28.2% 13.3% 30 • 6fo 
)rd Year 32. 6~b 20.0% 36. 01() 
4th Year 36. sro 26 • 61o 41.3% 
5th Year 41.3% 33.3~/o 46 .6% 
6th Year 50. o~; 40.0% 52.0.% 
7th Year 57.2% 46.6% 57.3% 
8th Year 64. 7~~ 53.3% 62.6% 
9th Year 72.4% 60. 07~ 68.0% 
lOth Year 78.2% 66.6% 73. 31b 
11th Year 84.1% 73. 3Jb 78.6% 
12th Year 90.3% 80.0% 84.0% 
13th Year 93.5% 86.6% 89. J:f. 
14th Year 96. 81o 93.3% 94.6% 
This shows that there is greater safety for the 
i n surance company in the ~quitable Plan at all times in com-
parison with the Philadel phia Plan with no original equity . 
There is slightl y greater protection in the Philadelphia Plan 
with 20~~ original equity through t he s event h year. 'i'here-
after, the Equitable Pl an prO\rides grea t er safety. Remember, 
-~ Supra , pp. 97 and 130. 
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too, tha t it is in the later years of the fifteen-year period 
where the exposure is greatest to both the obsolescence 
factor and to a possible long-term decline in reproduction 
costs. 
2. Additional Protection 
Through the Certificate of Inspection, t he insur ance 
company is assured that the equipmen t it is purchasing is 
built to mee t t he standards acceptable to the Association of 
American Railroads and is comple t ed in accordance with all 
specifications cont ained in Manufacturing and Lease Agree-
ments. -)~ :l.'his works t o the benefit of all parties to the 
nquitable Plan. 
The unpaid balance due to the manu£actur er is due 
over a fi ~1e-year period. However, if the insurance company 
finds its own cash piling up without suitable investment out-
let, it may prepay all or part of the unpaid installments.** 
The manufacturer is not unfairly trea ted, in tha t such pre-
payments a ppl y to the latest maturing installment of the un-
paid purchase price. 
If any car is lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond re-
pair, the insurance company receives, in effect, t h e balance 
of rentals due fr om the railroad. Any unpaid installments 
due the manufacturer for the car are remitt ed. at once.-*-*-::-
* Supra, p. 107. 
** Supr a , p. 110. 
*** Supra, p. 110. 
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Thus the railroad stands the complete loss, as indeed the 
railroad should. 
Events of de f ault are clearly outlined and are de-
signed to assure the insurance company prompt recovery of the 
equipment. The insurance company may also enter claim a s a 
gen er a l creditor for the bal ance of rentals due.* It is en-
tirel y pos sible that the ins ur ance company might reclaim it s 
equipment s ub s equent to a default, rent it to another r a il-
road a t a gooa r a te, and in addition make recovery from the 
original l essee. If recovery is made from t he original 
lessee, the manufactur er must be reimburs ed for unpaid in-
stallments due him on the purchas e price.** 
The l essee is required to keep t he equipment in 
good oper a ting condition and to add at his ovm expense any 
174 
additional equipment required under the Hules of Interchange. -:~-x--* 
3. Selection 
The insurance company is primar i ly interes ted in 
t he protection provided for its investment by the r egular 
r entals received f rom the lessee. Hence, it is not interest-
ed i n entering purchase-lease agreements with any r a ilroad 
without careful consideration of the credit and earning power 
of that railr oad. Exhaustive study of pre s ent condition and 
probable future condition of the prospective lessee is con-
ducted , prior to the ex ecution of any a greement. As Equit able 
* Supra, p. 125. 
** Supra , p. 111. 
*** Supra , p . 123. 
officials have indicated, they are satisfied to execute 
agreements with any road whose basic earning power is suffi-
ci ent to make the mortgage bonds of t hat railroad attractive 
to the ~quitable as secure investments. This elimina t e s the 
marginal r a ilroads from consider a t i on as prospecti ve lessees. 
The .B;q_uitable does its own investigating and appra isal of 
rai lroad credi t and does not depend merel y on the r a tings 
assigned to the various rai lroads by the well-kn o m invest-
ment services. 
4. Re turn 
The int erest return on the investment of t he insur-
anc e company is subject to negotiation with the l essee. 
Road s with higher credit standing are entitled to rec eive 
the lower rentals , rental s embodying a. lower i nteres t r e turn 
on the insurance company 's investment. 1'he insurance company 
regards 3~~ as a minimwn r a te of return. 1'his compar es very 
fa vorably with t he rates obtainable on Philadelphia Plan 
equipment trust certificates with 20/~ original equity. 
As for Philadelphia Plan certificates with no ori-
ginal equity, the interest rat e on these might have been any-
where from 2 3/4% to 3% at the time when the .l:!iquitable Plan 
was first put into operation. The return to the insurance 
company would have been only slightly higher under the 
~quitable Plan. The insurance company is better protected 
under the Equitable Plan, however. In addition, it receives 
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the benefit of lease rentals from the fifteenth to the 
t wenty-fifth year, if this option i s chosen by the railroad. 
It also receives the salvage value of the equipment. As-
suming a salvage rate of 4.7%, this has the effect of in-
crea sing th e rate of r eturn by about .3% per annum over a 
fifteen-y ear period -- a significant improvement. 
The return t o the insurance compaps is net of all 
expenses arising from the purchase-lea se a greements , except 
for the cost of Home Office investigation, supervisions, 
and bookkeeping . These exp ens es are unavoidable with any 
investment. 
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D. I.C.C. Reaction 
1. Henort to Congress 
The annual report of the I. C.C. for t he t welve 
months ended October 31, 1950, went to Congress on J anuar y 
19, 1951. It cont ained the s tatement t hat t he Bqui table 
Plan presents " ••• questions a s to its merits for financi ng 
a carrier's equipment requir ements," and poses " some serious 
acc ounting problems which are now under cons i der ation."* 
2. Recommended Legisla tion 
1'he I.C.C. report went on t o - recommend t ha t t he 
legislation und er which it exercises i t s authority be amend-
ed to permit the r.c.c. to "determine the compens a t i on to be 
pa i d and other terms of any contract agreement, or arrange-
ment f or t he use of any locomot i ve, car, or other vehicle 
not owned by the c arrier using it (and whether or not o~ned 
by another carr i er)."** f he Commission also sought power to 
use t h e per diem r a t e as a devic e t o give t he Commi s sion 
authority over t h e utilization of equipment. 
3. Ext ension of Authority 
Under pr esent law, the I.C.C. does not have a uthor-
ity over rental r a tes. In 1947 a Commission order i ncreas ing 
t he per di em rate was set aside by the court s , under ruling 
which held thi s acti on to exceed the Commission's sta tutory 
powers.~~-** f he I.C.C. is appar entl y no different fro:n any 
-X- 12, p. 16. 
** 12, p. 16. 
-~"*-}~ 12, p. 16. 
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other Federal agency in its efforts to seek extension of its 
authority. It is up to Congress to decide whether such ex -
tension is desirable. If the I.C.C. is really sincere in 
r a ising "questions as to the merits •.• n of the ..t!,;quitable 
Plan, it would do well to answer such questions to its own 
satisfaction before undertaking to interfere with a con-
structive idea designed to help the railroads out of a physi-
c al and financial problem. 
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1. Qrd9r$ 
V+ . The Equitabl e Pla n In Operation 
A. O:g.e Y~ar t~ f' rogress 
Purchase- l ec1 s e a gree. e:nts under t he EQuitable Plan 
accounted for a subs t hntial 8..1"'lount of bu s ines s f or t he car 
builders in 1950 .. In it::' f ir s t year in this f i eld of i nv st-
ment , the Equitable p l a ced orders for 19 1.8 50 f r ei 0 ht cars of 
assorted c l asses, and 195 Diesel-electric locomotive s . Th e 
de tail of th~ e orders is to· be fo tmd tn Table X~ 'III an d 
Table XXI V. 
2. Deliverie~ 
Dur L'1c. 1950, ~e1i.veries of railroad tran s port& t~_on 
· equipment to t he Equitable i n satisfactton of purcha.se- l er s e 
agreerrn~nt s amounted to 51865 f r ei ght car s of 'Ta.rious c &sses 
and 111 Di ,~ sel .... elec tric locomotives . 
3 . Investment 
As of Dec e::rf -cr 31, 19501 t he Eq,.J;t t able' s invest •. ent 
in transporta tion equi pmen t 1as as f ollows.: fr ei ht car s , 
$24~056 1 473 ~ locomotiv~s, ~141 440,6~12; t o t al , · $38 , 49 7 1 1 45 . 
Onp.ai d bal an.c es due· to manufact.l,lr..:.:.; rs on · account of purchase 
contr8.cts amounted to $:'!, 623, 143 in t he a ggr egate . 
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TABLE XXIII 
FREIGHT CARS ORDERED IN 1950 BY THE 
EqUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY* 
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Lessee 
Number 
of 
Units Class 
Date 
Capacity of 
{Pounds) Order Builder 
Atlantic 
Coastline 
Baltimore 
& Ohio 
Bangor & 
Aroostook 
Boston & 
Maine 
Delaware & 
Hudson 
Green Bay 
700 
500 
600 
Pulpwood 
Pulpwood 
Cement 
1,000 Gondola 
300 
750 
500 
500 
200 
Box 
Box 
Box 
Box 
Gondola 
100,000 
100,000 
140,000 
March 
Sept. 
March 
140,000 Sept. 
80,000 May 
100,000 Oct. 
100,000 May 
100,000 Nov. 
140,000 Nov. 
p 
p 
p 
b 
m 
p 
p 
p 
p 
& Western 200 Box 100,000 May p 
Missouri-
Kansas-Texas 100 Cov. Hopper 140,000 May p 
New York 
Central 
Pennsyl-
vania 
~ 1,500 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2,000 
1,000 
500 
2,000 
1,500 
3,000 
Box 
Box 
Box 
Hopper 
Gondola 
Box 
Box 
Box 
Box 
Gondola 
110,000 
110,000 
110,000 
110,000 
140,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
140,000 
Feb. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
N.A. 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
p-Pullman Standard 
s-Pressed Steel Car 
p 
p 
P . 
p 
b 
X 
g 
s 
a 
p 
a-American Car & Foundry 
b-Bethlehem Steel 
g-Greenville Steel Car 
m-Magor Car 
x-General American Transportation 
* 17, pp. 209-212. 
TABLE XXIV 
DIESEL-H;LECTRIC LOCOlVIOTI Vl::S ORDERED IN 1950 
BY THE h;QUI'l'ABLE LIF'B; ASSURAN CE SOCIETY-~ 
Number 
of 
Lessee Units Passenger 
Baltimore 
& Ohio 
1 
4 Passenger 
86 Freight 
28 . Freight 
14 Freight 
( 24 Switching 
~ 24 Switching 10 Switching 
Portland ( 4 Switching 
Terminal ( 1 Switching 
a-P.meri can-General .Ji;lectric 
b-Baldwin-Westinghouse 
e-Electro-Motiv e (General Motors) 
f-Fairbank s , Mors e-Westinghouse 
1-Lima, Hamilton 
* 15, pp . 218-222. 
Horse-
power Order 
2,250 May-Aug. 
1,500 Aug . 
1,600 Sept. 
1,600 July 
1,000 July 
1,200 Sept. 
1,200 Sept. 
1,000 Aug. 
1,500 Aug . 
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Builder 
e 
e 
a 
b 
b 
1 
f 
a 
e 
VII. Conclusion 
A. l!:valuation 
1. Present Situation 
The railroads are not presently in a position to 
know how much of their current equipment needs will qualify 
for rapid depreciation under Defense Order priorities, nor 
is t here any clear indica tion of the form and extent of tax 
law revisions . Thus it is manifestly impossible for the 
r ailroads to decide upon the most favorable method of finan-
cing equipment purchases. ~his situation has resul ted i n a 
practical cessa t i on of new purchase s of transporta tion equip-
ment by the Equitable during 1951. Officials of the insur-
ance company are of the opinion that when some of the 
present questions are cleared up railroads will again be 
intere s t ed in financing equipment purchases under the 
Equitable Pl'an. 
2. Long-run Importance 
It is difficult to assess the long-run significance 
of a development when it can show a record of less than a 
year's operation. Nevertheless, it is i mpossible to overlook 
the fact that during 1950 the Equi table placed orders for 
19,850 frei ght cars, out of a total of 14 7,066 freight cars 
ordered for domestic use.* The Equitable also placed orders 
for 195 locomotive units, out of total orders for 4,234 
-* 17' p. 207. 
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locomotive units.* The .i:!:quitable Plan may be in its infancy, 
but it is a hus~J infant. Its 1950 freight car orders were 
over three times as great as 1949 orders for the entire rail-
road industry. 
Over the long term, there is little possibility 
tha t the Equitable Plan will prove to have been a "flash in 
the pan", a brief solution to an unusual combination of 
transitory problems. It has too many sound economic advan-
tages to be quickly forgotten. 
* 15, p. 216. 
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B. Summary 
1. Economic Pressure 
Conditioned by three decades of inadequate earnings 
and financial difficulties, most American railroads ent ered 
1950 with a large percentage of over-used, over-ag e , out-of-
date equipment. Despite the obvious and i rmnediate need for 
large quantities of modern, efficient equipment, the modern-
izat ion of many railroads was being held up by shortages of 
working capital and by depression-conscious management. .F'or 
a way out of the impasse, economic pressure was very great. 
The manufacturers of railway equipment were well 
aware of the deterrents to r ailr oad modernization. They were 
the victims of the railroads' hand-to-mouth equipment renewal 
1 • • po ..... J.cJ.es . They were only too familiar with the disaster com-
plex peculiar to railroad executives -- a state of mind 
which brought almost complete cessation of equipment orders 
during every business recession. With heavy overhead costs, 
the manufacturers knew from long experience the close corre-
lation between cancelled orders and red ink. For some method 
of leveling out the fluctuations in their business, employ-
ment, and profits, the economic pressure was very great. 
1'he life insurance industry reached the mid-point 
of the century with a record of spectacular growth, a growth 
accelerated by the trend towards institutionalized savings. 
In the face of i ncreasing demand from institutional sourc es, 
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t h ere had been a relative decline in the supply of high-
grade, long-term investments. 1'here was economic pressure 
on the life insurance industry to develop new investment 
outlet s . 
Throughout the nation's history, our country has 
benefited greatly from t he efforts of individuals who de-
voted their energies to the discovery of practical solutions 
to seemingly insurmountable problems. In the present day, 
partly as a by-product of the economic pressure genera ted 
by one such situation, one more workable solution has been 
reached : the ~quitable Plan. 
2. A r 'air and Workable Solution 
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Railroad equipment orders financed under the Equit-
able Plan accounted for a significant portion of all r ailway 
equi pment orders placed during 1950. 1'his record of achieve-
ment is based on sound economic considerations. f he Equitable 
Plan is particularly noteworthy for t he manner in which it 
trea ts f airly al l par ties to the agreements. 
The ~quitable Plan makes it possible for railroads 
to correct their equipment deficiencies without exerting a 
drain on their working funds. Rentals under the Plan are 
lower than the per diem rentals established under t he Rules 
of Interchange . 1'he net cost of financing is lower than 
under traditional financing methods, by a good margin. 
The Equitable Plan requires the manufacturer to 
assume the initial risk of a portion of the contract value 
of an equ ipment order. 1'his portion is r e paid to h im over 
a five-ye ar per iod , with interest, out of rentals received 
by the purchaser from the l easing railroad. 'l'his risk i s 
more than off set by the l ar ger volume of busine s s and higher 
earnings potential which t h e Equitable Plan produces. 
fhe insuranc e company benefits from a l a r ge- s c a l e 
out l et for t he investment of fund s . 'l'he ownershi of trans-
porta tion equipment is rela tively a ttractive by virtue of 
the special nature of the lease obligation. Inve s tments 
back ed by l ease of r a i lway equipment have established an 
exc ellent safe t y record . Rate of return is attractive , r ela-
t i ve to yields on alter na tive inves tment s of compar able 
quali ty and t er m. 
3 . Pot ential 
De·s pite he avy equipment acquisitions i n 1950, the 
r ailroad i n dustry has barely scra tched the surfac e in f ul-
fi l l ing it s equipment needs. Substantial economies can be 
achieved by the railroads, if they will move as r apidl y a s 
possible towards a permanent policy of retiring ol d equi p-
ment, rather than rebuil ding it. Modern equipment results 
in savings from lower mai n t enance costs, fewer servicing 
delay s, gr eater tra i n s pe ed s , h eavier loads , and lower dama ge 
claims. 
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·roo long has there been the complaint, 11 1'he r ai l-
roads can't afford to modernize." As the pr esent defense 
emergency is so c l ear ly demonstra ting , t hey can 't afford not 
to modernize . Billions of dollars can be spent profitably 
in me eting t he railroads' equipment need s over the next f ew 
years. Gr anting clarific ation of Federal tax laws and depre-
ciation policy, the ~quitable Plan can take a major part in 
strengthen ing the steel sinews of the nation's commerce and 
ind ustr y -- t he American railroads . 
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